Segal v. Calcara, 6012.
| Decision Date | 17 January 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 6012.,6012. |
| Citation | 286 A.2d 223 |
| Parties | Louis SEGAL, by his friend, James W. Winchester, Appellant, v. Frank CALCARA and Michael Belli, Appellees. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
James W. Winchester, of the bar of the State of New Jersey, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, with whom Dudley R. Williams, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Herman Miller, Washington, D. C., submitted on the brief for appellees.
Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and PAIR and YEAGLEY, Associate Judges.
Appellant, a minor, commenced an action by his next friend in the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, seeking recovery of $550 which represented a security deposit and one month's rent for an apartment in the District of Columbia. He alleged that he entered into a voidable lease with appellee Calcara through his agent appellee Belli, that he personally paid $70, and that $480 was paid on his behalf by his mother. Appellant never took up residence in the subject premises. However, at his request, one of his prospective roommates was given a key and lived in the apartment for a period of eight days. Thereafter, the apartment was vacated and appellees were advised, by both appellant and his mother, that appellant would not comply with the rental agreement.
Appellees asserted at the trial that because the notice of termination was given during the first month of occupancy, its effect was to terminate the lease only after expiration of the second full month. Appellees, therefore, urged that they were entitled to two month's rent ($440) and a cleaning fee ($10). After the commencement of the action, they returned to appellant's mother $100 of the security deposit. Appellees also asserted that even though appellant was a minor he was liable for the reasonable rental value of the apartment during the period of his constructive occupancy (his friend's eight-day stay) and that such liability exceeded $70.
During presentation of appellant's case, the trial judge ruled, sua sponte, that ". . . this Court is not going to give her son $480, when she is the one who has paid for it." At the close of appellant's case, defense counsel moved for dismissal as to the full $550.1 That motion was not ruled upon and the claim for $70 was taken under advisement.
The court made no formal findings of fact or conclusions of law, and the only disposition apparent on the record is a handwritten notation on the original jacket cover, reading: "Complaint dismissed for failure of the proper party to sue." This notation was signed by the trial judge.
Rule 41(b)2 requires, in cases of involuntary dismissal, that ". . . [i]f the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a)." This requirement that the trial court "state findings of fact specially and state separately its conclusions of law"3 serves several purposes.4 The procedure, when followed, evokes care on the part of the trial judge and facilitates appellate review.
When a decision is accompanied by findings of fact, the reviewing court can decide whether the decision reached by the court or commission follows as a matter of law from the facts stated as its basis, and also whether the facts so stated have any substantial support in the evidence. In the absence of findings of fact the reviewing tribunal can determine neither of these things. . . . [Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C., 68 App.D.C. 282, 287, 96 F.2d 554, 559 (1938).]
This court also has held that a record which does not contain the requisite findings is not capable of intelligent review.5 Such is the case here.
The normal procedure is to remand the case to the trial court for appropriate findings. See Irish v. United States, 225 F.2d 3, 8 (9th Cir. 1955) Warner Corp. v. Magazine Realty Co., D.C.App., 255 A.2d 479 (1969). However, other factors may warrant remanding for a new trial.6 The summary disposal of appellant's claim for $480 might easily have precluded the introduction of evidence necessary to a...
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