Self v. Collins
| Decision Date | 22 September 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-2287,91-2287 |
| Citation | 973 F.2d 1198 |
| Parties | Michael Lloyd SELF, Petitioner-Appellee, v. James A. COLLINS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Elizabeth Elleson, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Dan Morales, Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for respondent-appellant.
Clinard J. Hanby, Essmyer & Hanby, Houston, Tex., for petitioner-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before SNEED, 1 REAVLEY, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
This appeal is bottomed on "our federalism" and turns on the proper application of the 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) presumption of correctness accorded state findings of fact. Its genesis is Michael Lloyd Self's conviction in 1973 for murder. In 1991, the district court granted his habeas application, holding that his confession, the critical evidence at trial, was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Based on our review of the state record, we conclude that the district court, inter alia, violated § 2254(d) by disregarding state findings which are fairly supported by the record, and so erred, in part, by making credibility choices contrary to those of the state judge who observed the witnesses' demeanor. We hold that the challenged confession was not obtained contrary to the Constitution and, therefore, REVERSE and REMAND for entry of an order of dismissal.
Self's problems with law enforcement began in 1970, when he was accused of "window peeping". In exchange for his agreeing to psychiatric treatment, no charges were filed. Self received such treatment on three occasions between October 1970 and January 1971.
About seven months later, on August 4, 1971, Sharon Shaw and her friend, Rhonda Renee Johnson, were last seen, when they left Webster, Texas, to make a day-trip to Galveston, about 25 miles away. (Located in Harris County, near Houston, Webster had a population of around 1,500.) Rhonda Johnson's grandfather was a member of the city council, which appointed the police chief. J.C. Norman was the chief then, and he and Self were friends. Webster policeman David Coburn took charge of the investigation into the girls' disappearance. In early 1972, their skeletal remains were discovered in a desolate area near Webster. 2
That May, after the city council elections, the council replaced chief Norman with Don Morris; Tommy Deal was hired as assistant chief. Both had been troopers with the Texas Department of Public Safety and had worked in an office in the Webster police department. Self had several encounters with Morris, before and after his appointment. While Morris was working as a security guard at an apartment complex, he accused Self of looking up girls' dresses as they walked up the stairs. He also talked to Self about gasoline thefts from city fire trucks, and threatened to jail him if he did not stop. (Self was a volunteer fireman and was often at the fire department, which was housed in the same building as the police department.) And, in early June, about a week before Self's arrest for Shaw's and Johnson's murders, Morris questioned him about possession of marijuana.
At around 5:00 a.m. on Friday, June 9, approximately three weeks after Morris and Deal took charge of the police force, Self was briefly questioned at his place of work about the murders. When he left work around 7:00 a.m., he agreed to go to the Webster police department for further questioning. After three hours of interrogation, he signed a written confession to the murders.
Self was then taken to nearby Houston, where he received a magistrate's warning; and Dewey Meadows, a Houston attorney, was appointed to represent him. Meadows advised Self not to speak to the police unless Meadows was present. Self told Meadows he wanted to take a polygraph examination to prove his innocence; Meadows advised against it.
That afternoon, Self was taken to the police department in nearby LaPorte, where charges were filed against him and nude photographs made. He then directed police to the location where the remains had been found. Next, he was examined at a hospital. Late that afternoon, a Harris County Deputy Sheriff visited Self in his cell in Webster; Self denied any mistreatment.
The next day, Saturday, June 10, part of an interrogation of Self was taped. Later that afternoon, he was moved to the county jail in Houston, where, the next Monday, June 12, he was questioned by various law enforcement officers about the murders of other girls in the area and given a polygraph examination. After the examination, he signed a second confession to the murders.
Finally, on June 23, Self directed another Harris County Deputy Sheriff to the locations described in his June 12 confession, including the area where the remains had been found.
Self moved to suppress the June 9 and 12 confessions prior to trial in mid-1973 for Shaw's murder. 3 During trial, after conducting an extensive hearing outside the presence of the jury, the state court entered findings of fact that both confessions were voluntarily given and admissible. After the June 12 confession was admitted in evidence, 4 Self testified that the June 9 confession was coerced and that he would not have signed the second but for the first. Concomitantly, the jury was instructed that it could not consider the June 12 confession unless it found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Self had been warned of his rights and had given the confession freely and "without compulsion or persuasion". 5
The jury found Self guilty of murder, and sentenced him to life imprisonment in May 1973. The conviction was affirmed in December 1974 by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Self v. State, 513 S.W.2d 832 (Tex.Crim.App.1974). 6 That next November, Self's first state habeas application was denied by that court without written order. Ex parte Self, Application No. 5383 (November 26, 1975). And, his first federal application was dismissed in late 1978 for failure to exhaust state remedies. Self v. Estelle, No. 75-H-2186 (S.D.Tex., September 21, 1978).
A few months later, in January 1979, Self filed his second state application. That March, at the state's request, the state court (the presiding judge at trial) ordered an evidentiary hearing on the issue of effectiveness of counsel. Between June 1979 and December 1980, it heard testimony on 14 days 7; and the scope of the hearing was expanded to include the voluntariness of Self's confessions. In addition to the testimony, the habeas record included, inter alia, the direct appeal record. In May 1981, the state judge entered detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, recommending that the writ be denied. Ten months later, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied this second application without written order on the findings of the trial court. Ex parte Self, Application No. 5383 (February 24, 1982).
In his second federal application, filed three years later in February 1985, Self sought relief on three grounds: (1) involuntary confession 8; (2) suppression of exculpatory evidence; and (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The magistrate judge ordered an evidentiary hearing, but cancelled it after both parties agreed that it was unnecessary, because the issues could be determined on the state record.
In a 39-page opinion, the magistrate judge recommended in August 1990 that relief be granted, on the ground that Self's conviction resulted from involuntary confessions, obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. But, it found that the suppression of evidence and ineffective counsel claims were meritless. 9
After conducting a de novo review of the state's extensive objections and the record, the district court in March 1991 adopted the recommendation. 10
"Th[e] interest in federalism recognized by Congress in enacting § 2254(d) requires deference by federal courts to factual determinations of all state courts." Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547, 101 S.Ct. 764, 769, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981). That section provides for a presumption of correctness for those findings, subject to specific exceptions. One is when, based on review of the pertinent part(s) of the record, the district court "concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record". 28 U.S.C. § 2554(d)(8). 11
We freely review the district court's legal conclusions, Johnson v. Puckett, 929 F.2d 1067, 1070 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 274, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991); but "[t]he factual findings of a federal district court in a habeas action should not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous." 12 Guzman v. Lensing, 934 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir.1991); see also Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 223, 108 S.Ct. 1771, 1777, 100 L.Ed.2d 249 (1988). However, it is well-settled in this circuit that the clearly erroneous standard of review does not apply to factual findings that result from an incorrect application of governing legal standards. E.g., Matter of Bradley, 960 F.2d 502, 507 (5th Cir.1992); Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 703 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126, 102 S.Ct. 2947, 73 L.Ed.2d 1342 (1982).
As stated, the state findings, including for the motion to suppress and the habeas application, 13 are presumptively correct unless they are not "fairly support[ed]" by the record, or another of the exceptions applies, or Self establishes "by convincing evidence" that they are erroneous. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, if the district court has made factual findings that are based on an incorrect application of the § 2254(d) governing standard, those findings are not subject to the clearly...
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