Seguin v. Remington Arms Co.

• Decision Date: 06 January 2022
• Docket Number: No. 17-30499,17-30499
• Citation: 22 F.4th 492
• Parties: Precious SEGUIN, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY, L.L.C., Defendant—Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

22 F.4th 492

Precious SEGUIN, Plaintiff—Appellee,

v.REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY, L.L.C., Defendant—Appellant.

No. 17-30499

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED January 6, 2022

Timothy W. Monsees, Robert Thrasher, Monsees & Mayer, P.C., Kansas City, MO, Andrew Allen Lemmon, Esq., Lemmon Law Firm, L.L.C., Hahnville, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Dale Gene Wills, Esq., Andrew Arthur Lothson, Swanson, Martin & Bell, L.L.P., Chicago, IL, Quentin F. Urquhart, Jr., Esq., Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore, L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before Owen, Chief Judge, and Dennis and Southwick, Circuit Judges.

Leslie H. Southwick, Circuit Judge

Precious Seguin was shot in the hip during a hunting accident when her father's firearm accidentally discharged. Seguin claimed that a faulty design caused the discharge, and she sued the firearm manufacturer for defective design under Louisiana law. This case presents the limited question of whether Louisiana Revised Statute § 9:2800.60, which limits certain products liability claims against firearms manufacturers and sellers, bars Seguin's claim. At summary judgment, the district court held that it did not and entered judgment for Seguin.

The required interpretation of the controlling Louisiana statute presents unresolved and difficult questions of state law. We therefore CERTIFY the relevant question to the Louisiana Supreme Court, requesting that it provide us a definitive answer.

Before addressing the reasons for certification, we must consider an issue of our jurisdiction. Absent jurisdiction, we have no basis for any ruling beyond what is needed to dismiss. The complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana alleged there was diversity jurisdiction over the defendant manufacturer, Remington Arms Company, L.L.C. The parties now agree that the complaint did not make accurate assertions about Remington's citizenship. We explain.

Diversity jurisdiction exists where "the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between ... citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The complaint stated that the plaintiffs were citizens of Louisiana and that Remington was a company incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in North Carolina. Instead, Remington is a limited liability company whose citizenship is determined by the citizenship of each its members. As we will later explain, the states of Remington's citizenship — Delaware and North Carolina — were accurately identified in this complaint, but the reasons those were the correct states were inaccurately detailed.

The citizenship of the parties must be "distinctly and affirmatively alleged," which means alleged in the complaint. Getty Oil Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am. , 841 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting McGovern v. American Airlines, Inc. , 511 F.2d 653, 654 (5th Cir. 1975) ). Failure to plead correctly is not necessarily fatal to the suit. "Defective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended ... in the trial or appellate courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1653. Whether a formal amendment is needed once the case is on appeal, and the significance of whether jurisdictional facts appear in the record when they were not asserted in the complaint, have been analyzed in many precedents.

One approach taken by the Supreme Court, before the current statute regarding amendments was adopted in 1948, was to rely on concessions by the parties as opposed to record evidence after the plaintiff had insufficiently alleged the defendant's citizenship in the complaint. Realty Holding Co. v. Donaldson , 268 U.S. 398, 399–400, 45 S.Ct. 521, 69 L.Ed. 1014 (1925). The Court declined to remand to district court to remedy the error because the defendant had "conceded ... that she was in fact a citizen of Michigan; and the court below assumed the point." Id. at 400, 45 S.Ct. 521. The Court continued: "Since the defect may be cured by amendment and nothing is to be gained by sending the case back for that purpose, we shall consider the amendment made and dispose of the case." Id. Though the Court did not cite the predecessor statute to Section 1653, its reference to curing the defect by amendment likely was referring to the first version of the statute, adopted in 1915, which provided that when "diverse citizenship in fact existed at the time the suit was brought or removed, though defectively alleged, either party may amend at any stage of the proceedings and in the appellate court upon such terms as the court may impose." Act of March 3, 1915, ch. 90, 38 Stat. 956 (1915); see Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain , 490 U.S. 826, 831, 109 S.Ct. 2218, 104 L.Ed.2d 893 (1989). Later, in a case in which the complaint made no allegation about the amount in controversy, the Court stated it was conceded that the necessary amount was satisfied; because of the court's "disposition of the case," which was to reverse and render, "no purpose would be served by requiring a formal amendment" under Section 1653. Schlesinger v. Councilman , 420 U.S. 738, 744 n. 9, 95 S.Ct. 1300, 43 L.Ed.2d 591 (1975).

We have followed different approaches when the complaint fails to allege jurisdiction properly. In an early opinion after the adoption of the current statute on amendments, this court sua sponte noted the complaint's failure to allege diverse citizenship sufficiently. See Kaufman v. Western Union Tel. Co. , 224 F.2d 723, 725 (5th Cir. 1955). The court resolved the appeal on the merits by relying on information outside the lower-court record but required the plaintiff to file an amended complaint in this court within ten days after the court's decision. Id. A slightly later opinion from our court cited Kaufman and held that allowing an amendment on appeal to the assertions of jurisdiction in a petition for removal was proper when the truth of the revisions was conceded by the other party. Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Robbins Coal Co. , 288 F.2d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 1961).

One opinion attempted to systematize our precedent by stating that "[w]here jurisdiction is clear from the record, this Court has allowed direct amendments to the pleadings without a remand."

Molett v. Penrod Drilling Co. , 872 F.2d 1221, 1228 (5th Cir. 1989). When the record is less clear "but there is some reason to believe that jurisdiction exists, the Court may remand the case to the district court for amendment of the allegations and for the record to be supplemented." Id. A recent remand for a district court to examine citizenship in the absence of any record evidence is Midcap Media Finance, L.L.C. v. Pathway Data, Inc. , 929 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2019).

Examples of declining to remand include one case in which the plaintiffs had failed to allege all relevant facts of citizenship; we granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend the pleadings under Section 1653 "because the record otherwise evidence[d] a substantial likelihood of diverse citizenship." Nadler v. American Motors Sales Corp. , 764 F.2d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 1985). In another case, when the parties stipulated to jurisdictional facts "not subject to reasonable dispute" set forth in publicly available documents, we took judicial notice of those facts under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2) and relied on Section 1653 in declining to remand to remedy a jurisdictional pleading deficiency. See Swindol v. Aurora Flight Scis. Corp. , 805 F.3d 516, 519 & n.2 (5th Cir. 2015). Finally, in an earlier appeal involving Remington, we relied on a joint submission by the parties establishing citizenship. Burdett v. Remington Arms Co. , 854 F.3d 733, 734 n.1 (5th Cir. 2017).

These opinions may well not be entirely consistent, but they reflect approaches this court has followed. As we were considering our options, we required the parties in this appeal to state if they could agree on Remington's citizenship. They could, as shown in this excerpt from their joint letter:

Remington is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in North Carolina. Remington filed a Corporate Disclosure Statement in the underlying matter on December 24, 2014. (D.E. 11), providing that the sole member of Remington is FGI Operating Company, LLC, and no publicly traded corporation owns ten percent (10%) or more of its stock.

The parties further agreed to this:

FGI Operating Company, LLC ("FGI Operating") is the sole member of Remington. FGI Operating is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in North Carolina. FGI Holding Company, LLC ("FGI Holding") is the sole member of FGI Operating. FGI Holding is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in North Carolina. Remington Outdoor Company, Inc. is the sole member of FGI Holding. Remington Outdoor Company, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in North Carolina.

We conclude that a substantial likelihood of diversity was supported by the record. First, the complaint alleged the correct states for citizenship but did not properly explain why they were correct. Second, the recent joint letter cited a disclosure statement filed in district court by Remington in 2014 that detailed most of the relevant information on citizenship. The likelihood of diversity is now known to be a reality due to the joint letter. After receiving the letter, we required the Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff did, and the current complaint properly asserts diverse citizenship.

Having assured ourselves of jurisdiction, we now return to the reasons for certification. We may certify an unsettled question of state law to a state's highest court when that court has a procedure permitting such questions to be posed. See 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4248 (3d ed. 2015). The Louisiana Supreme Court has such a procedural rule. See LA. SUP. CT. R. XII, § 1.

Because this appeal...