Selitsch v. Selitsch
| Decision Date | 14 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. M2014-00905-COA-R3-CV.,M2014-00905-COA-R3-CV. |
| Citation | 492 S.W.3d 677 |
| Parties | Angeli Chan Selitsch v. Michael John Selitsch |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Michael John Selitsch, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, Pro Se.
Brad W. Hornsby, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellee, Angeli Chan Selitsch.
FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR.
, P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ANDY D. BENNETT and RICHARD H. DINKINS, JJ., joined.
Husband filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02
motion to set aside an agreed upon Final Decree of Divorce. He claims the agreed order was the result of a mutual mistake concerning one of his military benefits and that he lacked the mental capacity to understand the agreement. The parties married in 1989. Husband retired from the military in 2009 with 100% disability. Wife filed for divorce in 2012. Over the course of several months, the parties negotiated an agreement as to the division of all of their marital property. The agreement was announced in court in August 2013, at which time both spouses were called to testify concerning their understanding and approval of the agreement. The final divorce decree was subsequently approved by the trial court and entered in January 2014. Pursuant to the final decree, Husband received the entirety of his Veterans Affairs disability benefits, and Wife received one-half of Husband's other retirement benefit. Husband subsequently filed a Rule 60.02 Motion to Set Aside Marital Agreement for Lack of Capacity and Mistake. He contended that the parties mistakenly believed that his military retirement benefit was marital property when, as a matter of law, the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act prohibits the courts from treating a disability benefit as marital property. He also contended that he lacked the mental capacity to appreciate the nature of the hearing in which he agreed to the division of marital property due to the pain and stress related to his disease, as well as his medication. The trial court denied relief on both grounds. We affirm. The trial court acted within its discretion by denying Rule 60 relief on the finding that Husband failed to present sufficient proof to obtain relief on the ground of mental incapacity. Furthermore, a mistake of law is not a ground for Rule 60.02 relief, and the trial court acted within its discretion when it denied relief on this ground and enforced the parties' agreement.
Angeli Chan Selitsch (“Wife”) and Michael John Selitsch (“Husband”) were married in 1989. Throughout the marriage, Husband was active in the military until 2008 when he was placed on the Temporary Disability Retired List for multiple sclerosis
. The following year, he was removed from the temporary list and retired at 100% disability pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1201
.
In 2012, Wife initiated divorce proceedings. Over the course of several months, the parties and their attorneys negotiated an agreement regarding the grounds of their divorce and the division of marital property. At a hearing on August 20, 2013 (“the August hearing”), the parties announced the terms of their agreement to the trial court. Importantly for purposes of this appeal, the parties announced that they had agreed that Husband's current Veterans Affairs (“VA”) disability benefits would be awarded solely to him, but that the parties would share equally Husband's other military retirement benefit. The parties also agreed that if Husband took any action to increase his VA disability, which would result in a decrease in his military retirement, Wife would be awarded one-half of the increased amount.
Husband was represented by stand-in counsel at the August hearing because counsel of record was unavailable. In response to questions from the court, Husband testified that he had fully discussed the matters at issue with his counsel of record and that he had no objection to proceeding with stand-in counsel. Husband acknowledged that the announced agreement would represent the ultimate terms of his divorce, would be reduced to writing, and would be reviewed by his counsel of record before being submitted to the court. Husband and Wife each testified that they understood the terms of the agreement and that the agreement constituted a fair and equitable resolution of their divorce. Due to the absence of Husband's counsel of record, the agreed upon final decree was not presented to the court at the hearing.
Wife's counsel submitted a proposed final decree to the court on September 4, 2013. Husband filed a timely objection concerning issues that did not pertain to the retirement benefits at issue in this appeal. Thereafter, Husband's counsel filed a series of motions to revise other provisions; nevertheless, as before, none of Husband's objections pertained to the retirement benefit. Following three months of hearings, counsel for both parties approved a proposed final decree of divorce that included the same retirement provisions as the order that had been presented for approval in September. The final decree of divorce as approved by the trial court was entered on January 13, 2014.
The final decree of divorce states in pertinent part:
Wife attempted to obtain her one-half interest of the retirement pay from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (“DFAS”) pursuant to the Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408
. However, the agency denied her application stating that, “the entire amount of the member's retired/retainer pay is based on disability, thus there are no funds available for payment under the Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act.” Wife then filed a motion under Rule 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, requesting that Husband set up an allotment allowing one-half of his “retired/retainer pay” to be sent directly to Wife as the final decree specifically authorized.
After the trial court modified the original order to set up an allotment, Husband filed a Motion to Set Aside Marital Agreement for Lack of Capacity and Mistake, contending that he lacked the capacity during the August hearing to be aware of the nature and consequences of the parties' agreement and that he mistakenly believed his military retirement was a marital asset. After a hearing, the trial court denied Husband's motion, finding that Husband was sufficiently competent and that the allotment best served the original intentions of the parties in reaching the agreement.
Although not explicitly stated in Husband's motion, the parties treat this motion as a motion under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure
. Accordingly, we analyze it as such.1 Rule 60.02 provides, in pertinent part, “[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for ... (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect ... or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02.
We review motions for relief based on Rule 60.02
grounds under an abuse of discretion standard. Underwood v. Zurich Ins. Co., 854 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Tenn.1993) ; Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479, 487 (Tenn.2012). “Abuse of discretion is found ‘only when the trial court applied incorrect legal standards, reached an illogical conclusion, based its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employed reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.’ ” Morgan, 363 S.W.3d at 487 (quoting State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 116 (Tenn.2008) ). Thus, the appellate court should “review a [trial] court's discretionary decision to determine (1) whether the factual basis for the decision is properly supported by evidence in the record, (2) whether the [trial] court properly identified and applied the most appropriate legal principles applicable to the decision, and (3) whether the [trial] court's decision was within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524–25 (Tenn.2010) (internal citations omitted).
Husband contends that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Set Aside Marital Agreement for Lack of Capacity and Mistake for two reasons. First, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion because he lacked the capacity to fully appreciate and understand the content and ramifications of the August hearing. He also argues that the court abused its discretion because, at the time that he entered into the property settlement agreement, he mistakenly believed his military retirement benefits were divisible marital...
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