Flamer v. Chaffinch
Decision Date | 30 June 1993 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 87-546-JJF. |
Citation | 827 F. Supp. 1079 |
Parties | William Henry FLAMER, Plaintiff/Petitioner, v. Darl CHAFFINCH, Raymond P. Callaway, Harold K. Brode, William H. Porter, Defendants, and Robert Snyder, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
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Charlene D. Davis, and Joshua L. Simon, of Bayard Handelman & Murdoch, Wilmington, DE, for plaintiff/petitioner.
John K. Welch, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, DE, for defendants.
Gary A. Myers, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Georgetown, DE, for respondent.
Presently before the Court are cross Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the Respondent and the Petitioner in this habeas corpus case filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons stated herein, the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted and the Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied.
On February 7, 1979 Alberta and Byard Smith (herein referred to as the "Smiths") were found murdered in their home in Harrington, Delaware. Their nephew, William Henry Flamer ("Flamer") was arrested the same day and charged with their murders. The following day, February 8, 1979, Flamer was taken before a state magistrate at Justice of the Peace Court No. 6 in Harrington, Delaware for his initial appearance. The state magistrate read Flamer the charges lodged against him and advised him of his constitutional rights. Flamer I, 490 A.2d at 110; Flamer IV, 585 A.2d at 742. Also, at the initial appearance, a State Public Defender was appointed to represent Flamer.2
After the initial appearance, Flamer was then taken back to the Delaware State Police Troop No. 5 where he met with his mother. After she left the troop, Corporal Porter, one of the officers who had questioned Flamer the day before, approached Flamer in his cell. Flamer I, 490 A.2d at 113-14. Flamer was again read his rights by Corporal Porter, however, Flamer did not request that his recently appointed attorney be present. Flamer IV, 585 A.2d at 743. During the course of providing a tape recorded statement to Corporal Porter, Flamer admitted stabbing Byard Smith several times; however, he claimed that Andre Deputy ("Deputy"), who was apprehended with Flamer and eventually charged with the Smiths' murders, actually killed both of the Smiths.
A jury convicted Flamer of the following offenses related to the homicides of the Smiths: (1) four counts of first degree murder; (2) one count of first degree robbery; (3) one count of possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony; and (4) one count of misdemeanor theft. See Flamer III. At the close of the trial, Flamer's counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal which was denied. Subsequently, after a penalty hearing was held, the jury voted a sentence of death. Thereafter, Flamer's counsel moved to vacate the penalties, including the death penalty, on evidentiary, statutory and constitutional grounds, which was also denied. Flamer IV, 585 A.2d at 744.
The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the conviction on direct appeal in February 1983 but reserved its ruling on the issues regarding the death sentence. Flamer I, 490 A.2d at 112 n. 5, 119. Flamer moved for reargument in the Delaware Supreme Court which was denied and unsuccessfully petitioned the United States Supreme Court to review the decision. Flamer v. Delaware, 464 US. 865, 104 S.Ct. 198, 78 L.Ed.2d 173 (1983). In September 1984 the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the sentence of death that had been imposed. Flamer I, 490 A.2d at 120-53. Again, Flamer unsuccessfully sought reargument in the Delaware Supreme Court and review by the United States Supreme Court. Flamer v. Delaware, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S.Ct. 185, 88 L.Ed.2d 154 (1985).
In June 1986 Flamer sought post conviction relief pursuant to then Del.Super.Ct.Crim.R. 35. In his petition, Flamer claimed that his trial and appellate counsel had been ineffective. He also raised several other issues that had been decided adversely to him on his prior direct appeal. The Delaware Superior Court, after holding a hearing, denied the relief sought by Flamer. See Flamer III.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Superior Court and remanded the matter for Flamer to file a new application under the new state statute for post conviction relief, Del.Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61. Flamer v. Delaware, 1988 WL 235535 (Del.Supr.1988); Flamer IV, 585 A.2d at 744. Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 35 was replaced by Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 which contained new provisions related to post-conviction relief. Rule 61 was intended to apply "to all pending and future post conviction relief applications unless" it was unfeasible or unjust.3
In accordance with the Delaware Supreme Court record, Flamer filed a new motion for post conviction relief in the Delaware Superior Court. Again, in June 1989, the Delaware Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing and denied all of Flamer's claims for relief. See Flamer III. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court in December 1990 affirmed the Superior Court decision. See Flamer IV. The Delaware Supreme Court found that the claims had been resolved in prior litigation or were barred due to procedural default. Flamer IV, 585 A.2d at 745-53. In its decision, the Supreme Court rejected Flamer's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court indicated that Flamer had failed to establish that the representation provided was unreasonable to the extent that it would undermine the confidence one could have in the verdicts and sentences. Flamer IV, 585 A.2d at 753-58. Thereafter, Flamer filed this action seeking federal habeas review of his convictions and the death sentence imposed upon him.
The Court will review each claim of Petitioner and the answer of Respondent in turn.
The issue presented here is whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a taped statement of an interrogation of Flamer by Corporal Porter, a Delaware State Police detective. In the statement, Flamer admitted to planning the robbery and stabbing of Byard Smith and disclosed the location of one of the murder weapons. This statement was made during a police initiated interrogation that occurred after Flamer's Initial Appearance in the state Justice of the Peace Court where the state magistrate appointed a State Public Defender to represent Flamer "before this court, or other court, in all matters thereof, unless and until received by order of a higher Court." Flamer IV, 585 A.2d at 742 & n. 1.
Flamer contends that the appointment of counsel by the state magistrate coupled with his request to make a phone call to his mother regarding an attorney during his initial detention was sufficient to invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Thus, Flamer claims that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the trial court decided to admit the taped statement and fruits of that statement into evidence at his trial. According to Flamer, he had invoked his right to counsel prior to the police initiating the interrogation that led to his giving the statement and, therefore the admission of the statement violated the law as announced in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).
Although Edwards is not applicable retroactively, Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 104 S.Ct. 1338, 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984), it may be applicable to cases that were pending on appeal at the time of the decision. Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 105 S.Ct. 1065, 84 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985). Flamer's conviction and sentencing were on appeal at the time the Edwards decision was handed down and therefore the law as announced in Edwards may be applicable to Flamer's case. It is important, however, to reiterate the holding of Edwards in order to determine its applicability to the issues raised by Flamer. In Edwards the United States Supreme Court held:
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85.
The Delaware Superior Court in considering Flamer's petition for post-conviction relief under Criminal Rule 61 held that Flamer's actions, although sufficient to invoke his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the adjudicatory process, was not an adequate invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and, therefore Edwards was inapplicable. Flamer III, 1989 WL 70893, *9. Further, the Delaware Superior Court held that an expansion of Edwards to the extent argued by Flamer was not appropriate as it was not dictated by legal precedent existing at the time Flamer's convictions became final. Flamer III, 1989 WL 70893, *9-10. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court refused to consider Flamer's Edwards claim on the merits. Rather, the Supreme Court held that Flamer was procedurally barred from raising the Edwards claim as he had failed to raise it on direct appeal. Flamer IV, 585 A.2d at 747.
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