Seemann v. Coastal Envtl. Grp., Inc.

• Citation: 219 F.Supp.3d 362
• Decision Date: 29 November 2016
• Docket Number: 15–CV–02065 (ADS) (AYS)
• Parties: Johnny SEEMANN, Plaintiff, v. COASTAL ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

219 F.Supp.3d 362

Johnny SEEMANN, Plaintiff,

v.COASTAL ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP, INC., Defendant.

15–CV–02065 (ADS) (AYS)

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed November 29, 2016

Tabak, Mellusi & Shisha, Attorneys for the Plaintiff, 29 Broadway, New York, NY 10006, By: Jacob Shisha, Esq., Of Counsel

Rubin Fiorella & Friedman, LLP, Attorneys for the Defendant, 292 Madison Avenue, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10017, By: Michael E. Stern, Esq., Kristin E. Poling, Esq., Of Counsel

Steven A. Berkowitz & Associates, P.C., Attorneys for GSI Disaster Services, Inc., One Greentree Centre, Suite 201, Marlton, NJ 08053, By: Ira E. Dorfinan, Esq., Of Counsel

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION & ORDER

SPATT, District Judge:

This action arises out of allegations by the Plaintiff Johnny Seemann (the "Plaintiff") that he suffered injuries due to the unseaworthiness of a barge on which he worked, and the alleged negligence of the Defendant Coastal Environmental Group, Inc. (the "Defendant Coastal"), in violation of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (the "Jones Act") and general maritime law. The Plaintiff now seeks to amend his complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ( FED. R. CIV. P. or the "Rule(s)") 15 to add GSI Disaster Services, Inc. ("GSI") as a Defendant. For the following reasons, the Plaintiff's motion to amend is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Procedural History

On April 15, 2015, the Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Defendant Coastal, seeking damages for the injuries he suffered due to the Defendant Coastal's alleged negligence and the alleged unseaworthiness of a barge, the MV Army I (the "Army I"), upon which the Plaintiff worked. The Plaintiff asserted a claim under the Jones Act for negligence; and claims under general maritime law for the alleged "unseaworthiness" of the Army I and for maintenance and cure obligations.

On September 15, 2015, the Defendant Coastal filed an amended third-party complaint against GSI pursuant to Rule 14(c). Thereafter, GSI moved to dismiss the amended third-party complaint and, on July 2, 2016, the Court dismissed the third-party complaint. The Court based its holding on the fact that the Defendant Coastal moved to implead GSI under Rule 14(c) instead of 14(a), but also determined that because the Plaintiff did not designate his claims as admiralty claims under Rule 9(h), impleader under 14(c) was unavailable to the Defendant Coastal. (See Court's Memorandum of Decision and Order, ECF No. 34 at 12).

On July 7, 2016, the Plaintiff moved to amend his complaint pursuant to Rule 15 to add GSI as a defendant, alleging the same causes of action against GSI as he alleged against the Defendant Coastal in the initial complaint. The Plaintiff clarified that he does not intend to file under Rule 9(h), and again requested a trial by jury.

On July 21, 2016, GSI filed a memorandum in opposition to the Plaintiff's motion to amend. The Court notes that when it dismissed the third-party complaint against GSI, that party should have been removed from the docket as a party. However, GSI was not removed from the docket on ECF. Although GSI was technically not a party to the action when it filed its memorandum in opposition, the Court exercises its discretion and accepts GSI's memorandum of law as an interested party. The Defendant Coastal has not filed a memorandum in opposition.

B. The Alleged Facts

The following facts are drawn from the Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint (the "PAC"), and are accepted as true for the purposes of the instant motion.

At all relevant times, the Defendant Coastal and GSI both operated, managed and controlled the Army I, a self-propelled barge. (PAC at ¶¶ 5, 7–9, 11–13). GSI owned the Army I, and the Defendant Coastal owned it "pro hac vice. " (Id. at ¶¶ 5–6). That is, the Defendant Coastal chartered the Army I from GSI. (Id. at ¶ 18). The Defendant Coastal hired the Plaintiff as a seaman and member of the Army I crew. (Id. at ¶ 10).

On January 24, 2014, the Plaintiff injured his back and shoulder when he slipped and fell on a patch of ice and/or snow on the deck of the Army I. (Id. at ¶ 14). The Plaintiff states that he had to undergo surgery and, as of the filing of his PAC, the Plaintiff was allegedly still not fit for duty. (Id. at ¶ 19). The Plaintiff alleges that both Defendants were negligent by failing to de-ice the deck or maintain a non-skid surface. (Id. at ¶ 15). The Plaintiff further alleges that he made several requests for salt or de-icing material but that those requests were never fulfilled. (Id. at ¶ 16).

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Legal Standard

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) applies to motions to amend the pleadings once the time for amending a pleading as a matter of right has expired. It states, in pertinent part, that "a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires." Courts have construed the rule liberally and have said that "the purpose of Rule 15 is to allow a party to correct an error that might otherwise prevent the court from hearing the merits of the claim." Safety–Kleen Sys., Inc. v. Silogram Lubricants Corp. , No. 12–CV–849, 2013 WL 6795963, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2013) (quoting Chapman v. YMCA of Greater Buffalo , 161 F.R.D. 21, 24 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) ); see also Williams v. Citigroup Inc. , 659 F.3d 208, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding a "strong preference for resolving disputes on the merits").

"In deciding whether to permit the addition of defendants, courts apply the ‘same standard of liberality afforded to motions to amend pleadings under Rule 15.’ " Henriquez v. Kelco Landscaping Inc. , 299 F.R.D. 376, 379 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (Spatt, J.) (quoting Fair Hous. Dev. Fund Corp. v. Burke , 55 F.R.D. 414, 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) ).

A court should deny leave to amend "in instances of futility, undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or undue prejudice to the nonmoving party." Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. , 551 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).

"The party opposing the motion for leave to amend has the burden of establishing that an amendment would be prejudicial." Fariello v. Campbell , 860 F.Supp. 54, 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ; see also European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc. , 150 F.Supp.2d 456, 502–03 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) ; Saxholm AS v. Dynal, Inc. , 938 F.Supp. 120, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). The opposing party likewise bears the burden of establishing that an amendment would be futile. See Blaskiewicz v. County of Suffolk , 29 F.Supp.2d 134, 137–38 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Harrison v. NBD Inc. , 990 F.Supp. 179, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) ).

B. Application to the Facts

1) As to the Delay of the Motion to Amend, whether the Plaintiff Acted in Bad Faith and the Resulting Alleged Prejudice to GSI

Although GSI does not argue prejudice or bad faith, the Court considers these matters sua sponte , and finds that the Plaintiff did not act in bad faith or with undue delay, and that there is no resulting prejudice to GSI.

"Mere delay ... absent a showing of bad faith or undue prejudice, does not provide a basis for a district court to deny the right to amend." State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor Corp. , 654 F.2d 843, 856 (2d Cir. 1981) ; Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo Equip. Corp. , 215 F.3d 321, 333 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming grant of motion to amend after seven-year delay, where defendant did not show prejudice). "The concepts of delay and undue prejudice are interrelated—the longer the period of unexplained delay, the less will be required of the non-moving party in terms of showing prejudice." Evans v. Syracuse City Sch. Dist. , 704 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1983).

As stated above, GSI was interplead into this action by the Defendant Coastal approximately three months after the Plaintiff filed his initial complaint. The Plaintiff moved to add GSI as a defendant only ten days after the Court dismissed the third-party complaint. Furthermore, discovery was stayed while GSI's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint was pending. The Court therefore finds that there is no evidence that the Plaintiff has engaged in bad faith. Also, GSI is not prejudiced by the delay.

2) As to the Futility of the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend

Proposed amendments are futile when they "would fail to cure prior deficiencies or to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." IBEW Local Union No. 58 Pension Trust Fund & Annuity Fund v. Royal Bank of Scotland Grp., PLC , 783 F.3d 383, 389 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc'ns, Inc. , 681 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2012) ).

Under the Bell Atlantic v. Twombly standard, a complaint should be dismissed only if it does not contain enough allegations of fact to state a claim for relief that is "plausible on its face." 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1973, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The Second Circuit has explained that, after Twombly, the Court's inquiry under Rule 12(b)(6) is guided by two principles:

First, although a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint, that tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions, and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss and determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.

Harris v. Mills , 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).

The Court notes here that GSI refers to its contract with the Defendant Coastal throughout its memorandum. The Court declines to consider the contract in deciding the Plaintiff's ...