Sekerke v. Gore
| Decision Date | 13 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20-CV-1998 JLS (MSB) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
| Parties | KEITH WAYNE SEKERKE, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM GORE, Sheriff, Respondent. |
ORDER (1) DENYING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (2) DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE AND (3) TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE CASE SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS MOOT
Petitioner Kevin Wayne Sekerke (“Petitioner” or “Sekerke”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his confinement at San Diego County Jail while awaiting sentencing on several felony convictions in San Diego Superior Court Case Nos. SCS304221 and SCS305297. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”) at 1. Sekerke alleges the dangers presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, combined with his pre-existing medical conditions, render his continued detention in the San Diego County Jail unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 6-8. Sekerke has also filed an “Emergency Motion to be Released” (“Pet.'s Mot., ” ECF No. 5). Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition (“Resp't Mot., ” ECF No. 8). The Court has reviewed the Petition, the Emergency Motion, the Motion to Dismiss, the Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9), the relevant documents filed in this case, and the legal arguments presented by both Parties. For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and DENIES Petitioner's “Emergency Motion to be Released.” Furthermore, the Court ORDERS the Parties to SHOW CAUSE why the case is not now moot.
At the time Sekerke filed his federal Petition, October 9, 2020, he was confined at San Diego Central Jail, awaiting sentencing on convictions for robbery, burglary, vehicle theft, and attempted extortion.[1] See Pet. at 2. The facts underlying Sekerke's convictions are not relevant to his Petition because, rather than challenging the constitutionality of his criminal convictions, Sekerke seeks release from custody due to alleged unsafe conditions in San Diego County Jail caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at 6-8.
Prior to filing his federal Petition, Sekerke raised his claims in the California courts. On May 19, 2020, Sekerke filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, seeking release from custody.[2] See Pet. at 79-84. Sekerke argued his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were being violated by his continued confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at 81. He asserted, among other things, that he suffered from pre-existing medical conditions, including asthma and a past history of tuberculosis, which made his detention in the San Diego County Jail uniquely dangerous for him during the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. He argued that his continued confinement was unconstitutional because “when the COVID-19 infection reaches Petitioner in County Jail, it [will] kill [him].” Id.
On May 26, 2020, the California Court of Appeal denied Sekerke's habeas petition. Id. at 77-78. First, the court noted that under California law, “[a]s a general rule, a litigant will not be afforded judicial relief unless he has exhausted available administrative remedies [Citation] [¶] The requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted ‘applies to grievances lodged by prisoner.'” Id. (citing In re Dexter, 25 Cal.3d 921, 925 (Cal. 1979)). The Court then concluded that Sekerke had “failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before going to court” and therefore was not entitled to relief. Id.
The court went on conclude that Sekerke's claims also failed on the merits. It found that Sekerke had failed to allege sufficient facts to support his claim that the jail was so unsafe for him that he must be released. The court stated, in part, “Sekerke asserts his ‘life is in danger due to the COVID-19 pandemic,' but does not identify any medical care or safety precautions his jailors have failed or refused to provide to eliminate or reduce the danger.” Id. at 78. The court found that Sekerke's “[c]onclusory allegations made without any explanation of the basis for the allegations [did] not warrant relief, let alone an evidentiary hearing.” Id. (quoting People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (Cal. 1995)).
On August 4, 2020, Sekerke filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. See Id. at 89. On September 23, 2020, the California Supreme Court denied the petition, stating: Id. at 88 (citing In re Dexter, 25 Cal.3d at 925-26).
On October 9, 2020, Sekerke filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. Id. at 1. Petitioner subsequently filed an “Emergency Motion to be Released.” ECF No. 5. On February 18, 2021, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition. ECF No. 8. Sekerke filed a Response in Opposition to Respondent's Motion on March 4, 2021. ECF No. 9.
Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic more than a year ago federal courts have been faced with novel issues related to prisoners seeking release from custody due to alleged unsafe conditions in prisons, jails, and other detention facilities. The threshold question is often: What is the proper vehicle for a detainee or prisoner who alleges that COVID-19 has made their detention so unsafe that their continued confinement violates their Eighth Amendment rights and the Petitioner seeks release from custody? And that is the question in this case.
Respondent argues the Petition should be dismissed because Sekerke is merely challenging the conditions of his confinement and as such, he must pursue his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Resp't Mot. at 4. For his part, Sekerke contends that a petition for writ of habeas corpus is proper because he is seeking release from confinement, which he contends presents a risk to his safety so serious that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require his release. Pet. at 6-8.
In general, federal law provides “two main avenues to relief on claims related to imprisonment: a petition for a writ of habeas corpus [under] 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint [for violation of federal civil rights under] 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004). “Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus; requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983 action.” Id.
A district court has the authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus where an individual is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Indeed, federal habeas corpus proceedings are the “exclusive remedy” for a prisoner seeking release from custody. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 533-34 (2011) (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)); see Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 747 (1998); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) ( prisoner cannot seek a determination that she is entitled to immediate or speedier release from confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (). On the other hand, when a prisoner's claim would not “necessarily spell speedier release, ” suit may be brought under § 1983. Skinner, 562 U.S. at 525 (quoting Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82).
The Supreme Court discussed the interplay between a § 2254 habeas corpus action and a § 1983 civil rights action in Preiser. In that case, prisoners brought suit under § 1983, challenging the constitutionality of the disciplinary proceedings that lead to the deprivation of good-time credits. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 476-77. The Court considered “whether the specific federal habeas corpus statute, explicitly and historically designed to provide the means for a state prisoner to attack the validity of his confinement, must be understood to be the exclusive remedy available in a situation like this where it so clearly applies.” Id. at 489. The court concluded that a state prisoner cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge “the fact or duration of his confinement, ” id. at 489, because such an action lies at “the core of habeas corpus.” Id. at 487. The Court explained that a claim falls within the “core of habeas corpus” when a prisoner challenges “the fact or duration of his confinement” and “seeks either immediate release from that confinement or the shortening of its duration.” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489.
Since Preiser, the Supreme Court has applied its holding in several different cases. First, in Wolff v. McDonnell, the plaintiffs' claims for restoration of good-time credits were deemed “core” habeas proceedings. 418 U.S. 539, 554 (1974). However, challenges to the validity of the procedures for assessing loss of good-time were not core habeas proceedings because success on that claim would not necessarily result in restoration of credits. See id. at 554-55. In Edwards, the plaintiff's claim alleging due process violations for procedures used in a disciplinary hearing that resulted in deprivation of good-time credits was not properly brought under § 1983 because success on the claim would result in restoration of credits (and thus affect the duration of confinement), making them “core” habeas claims. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 647-48.
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