Segal v. First Psychiatric Planners, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-P-699.,06-P-699.
• Citation: 864 N.E.2d 574,68 Mass. App. Ct. 709
• Parties: Cindy SEGAL v. FIRST PSYCHIATRIC PLANNERS, INC.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

864 N.E.2d 574

68 Mass. App. Ct. 709

Cindy SEGAL v. FIRST PSYCHIATRIC PLANNERS, INC.¹

No. 06-P-699.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

Argued January 4, 2007.

Decided April 23, 2007.

Laurie M. Ruskin, Boston, for the plaintiff.

Alan Garber for the defendant.

Present: RAPOZA, C.J., DREBEN, & MEADE, JJ.

DREBEN, J.

The issue in this case is whether the plaintiff alleges only medical malpractice claims appropriate for screening by a tribunal or whether she also asserts nonmedical claims which do not require her to post a bond pursuant to G.L. c. 231, § 60B. In her complaint against a physician as well as the operator of Bournewood Hospital (hospital), the plaintiff asserted numerous instances of medical malpractice and also asserted claims of false imprisonment and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress by the hospital.² After a medical tribunal determined that the evidence presented by the plaintiff was insufficient to raise a legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry as to both defendants, and that she may pursue her claims only upon filing a bond, she filed an emergency motion in the Superior Court for clarification or reconsideration. In her motion, she argued that her claim for false imprisonment against the hospital was based exclusively on nonmedical grounds and that her claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress against the hospital were, in large part, based on nonmedical grounds. The judge ruled that the bond requirement applies to all her claims, stating, "Based on the specific fact allegations in the complaint, the court concludes that all of the plaintiff's claims are based on `malpractice, error or mistake' by a health care provider in the course of providing medical treatment." After the plaintiff failed to post a bond, a judgment entered dismissing her complaint against the hospital. This is an appeal by the plaintiff. We vacate the judgment in part, as some of the plaintiff's claims are not medical and, hence, she was not required to file a bond for judicial consideration of those claims.

1. The claims asserted to be nonmedical. "General Laws c. 231, § 60B, inserted by St.1975, c. 362, § 5, empowers a screening tribunal to appraise `[e]very action for malpractice, error or mistake against a provider of health care.'" Little v. Rosenthal, 376 Mass. 573, 576, 382 N.E.2d 1037 (1978). The court interpreted this language to mean that "all treatment-related claims were meant to be referred to a malpractice tribunal." Ibid. Here, not only was the complaint sufficient to afford the hospital fair notice that the plaintiff's claims were not limited to medical malpractice,³ but also both the hospital and the judge were apprised of additional details of her claims, including the assertion, not specified in her complaint, that the hospital violated the requirements of G.L. c. 123, § 11.⁴

Prior to the convening of the medical malpractice tribunal, the hospital filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claims in counts III (false imprisonment), VI (negligent infliction of emotional distress), and VII (intentional infliction of emotional distress).⁵ In her opposition to the motion, and again in her motion subsequent to the determination of the tribunal, the plaintiff claimed that, contrary to the requirements of G.L. c. 123, § 11, she was formally admitted into the hospital either without, or at the least before, a psychiatric admission assessment. Her claim of false imprisonment is also based on her assertion that the hospital misled her into believing that she could leave at the time of her choosing and failed to inform her of a three-day notice requirement contained in the application for "conditional voluntary admission" (see note 4, supra).⁶

In her introduction to her offer of proof to the tribunal, the plaintiff specifically stated that her claims against the defendants "include more than her medical malpractice claims," mentioned her claims of false imprisonment and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and pointed out that the jurisdiction of the tribunal extends only to the medical aspects of her claims.

In an affidavit, which was part of the offer, the plaintiff, in addition to detailing numerous events that in her view amounted to medical malpractice, set forth the following material relevant to her nonmedical claims. Expanding on the substance of paragraphs 42 and 45 of her complaint, see note 3, supra, she stated that upon her arrival at the hospital on October 1, 2001, a woman, who did not identify herself as a physician, took her into an office where the woman processed the plaintiff's admission. The woman took down the plaintiff's personal and insurance information and asked the plaintiff to sign a document (application), see note 6, supra, which the plaintiff did not read because of her blurred vision. From what she was told by hospital staff on the day of her admission, the plaintiff understood that she would be able to leave the hospital as she chose.

"After completing [her] admission," the woman escorted the plaintiff to an anteroom where her belongings were searched. She was then taken by the woman and a nurse to a small room where the plaintiff was undressed and her clothing was searched. Thereafter, she was taken into the ward, Dodge I, and shown her room and bed. Only after these admission procedures were completed was the plaintiff seen by a woman who took the plaintiff's medical and psychiatric history. The plaintiff does not recall meeting the doctor whose notes appear on the hospital records (Dr. Nguyen)⁷ or any other male physician on the day of her admission.

The plaintiff stated in her affidavit that although she wanted to leave the hospital the morning after her admission, as a result of being misinformed prior to signing the application and later again by not being properly informed of the three-day requirement, she was forced to remain at the hospital for several days.

Because the action was dismissed for failure to file a bond, and not under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), our review of the dismissal is limited to whether the claims dismissed were "medical." "The tribunal procedure . . . is appropriate only where there is an `issue of medical "malpractice, error or mistake"' (emphasis in original)." Leininger v. Franklin Med. Center, 404 Mass. 245, 248, 534 N.E.2d 1151 (1989), quoting from Little, 376 Mass. at 577, 382 N.E.2d 1037. In the view of the majority of the panel, the false imprisonment claim — that the plaintiff was admitted under misleading circumstances and without following the procedures of c. 123, § 11, for proper admission — does not present an issue of "medical malpractice, error or mistake."⁸

In Leininger, supra at 248, 534 N.E.2d 1151, the Supreme Judicial Court held that a claim of failure to follow the requirements of G.L. c. 123, § 12 (involuntary commitment), by committing the plaintiff to a mental health facility without an examination was not a medical claim that should have been referred to a medical malpractice tribunal. Failure to comply with the provision of the statute was not a medical decision. Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff's complaint should not have been screened by a tribunal; the court vacated the judgment dismissing the action because of the plaintiff's failure to post a bond. The Leininger court stated, "We have discerned a strong legislative intent that the tribunal `should evaluate only the medical aspects of a malpractice claim.'" Id. at 247-248, 534 N.E.2d 1151, quoting from Salem Orthopedic Surgeons, Inc. v. Quinn, 377 Mass. 514, 521, 386 N.E.2d 1268 (1979).

The claims of the plaintiff in Leininger, supra at 246, 534 N.E.2d 1151, were for violation of her civil rights under G.L. c. 12, § 11I, for false imprisonment, and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. At the hearing before the Leininger tribunal the plaintiff asserted that those claims were established by her involuntary commitment without following the statute. Id. at 247, 534 N.E.2d 1151. The false imprisonment and emotional distress claims of the plaintiff in the case at bar are sufficiently similar to the claims in Leininger for us to conclude that they, too, do not present an "issue of medical `malpractice, error or mistake.'" 404 Mass. at 248, 534 N.E.2d 1151, quoting from Little, 376 Mass. at 577, 382 N.E.2d 1037. See Garcia v. Psychiatric Insts. of America, Inc., 638 So.2d 567, 567 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994) (false imprisonment and battery claims against doctor and hospital governed by tort statute of limitations rather than shorter medical malpractice statute of limitations). The plaintiff's nonmedical claims center on the allegation that she was misled as to the terms of her admission and discharge and that she was not examined until after her admission in violation of the statutory requirement. As in Leininger, she does not, with respect to these claims, urge that the hospital was negligent or mistaken by reason of its medical judgment. Contrast Johnston v. Stein, 29 Mass.App.Ct. 996, 997, 562 N.E.2d 1365 (1990) (where the misrepresentation was of a medical nature).

Because the foregoing claims of the plaintiff do not involve the medical aspects of a malpractice claim, the judgment insofar as it dismissed those claims is to be vacated and the case remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings thereon consistent with this opinion.⁹

So ordered.

MEADE, J. (dissenting).

In its decision to partially vacate the dismissal of the complaint, the majority has carved out the plaintiff's counts that alleged false imprisonment and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. In so doing, the majority has resurrected what it describes as nonmedical claims over which the tribunal should not have exercised jurisdiction. In my view, however, the substance of these claims relates to the...