Segar v. Youngs
| Decision Date | 31 October 1978 |
| Citation | 383 N.E.2d 103,45 N.Y.2d 568,410 N.Y.S.2d 801 |
| Parties | , 383 N.E.2d 103 Rocca J. SEGAR et al., Respondents, v. George W. YOUNGS et al., Respondents, and Virginia Reuss, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
In this action to quiet title, brought pursuant to article 15 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, we are called upon to decide whether village tax liens are extinguished by the conveyance of a county tax deed under section 1020 of the Real Property Tax Law. We hold they are.
The property to which the tax liens in question attached is located in the Village of Gouverneur, County of St. Lawrence. In October, 1972, plaintiffs Segar and Oliver bought tax sale certificates covering certain village and county taxes on the property then in default. Subsequently, the property having fallen into arrears on 1973 taxes as well, the village failed to sell the tax sale certificate issued for that period and therefore retained ownership of it. Still later, on March 13, 1975, it sold defendant Reuss a certificate for unpaid village taxes for 1974.
Meanwhile, in February, 1975, the defendant Youngs, who held a mortgage on the property, had obtained a judgment of foreclosure and sale against its record owner. Segar and Oliver learned of the impending sale, whereupon they, as holders of county tax certificates on the property, applied for and received a county treasurer's deed as provided by section 1018 of the Real Property Tax Law. Having obtained title, they then promptly commenced this action, pending the outcome of which the sale has been withheld.
The case now comes to us in the following procedural context:
Special Term granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against Youngs, the mortgagee, but denied relief against both lienors, Reuss and the village. Holding that the village's liens were not extinguished by the county tax sale or tax deed, the court proceeded to grant the village's affirmative motion for summary judgment. On appeal, a closely divided Appellate Division modified. The majority was of the opinion that, although the publicly held village interest survived, the one privately owned by Reuss did not. The dissenters would have found Reuss' liens entitled to the same preference as those of the village. Reuss alone now appeals to this court.
We believe an affirmance is required, but for the reasons which follow:
Subdivision 1 of section 1020 of the Real Property Tax Law provides: "A conveyance by the county treasurer (of a deed to real property sold for nonpayment of taxes) shall vest in the grantee an absolute estate in fee, subject, however, to (a) all claims of the County or state for taxes, liens or other encumbrances" (emphasis ours). By its plain language, this section permits the survival of county or State liens, but not claims of a municipal taxing authority. That the Legislature knew how to give preferential treatment to village tax liens when it intended to do so is demonstrated by subdivision 3 of section 1464 of the Real Property Tax Law, which allows village treasurers to convey deeds to tax delinquent real property within their jurisdictions and to thus "vest in the grantee an absolute estate in fee, subject, however, to all claims the Village, county or state may have thereon for taxes, liens or encumbrances". The conscious parallelism between section 1020 and section 1464 strongly suggests that the limitation to "county or state" specifically incorporated in the former was deliberate. Each statute should, therefore, be read for what its unambiguous words say, no more and no less.
City of Rochester v. Kapell, 86 App.Div. 224, 225, 83 N.Y.S. 640, 641, affd. on opn. below 177 N.Y. 533, 69 N.E. 1121, is not to the contrary. That case did not involve present section 1020 of the Real Property Tax Law, but its predecessor st...
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