Seiler v. Crandall

• Decision Date: 13 November 2020
• Docket Number: OP 19–02250,620
• Citation: 188 A.D.3d 1614,135 N.Y.S.3d 714
• Parties: In the Matter of Brian SEILER, Petitioner, v. Hon. John H. CRANDALL, as Acting Herkimer County Court Judge, Letitia James, New York State Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Carpenter, as Herkimer County District Attorney and Schuyler Town Court, Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

188 A.D.3d 1614

135 N.Y.S.3d 714

In the Matter of Brian SEILER, Petitioner,

v.Hon. John H. CRANDALL, as Acting Herkimer County Court Judge, Letitia James, New York State Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Carpenter, as Herkimer County District Attorney and Schuyler Town Court, Respondents.

620

OP 19–02250

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Entered: November 13, 2020

THE LAW OFFICES OF ZEV GOLDSTEIN, PLLC, MONSEY (ZEV GOLDSTEIN OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER.

LORRAINE H. LEWANDROWSKI, COUNTY ATTORNEY, HERKIMER, FOR RESPONDENT JEFFREY S. CARPENTER, AS HERKIMER COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY.

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CARNI, NEMOYER, TROUTMAN, AND BANNISTER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department pursuant to CPLR 506 [b] [1] ) to compel respondent Hon. John H. Crandall, Acting Herkimer County Court Judge, to reconsider his denial of petitioner's request for leave to appeal from the denial of his coram nobis application by Schuyler Town Court.

It is hereby ORDERED that said petition is unanimously dismissed without costs.

Memorandum: In this original CPLR article 78 proceeding, petitioner seeks to compel Herkimer County Court to reconsider its denial of petitioner's request for leave to appeal from the denial of his coram nobis application by Schuyler Town Court. We conclude that the petition must be dismissed.

The parties agree that in 1996 petitioner pleaded guilty in Town Court to a charge of speeding ( Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 [d] ), and that his driver's license was thereafter assessed with four points. Petitioner contends that, at an undisclosed later date, his driver's license was revoked and, pursuant to 15 NYCRR 136.5 (b) (2), the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles denied his application for relicensing. Insofar as relevant here, that regulation mandates that an application for relicensing be denied where the applicant has been convicted of three or four alcohol-related driving convictions and accumulated "20 or more points from any violations" ( 15 NYCRR 136.5 [a] [2] [iv] ) during a 25-year look-back period. After that denial, petitioner moved in Town Court for a writ of error coram nobis that would permit him to withdraw his guilty plea to the 1996 speeding infraction. Town Court denied coram nobis relief, and then petitioner moved for leave to appeal to County Court, which declined to grant leave in a letter order issued July 9, 2019. Petitioner now seeks a judgment pursuant to CPLR article 78 directing County Court to reconsider its denial of petitioner's motion for leave to appeal.

Initially, we note that this proceeding seeks relief concerning a County Court Judge, among others, and thus it was properly commenced in this Court (see CPLR 506 [b] [1] ; cf. Matter of Tonawanda Seneca Nation v. Noonan , 27 N.Y.3d 713, 715, 37 N.Y.S.3d 36, 57 N.E.3d 1073 [2016], affg 122 A.D.3d 1334, 996 N.Y.S.2d 446 [4th Dept. 2014] ).

It is well settled that "[t]he extraordinary remedy either of prohibition or mandamus lies only where there is a clear legal right, and in the case of prohibition only when a court ... acts or threatens to act without jurisdiction in a matter of over which it has no power over the subject matter or where it exceeds its authorized powers in a proceeding over which it has jurisdiction" ( Matter of State of New York v. King , 36 N.Y.2d 59, 62, 364 N.Y.S.2d 879, 324 N.E.2d 351 [1975] ; see Matter of Morgenthau v. Erlbaum , 59 N.Y.2d 143, 147, 464 N.Y.S.2d 392, 451 N.E.2d 150 [1983], cert denied 464 U.S. 993, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 [1983] ). Furthermore, a "court cannot be said to be acting without power merely because it issues an arguably erroneous ruling in a case that is otherwise properly before it ... Prohibition, therefore, may be used for collateral review of an error of law ‘only where the very jurisdiction and power of the court are in issue’ " ( Morgenthau , 59 N.Y.2d at 149-150, 464 N.Y.S.2d 392, 451 N.E.2d 150 ; see generally Matter of O'Neill v. Beisheim , 39 N.Y.2d 924, 925, 386 N.Y.S.2d 576, 352 N.E.2d 880 [1976] ). Because petitioner does not allege that County Court lacks the power to review the issue and, indeed, he seeks to compel the exercise of that power, prohibition does not lie. In addition, prohibition does not lie where there is "an adequate ‘ordinary’ remedy," i.e., a direct appeal ( Morgenthau , 59 N.Y.2d at 147, 464 N.Y.S.2d 392, 451 N.E.2d 150 ; see Matter of Coffee v. Argento , 169 A.D.3d 1354, 1355, 91 N.Y.S.3d 741 [4th Dept. 2019] ; Matter of Dale v. Burns , 103 A.D.3d 1243, 1244-1245, 959 N.Y.S.2d 781 [4th Dept. 2013], appeal dismissed 21 N.Y.3d 968, 970 N.Y.S.2d 493, 992 N.E.2d 421 [2013] ). Here, the petition seeks to expand the statutory scheme for appeals in criminal matters by, in effect, asking this Court to grant further review of an appeal in a manner inconsistent with the statutory scheme. Because "[t]he right of review by appeal in criminal matters ... is determined exclusively by statute" ( King , 36 N.Y.2d at 63, 364 N.Y.S.2d 879, 324 N.E.2d 351 ),...