Walker v. State

• Decision Date: 09 February 1993
• Docket Number: No. 20S00-9202-CR-83,20S00-9202-CR-83
• Citation: 607 N.E.2d 391
• Parties: Vincent Doyle WALKER, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 391

607 N.E.2d 391

Vincent Doyle WALKER, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 20S00-9202-CR-83.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Feb. 9, 1993.

Rehearing Denied May 11, 1993.

Thomas A. Murto, Murto & Holbrook, Goshen, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Cynthia L. Ploughe, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

GIVAN, Justice.

Appellant was tried by jury and convicted of Theft, a Class D felony, and Murder, a felony. The trial court sentenced appellant to three (3) years for theft and sixty (60) years for murder, to be served consecutively.

The facts are: On March 2, 1990, Elnora Martin, the victim in this case, called her mother to inform her that she was going to drive to a bus stop in Elkhart, Indiana to pick up a man from Florida who was coming to visit her at her apartment in Goshen, Indiana.

Sherry Martin, the victim's sister, testified that she last spoke with the victim on March 3, 1990. The victim told her that she was leaving but would be coming back later that evening. When the victim did not contact her, Martin became concerned. On March 6, 1990, Martin went to the victim's house where she found the victim lying on the floor face down in a pool of blood. The contents of the victim's purse were scattered on the floor and no money was found. An autopsy revealed that the victim had died three days earlier from blood loss due to fifteen stab wounds.

Further testimony showed that the victim had picked up appellant at the bus stop on March 2, 1990. Once they returned to the victim's apartment she engaged in telephone conversations while appellant watched television.

During the day on Saturday, appellant and the victim did errands, which included stopping at the victim's bank to complete a transaction. After returning to the apartment, the victim conversed with someone on the telephone. Appellant told Detective Taylor of the Goshen Police Department that at this time two men entered the victim's house and killed her while appellant watched from the bathroom.

On March 3, 1990, appellant drove the victim's car to his aunt's apartment in Tarentum, Pennsylvania. Timothy Metzler, appellant's cousin, testified that appellant told him that he had stolen the car in Indiana. Appellant told Timothy Metzler and Wendy Metzler, another cousin, that he had stabbed a man in Chicago fourteen times and as a result had splattered blood on his clothes. Wendy Metzler testified that appellant had asked her how to remove blood stains from clothing.

John Paul Metzler, another cousin, and Anna Metzler, appellant's aunt, saw clothing soaking in water in a clear plastic bag. The water in the bag was a reddish color. Appellant was unsuccessful in removing the bloodstains from the clothes, and he disposed of the bag and clothes.

Appellant left the Metzler house and attempted to visit his son in a nearby town, but was unable because the victim's car broke down in Kittaning, Pennsylvania. After he wiped his fingerprints from the car, appellant walked back to the Metzlers' house. On March 9, 1990, the victim's car was found by the police in the Kittaning area.

Wendy Metzler told appellant's story to Anna Metzler. After Anna found appellant's knife in her house, she called the Pennsylvania Crimestoppers. The shape and size of the knife later was found to be consistent with the shape and size of the wounds on the victim.

Timothy Metzler reported to the police the fact that appellant had recanted his story about the stabbing in Chicago and had said that he killed a woman he had met through a dating service.

Appellant contends the trial court erred by refusing to give his proposed instruction on flight and giving the court's instruction to the jury.

The following is the instruction which was given to the jury:

"The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime that has been committed if proved, is not evidence of guilt. It is, however, evidence of consciousness of guilt."

Appellant claims the instruction given placed an undue emphasis on the evidence of flight. He contends the instruction takes from the jury the task of weighing and evaluating the evidence, including any evidence of fear and confusion offered by appellant, by leading the jury to a specific conclusion. He claims that no other instruction offsets the bias of the flight instruction. We disagree.

We have held that it is proper for a jury to consider evidence of flight immediately after the commission of a crime as consciousness of guilt. Seely v. State (1989), Ind., 547 N.E.2d 1089. Therefore, the instruction which was given is a correct statement of the law. Further, we have held that no particular emphasis is given to evidence by the presence of the words "is evidence of consciousness of guilt" in an instruction regarding flight. Cox v. State (1987), Ind., 512 N.E.2d 1099. This holding refutes appellant's assertion that the instruction, without more, tends to create a bias against appellant's evidence of fear and confusion. The evidence supports the trial court's decision to instruct the jury regarding flight. (We note this Court has recommended against future use of the flight instruction. Bellmore v. State (1992), Ind., 602 N.E.2d 111.)

Appellant tendered an instruction on flight which included a statement that flight might give rise to an inference that the person simply was scared and did not know how to respond. We have held that the trial court does not err by refusing to give a tendered instruction when the substance of that instruction is adequately covered by other instructions which are given. Harden v. State (1991), Ind., 576 N.E.2d 590. Review of the final instructions which were given in the present case leads us to the conclusion that the additional wording contained in appellant's proposed instruction was covered by the other instructions.

The trial court properly instructed the jury that they must weigh the evidence, that they must presume that appellant is innocent until proven guilty, and that they must resolve any conflicts in the testimony based upon their determination of who is more truthful or believable. Under the instructions given, the jury could consider the evidence presented by the defense concerning fear or confusion from the circumstances involved resulting in flight and the inference the defense suggested could be drawn therefrom. The trial court did not err.

Appellant claims the trial court committed reversible error by failing to excuse a juror for cause. He contends he was forced to unnecessarily use a peremptory challenge at that point to remove the juror.

During voir dire, Venireman Robert Heckathorn responded to a question propounded by the defense by initially stating that he thought appellant was more than likely guilty. He further explained that when a person is arrested the police are correct about ninety-nine percent of the time. However, Heckathorn went on to say that the police are not always correct, and the chance of error was the reason why cases were presented to juries.

The defense then elicited testimony from Heckathorn which indicated that he understood the State had the burden of proving appellant's guilt, that he understood that the defense did not have to prove anything, that he would listen to the testimony presented, and that he could be a fair and impartial juror. Appellant challenged Heckathorn for cause. The trial court denied the challenge for cause and the defense used one of its peremptory strikes to remove Heckathorn from the panel. Defense counsel renewed his objection when his later attempt to use one peremptory strike to remove both Veniremen Miller and Powers from the panel was denied. The trial court maintained his previously stated position and explained that defense counsel had rehabilitated Heckathorn. Miller was struck from the panel, but Powers was seated on the jury.

Ind.Code Sec. 35-37-1-5(b) provides as follows:

"(b) If a person called as a juror states that the person formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the Defendant, the court or the parties shall proceed to examine the juror on oath as to the grounds of the juror's opinion. If the grounds of the juror's opinion appear to have been founded upon reading newspaper statements, communications, comments, reports, rumors, or hearsay, and if:

(1) The juror's opinion appears not to be founded upon:

(A) Conversation with a witness of the transaction;

(B) Reading reports of a witness' testimony; or

(C) Hearing a witness testify;

(2) The juror states on oath that the juror feels able, notwithstanding the juror's opinion, to render an impartial verdict upon the law and evidence; and

(3) The court is satisfied that the juror will render an impartial verdict.

the court may admit the juror as competent to serve in the case."

We have held the trial court may use its discretion in deciding whether to grant a challenge for cause. Woolston v. State (1983), Ind., 453 N.E.2d 965. Discretion is afforded the trial court in this situation because the trial judge is in the best position to assess the demeanor of prospective jurors as they answer the questions posed by counsel. On review, we will disturb the trial court's decision only if we find that this authority was used in an illogical or arbitrary manner. Holt v. State (1977), 266 Ind. 586, 365 N.E.2d 1209.

Although the responses to defense counsel's initial questions seemed to indicate that Heckathorn believed that appellant was guilty, further questioning by the defense brought forth responses from Heckathorn which indicated that he would be able to remain impartial as he heard the evidence presented. Clearly the trial court was aware of the prospective juror's opinion and potential disqualification because, in denying appellant's challenge for cause, the trial judge indicated that defense counsel had rehabilitated the juror's qualification to hear the case. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to...