Seguin v. Remington Arms Co.
| Decision Date | 07 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 17-30499 |
| Citation | 31 F.4th 311 |
| Parties | Precious SEGUIN, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY, L.L.C., Defendant—Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Timothy W. Monsees, Robert Thrasher, Monsees & Mayer, P.C., Kansas City, MO, Andrew Allen Lemmon, Esq., Lemmon Law Firm, L.L.C., Hahnville, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Dale Gene Wills, Esq., Andrew Arthur Lothson, Swanson, Martin & Bell, L.L.P., Chicago, IL, Quentin F. Urquhart, Jr., Esq., Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore, L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before Owen, Chief Judge, and Dennis and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
The plaintiff seeks to impose liability on a firearm manufacturer for injuries said to result from a design defect. Our interpretive task is to decide whether a Louisiana statute permits that category of claim. We conclude that it does not. We REVERSE and RENDER for the defendant.
In October 2013, Precious Seguin was injured while she, her father, a brother, and a friend were tracking a wounded deer at night in the woods near Loranger, Louisiana. Her father's Remington Model 710 bolt-action rifle accidentally discharged and injured her. A year later, Precious Seguin and other family members filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Those plaintiffs claimed the court had diversity jurisdiction over the defendant manufacturer, Remington Arms Co., L.L.C. In our earlier opinion in this appeal, we concluded that the initial assertions regarding Remington's citizenship were insufficient to sustain diversity jurisdiction. See Seguin v. Remington Arms Co., L.L.C. , 22 F.4th 492, 494–96 (5th Cir. 2022). The parties, though, cured this defect on appeal through the submission of a joint letter and Seguin's filing of an amended complaint. Id. at 496.
Early in the litigation, the district court dismissed all parties and claims other than Precious Seguin and her claims under the Louisiana Products Liability Act ("LPLA"). LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2800.51 –60. Before trial, the remaining parties stipulated to uncontested facts and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In the statement of facts, the parties stipulated that the LPLA exclusively governs Seguin's claims; Remington is a "Firearm Manufacturer" under Section 60; Seguin is a "Claimant" under Section 53(4); and Seguin's only products liability claim was for a design defect under Section 56. The district court relied on these stipulations to conclude that the only question was whether Section 60(B) permitted Seguin to recover for a Section 56 design-defect claim against Remington. The district court held that Section 60(B) did permit the claim.
The court's reasoning started with a determination that Section 60(B) was ambiguous in one respect, though not in a manner directly relevant to whether a design-defect claim was permissible. The court also determined that whatever choice was made in resolving the ambiguity would lead to an absurd result. Ambiguity in the statutory text allowed the district court to consider the legislative intent and history of Section 60(B). The court concluded that there was no statutory purpose to preclude design-defect claims. That analysis inexorably led to a summary judgment for Seguin on that claim. The court dismissed the remaining claims with prejudice and entered final judgment for Seguin in the amount of $500,000.
Remington timely appealed. Since the appeal was filed, there have been two notifications of Remington's bankruptcy. Each of those subjected the appeal to an automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362. The first notice was filed in March 2018, informing this court that Remington had filed a voluntary petition in Delaware bankruptcy court. After those proceedings were completed and the stay was lifted, notice was given to the court in July 2020 that Remington had filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Alabama. In March 2021, the Alabama court entered an order that certain tort claimants would have the right to pursue their litigation against Remington. Seguin, through counsel, filed a notice with the bankruptcy court that she elected to exercise her right to resume her litigation. As a result, the stay of the case before us was lifted on May 7, 2021. By a joint letter, counsel for each party agreed that no further briefing was needed, and the case was ripe for resolution.
We review summary judgment determinations de novo. See Martin v. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist. , 353 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2003). A movant is entitled to summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). This case presents no factual disputes. It turns purely on a question of Louisiana statutory interpretation that neither the Louisiana Supreme Court nor any lower Louisiana court has answered. When faced with uncertainty about state law, one option is for the court to certify the relevant questions to that state's highest court.1 We earlier chose that option and certified to the Louisiana Supreme Court a question about the meaning of the statute that controls the outcome of this case. See Seguin , 22 F.4th at 497–98. The Louisiana Supreme Court declined our invitation by a 4-3 vote of the justices. Seguin v. Remington Arms Co., L.L.C. , 2022-CQ-00037 (La. 3/22/22), 334 So.3d 752.
Thus, we perforce follow the other option of interpreting the statute ourselves, applying the state's statutory interpretation methods to conclude as we believe the Louisiana Supreme Court would if it were deciding this case. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig. , 495 F.3d 191, 206 (5th Cir. 2007). The remainder of this opinion explains our interpretation.
Our only issue is whether the district court erred when it held that Section 60 of the LPLA, which specifically applies to injuries resulting from discharge of a firearm, did not bar Seguin from bringing a claim under Section 56 of the LPLA, which is a general section applicable to design-defect claims. The LPLA "establishes the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by their products." LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.52.
Generally, a claimant may recover from a manufacturer if:
In 1999, the Louisiana Legislature amended the LPLA to limit products liability actions against firearms manufacturers, codifying that amendment as Section 60 of the LPLA. 1999 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1299 (codified at § 9:2800.60). The appeal here focuses on Section 60(B):
No firearm manufacturer or seller shall be liable for any injury, damage, or death resulting from any shooting injury by any other person unless the claimant proves and shows that such injury, damage, or death was proximately caused by the unreasonably dangerous construction or composition of the product as provided in R.S. 9:2800.55.
When interpreting statutes, Louisiana courts start with the text. They apply "the well-established rules of statutory construction ... to ascertain and enforce the intent of the statute." See Boudreaux v. La. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. , 2012-0239, p.4 (La. 10/16/12), 101 So. 3d 22, 26. If the text "is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature." LA. CIV. CODE art. 9. Conversely, if "the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law." LA. CIV. CODE art. 10.
We add to this analysis the need to look at the entire statute; at times the Louisiana Supreme Court has emphasized a need to interpret one provision in a manner that reconciles it to the rest of an enactment:
A statute's meaning and intent is determined after consideration of the entire statute and all other statutes on the same subject matter, and a construction should be placed on the provision in question which is consistent with the express terms of the statute and with the obvious intent of the Legislature in its enactment of the statute. Where it is possible, the courts have a duty in the interpretation of a statute to adopt a construction which harmonizes and reconciles it with other provisions.
ABL Mgmt. v. Bd. of Supervisors of S. Univ. , 2000-0798, p.6 (La. 11/28/00), 773 So. 2d 131, 135.
With this guidance, we start down the interpretive path.
In an unambiguous manner, the text of Section 60(B) provides that a manufacturer of a firearm like Remington has liability for harm only when "the claimant proves and shows that such injury, damage, or death was proximately caused by the unreasonably dangerous construction or composition of the product." LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.60(B). The parties agree to label that liability as being for a manufacturing defect. We left out some arguably ambiguous words that were of concern to the district court and which we discuss next, but what we have quoted makes clear that this subsection of the LPLA is limited to dangerous construction or composition of the firearm.
The district court identified ambiguity in Section 60(B) based on the language that liability may exist "for any injury, damage, or...
To continue reading
Request your trial