Segovia v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 20 February 1976
• Parties: Carmen SEGOVIA, Administratrix of the Estate of Raul Jose Segovia, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent; Eugene RADFORD et al., Real Parties In Interest. Civ. 37244.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 501

127 Cal.Rptr. 501

55 Cal.App.3d 464

Carmen SEGOVIA, Administratrix of the Estate of Raul Jose Segovia, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent Eugene RADFORD et al., Real Parties In Interest.

Civ. 37244.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Feb. 20, 1976.

Hearing Denied April 15, 1976.

Eliassen, Postel & Mee, R. B. Eliassen, II, San Francisco, for petitioner.

Colin C. Kelley, Oakland, for real parties in interest.

SIMS, Associate Justice.

The petition in this matter seeks review of an order granting the petition of real parties in interest to file a late claim against the Estate of Raul Jose Segovia, also known as Raul J. Segovia, for injuries allegedly suffered January 23, 1971, in an accident in which the decedent was killed. The issue here is not whether the real parties in interest have, in the civil proceedings in which they seek damages, alleged sufficient facts to establish that the legal representative of the decedent's estate or any of her authorized agents has waived, or is estopped to assert the lack of, the formal submission of a claim. (See Satterfield v. Garmire (1967) 65 Cal.2d 638, 56 Cal.Rptr. 102, 422 P.2d 990.) It is simply whether the superior court in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction has power and authority to modify the provisions of the Probate Code which require 'all persons having claims against the decedent to file them . . . or to present them . . . within four months after the first publication of the notice' to creditors. (Prob.Code, § 700.) Section 707 further states '. . . all claims for damages for injuries to or death of a person . . . must be filed or presented within the time limited in the notice (to creditors) or as extended by Sections 702 (for failure to file affidavit showing due publication within 30 days) and 709 (relating to actions pending against a decedent at the time of his death) of this code; and any claim not so filed or presented is barred forever, unless . . . (where claimant has not received notice by reason of being out of the state).' ¹

In addition to the 1971 additions to section 707, which by their express terms are not applicable to the claim under review (see fn. 1 above), section 707 also excepts claims by public entities, which are specially provided for in section 707.5, and the special provisions for claims for damages for injuries to or death of a person found in section 720. That section provides that 'the court, upon application of the claimant made not later than one year after accrual of the claimant's cause of action, and upon such notice and hearing, if any, as the court may order, shall permit the filing of the claim' 'for damages for injuries to, or death of, a person, for which no action specified in Section 709 was pending at the time of the decedent's death' even though a claim was not filed within the time otherwise provided. Here more than one year had expired since the claimant's cause of action accrued and the section is not applicable. ² In Nathanson v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 355, 115 Cal.Rptr. 783, 525 P.2d 687, as in this case, the claimant filed a petition seeking an order authorizing the filing of a late claim because the estate had actual knowledge of the claim within the statutory period. There the trial court denied relief, and the Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ directing the trial court to permit the filing of an amended claim and vacating the order denying the claimant relief. The Supreme Court granted a hearing, discharged the alternative writ and denied the petition for a peremptory writ. After reviewing the provisions of sections 700 and 707, which have been alluded to above, the court observed, 'Accordingly, it has been long and consistently held by California courts that with certain exceptions not here applicable, 'all claims against the estate of a decedent arising upon contract must be filed or presented within the time prescribed in the published notice to creditors, and if not so filed or presented they are forever barred.' (Estate of Grant (1935) 2 Cal.2d 661, 664--665, 43 P.2d 266, other citations omitted.)' (12 Cal.3d at p. 362, 115 Cal.Rptr. 783, 787, 525 P.2d 687, 691, fn. omitted. ³ ) The court concluded, 'In the instant case, it is not disputed--indeed it is conceded--that petitioner's creditor's claim was not filed within the period provided by law for the presentation or filing of claims. She makes no contention that filing was permissible under any of the statutory exceptions heretofore noted . . . (see fn. 3 above). It is clear, then, that the order of the probate court denying her leave to file the claim was proper and in accordance with governing law. The court had no authority--much less a legally enjoinable duty--to permit the filing of the claim, and in view of this, cannot be compelled by mandate to act otherwise.' (Id.)

The court discussed the power of the probate court to permit an amendment to a claim, and concluded as follows: 'To recapitulate, we hold that (1) except as otherwise provided by statute (see, e.g., fns. 2 and 3 and accompanying text), a probate court has no power to permit the filing of a creditor's claim after expiration of the statutory period for filing or presenting claims; (2) under proper circumstances, a creditor's claim which has been filed or presented within the statutory period may be amended after such period had run; (3) whether a claim has in fact been filed or presented within the statutory period so as to be the subject of an amendment depends upon the circumstances of the particular case; and (4) mere notice to the estate, in the sense of imparting knowledge of the underlying debt to the representative, does not constitute a sufficient claim or demand which can be the basis of an amendment.' (Id., pp. 369--370, 115 Cal.Rptr. pp. 793, 525 P.2d pp. 697.)

The court recognized the viability of Satterfield v. Garmire, supra, by quoting it for the following proposition: 'Probate Code section 707 is intended to insure that the executor or administrator of an estate will be notified within a reasonable period of time of all claims so that the estate may be expeditiously settled and distributed to the legatees or heirs.' (65 Cal.2d at p. 641, 56 Cal.Rptr. at 105, 422 P.2d at 993, quoted at 12 Cal.3d at p. 365, at 115 Cal.Rptr. at p. 783, at 422 P.2d at p. 687.) It also noted by comparison that Satterfield v. Garmire, supra, was an exception to the general rule 'that the statutory requirement that a creditor's claim be presented or filed within the statutory period cannot be waived by the representative of the estate.' (12 Cal.3d at p. 365, 115 Cal.Rptr. at p. 790, 422 P.2d at p. 694.)

Turning to the earlier case we find nothing which authorizes the order made by the superior court in the probate proceedings. In that case the court expressly stated, 'The statutory requirement of presentation of a claim is not satisfied by service of summons and complaint in a lawsuit, although the pleadings do in their way provide an ammouncement of the amount and nature of the claim.' (65 Cal.2d at p. 642, 56 Cal.Rptr. at p. 105, 422 P.2d at p. 993. See also Wood v. Brown (1974), 39 Cal.App.3d 232, 237, 114 Cal.Rptr. 63.) In Nathanson v. Superior Court, supra, the court repudiated the notion that mere notice from conversation between the attorneys for both parties is a sufficient basis upon which to entertain an amendment to a claim subsequent to the statutory period (12 Cal.3d at p. 369, 115 Cal.Rptr. 783, 525 P.2d 687). It must therefore be concluded that the facts upon which the claimant relies to establish waiver do not of themselves authorize the probate court to permit the filing of a late claim.

The precedents relied upon by the court in Satterfield v. Garmire, supra, do not trespass on the claim procedure. They stem from Farrell v. County of Placer (1944), 23 Cal.2d 624, 145 P.2d 570, in which the court concluded: 'In the instant case the facts clearly establish that defendants should be estopped to complain of the late filing of the claim' (23 Cal.2d at p. 628, 145 P.2d at p. 572); and '. . . the filing of the claim within ninety days, while mandatory upon the claimant and a condition precedent to his cause of action, is nothing more than a procedural requirement as to the agency, which, as to the claimant, may be excused by estoppel.' (Id., at pp. 630--631, 145 P.2d at pp. 573.) In Katz v. A. J. Ruhlman & Co. (1945), 69 Cal.App.2d 541, 159 P.2d 426, the appeal involved the claimant's attempt to offset his claim against the decedent in an action by the administrator to recover upon a note given by the claimant to the decedent. The evidence showed an agreement whereby the maker had agreed to pay the difference, and the representative of the estate agreed on that amount and that it was unnecessary to file a claim. In reversing the judgment of the lower court which had allowed the full amount of the note because no claim had been filed for the offset, the court after noting cases in other jurisdictions which hold that the doctrine of estoppel applies to an administrator, and after alluding to Farrell v. County of Placer, stated: 'There is sounder reason why the doctrine of waiver and estoppel should apply here than in the Farrell case because here the representation were made to appellant by one who had been a legal adviser and were accepted and relied on as professional advice upon matters of legal procedure.' (69 Cal.App.2d at p. 545, 159 P.2d at p. 428.) Radar v. Rogers (1957), 49 Cal.2d 243, 317 P.2d 17 involved, not the provisions of section 707, but the provisions of section 714 of the Probate Code which require the institution of suit within three months of the rejection of the claim. Those provisions were held inapplicable when an action was already on file. The salient point is that in all three cases, the issue was...