Seeling v. Deposit Bank & Trust Co.

Decision Date07 December 1928
Docket NumberNo. 26858.,26858.
Citation176 Minn. 11,222 N.W. 295
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court
PartiesSEELING et ux. v. DEPOSIT BANK & TRUST CO.

Appeal from District Court, Winona County; Karl Finkelnburg, Judge.

Action by Fred W. Seeling, Jr., and wife against the Deposit Bank & Trust Company. From an order permitting defendant to pay money into court and directing substitution of another party as defendant, plaintiffs appeal. Appeal dismissed.

Herbert M. Bierce, of Winona, for appellants.

Lamberton & Lamberton and Clarence Hengel, all of Winona, for respondent.

TAYLOR, C.

The plaintiffs are husband and wife, and had a checking account in their joint names in defendant bank on which each had the right to draw checks. The Gate City Iron Works, a corporation, of which plaintiff Fred W. Seeling, Jr., was secretary and his uncle John M. Seeling was president, also had a checking account in defendant bank. A rule of the Iron Works, known to the bank, required that all checks issued by it should be signed by both its president and its secretary. On Saturday, December 12, 1925, plaintiff Fred W. Seeling, Jr., issued a check of the Iron Works for the sum of $424.19, payable to himself, to which he signed his uncle's name as president and his own name as secretary, and then indorsed the check and deposited it in the bank to the credit of the joint account of himself and his wife. The bank credited it to that account, and charged it to the account of the Iron Works. The Iron Works promptly repudiated the check as void, and claimed the $424.19 which had been charged to its account. Whether Fred W. Seeling, Jr., had authority to sign his uncle's name to the check is in dispute. After the Iron Works claimed the money, and on Monday, December 14, 1925, the bank canceled the credit to the joint account of the plaintiffs. Thereafter the plaintiffs brought suit against the bank for the amount of the check. The bank set forth the facts in full. Among other things it stated that it had canceled the credit to the plaintiffs and had segregated the amount of the check from its other funds and had set that amount aside for the purpose of paying it to whomever was entitled to it, and that it was claimed by both the plaintiffs and the Iron Works. Upon the facts stated, the bank made an application under section 9261, G. S. 1923, to be permitted to pay the money into court and that the Gate City Iron Works be substituted as defendant. This application was opposed by plaintiffs, but finally resulted in an order permitting the bank to pay the money into court and directing that the Gate City Iron Works be substituted as defendant. Plaintiffs appealed from this order.

The defendant bank raises the point that the order is not appealable.

The statute provides:

"A judgment or order in a civil action in a district court may be removed to the supreme court by appeal, as provided in this chapter, and not otherwise." G. S. 1923, § 9490.

This forbids an appeal from any order except those specified in the statute. There is no provision of the statute which authorizes an appeal from the order in question unless it be subdivision 3 of section 9498, G. S. 1923, which permits an appeal, "from an order involving the merits of the action or some part thereof." As orders affecting the merits are ordinarily reviewable upon an appeal from the judgment, or from an order denying a new trial, this provision is strictly construed to avoid unnecessary delays and inconclusive appeals. An order is not appealable under this provision unless, in effect, it finally determines the action, or finally determines some positive legal right of the appellant relating thereto. I Dunnell Minn. Dig. (2d Ed.) § 298, and cases cited. Plaintiffs and the Iron Works both claim the same money now in the hands of the bank. The bank concedes that the entire amount belongs to one or the other, and is ready and willing to pay it to whichever claimant is entitled to it....

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