Seipold v. Gibbud
| Decision Date | 06 January 1930 |
| Citation | 148 A. 328,110 Conn. 392 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | SEIPOLD v. GIBBUD ET AL. |
Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Alfred C. Baldwin Judge.
Action by Emil Seipold to foreclose a mechanics' lien against Nettie R. Gibbud and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. No error.
Albert M. Herrmann, of New Haven, for appellants.
Charles A. Harrison and Milton G. Harrison, both of New Haven, for appellee.
Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS JJ.
The defendant Slade owned a piece of land with an unfinished dwelling thereon. He made a verbal contract for the sale of the premises to the defendant Mrs. Gibbud. By the terms of the agreement she was to enter into possession of the land and buildings and complete the house, and when it was completed the defendant Slade was to deliver title to her and to receive payment of the purchase price, $17,000. Mrs. Gibbud did enter into possession and made a contract with the defendant Laden to complete the building, the contract containing no provision as to when the agreed price was to be paid. Laden engaged the plaintiff to do the plumbing and heating work, and this was finished on November 24th, 1928. He received only a small portion of the amount due him for his work. Laden substantially completed his contract on December 14, 1928. He received some payments on account from Mrs. Gibbud, but there was still due him more than enough to pay the plaintiff's bill. On that day the defendant Slade conveyed the premises to Mrs. Gibbud, receiving $5,000 in cash and a mortgage for the balance of the purchase price, $12,000. On January 18, 1929, the plaintiff gave Mrs. Gibbud notice in writing of his intention to claim a mechanic's lien, and the next day filed a certificate of lien. Mrs. Gibbud was the president and practically the sole owner of the Wallingford Lumber Company, and Laden was largely indebted to it for materials and supplies furnished in building the house for Mrs. Gibbud and for other jobs. She thereupon wrote off the indebtedness of Laden on the books of the company and charged it against herself, and she claims to set off the amount of this indebtedness against her indebtedness to him under the contract. The trial court has, however, found that the change in Laden's indebtedness from one due the company to one due to her was made without his knowledge or consent, and gave judgment for the plaintiff.
Of course, the assumption of Laden's indebtedness to the company by her and the crediting of its amount against the sum due him on the contract could constitute a discharge of her indebtedness to him only if it was done with his consent expressed or implied. Collins v. Richmond Stove Co., 63 Conn. 356, 360, 28 A. 534. Recognizing this, the appellants seek to have stricken out the court's findings that the acts of Mrs. Gibbud in changing Laden's indebtedness from one due the company to one due her were without his knowledge and consent, and to substitute a finding to the effect that on or about December 15, 1928, it was expressly agreed between them that she was to take over his indebtedness to the company and charge it against the amount due him on the contract. In support of the appellants' claim certain evidence is certified to us. There is lacking in it any direct evidence of such an agreement, and it could be found only as an inference. It may be that, reading the printed testimony, a basis for such an inference could be found. But in considering the evidence certain circumstances which might much affect its interpretation and the deductions to be drawn from it obtrude themselves. It consists solely of the testimony given by Laden. He was in a position where he might have a great personal interest in the final determination of this issue. That this, or some other consideration, was much in his mind is rather obvious from the nature of his guarded answers. Moreover, there is a complete lack of any evidence by Mrs. Gibbud, or any one representing her or the company, as to any such agreement as that claimed. The trial court was in a much better position to weigh these considerations and to draw inferences from the testimony than are we, and we cannot say that it was in error in refusing to make...
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New England Sav. Bank v. Meadow Lakes Realty Co.
...to carry out that undertaking have a right of lien which will take precedence over even a purchase price mortgage." Seipold v. Gibbud, 110 Conn. 392, 396, 148 A. 328 (1930) (extending equitable interest to partial performance of oral contract for sale). "One who renders services or furnishe......
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...for tort actions set forth in General Statutes § 52-577. Neither of those statutes creates a jurisdictional bar. See Seipold v. Gibbud, 110 Conn. 392, 395, 148 A. 328 (1930) (statute of frauds); Orticelli v. Powers, 197 Conn. 9, 15-16, 495 A.2d 1023 (1985) (§ 52-577).17 "[Practice Book] Sec......
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NRT New Eng., LLC v. Longo
...tort actions set forth in General Statutes § 52-577. Neither of those statutes creates a jurisdictional bar. See Seipold v. Gibbud , 110 Conn. 392, 395, 148 A. 328 (1930) (statute of frauds); Orticelli v. Powers , 197 Conn. 9, 15–16, 495 A.2d 1023 (1985) (§ 52-577 )." McCutcheon & Burr , In......
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