Selkirk Island Corp. v. Standley

• Decision Date: 13 December 1984
• Docket Number: No. 13-83-484-CV,13-83-484-CV
• Citation: 683 S.W.2d 793
• Parties: SELKIRK ISLAND CORP., Appellant, v. M.H. STANDLEY, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 793

683 S.W.2d 793

SELKIRK ISLAND CORP., Appellant, v. M.H. STANDLEY, et al., Appellees.

No. 13-83-484-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Corpus Christi.

Dec. 13, 1984.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 3, 1985.

Barry G. Flynn, Houston, for appellant.

Robert LeBoeuf, Angleton, Wade Williams, Galveston, for appellees.

Before UTTER, YOUNG and GONZALEZ, JJ.

OPINION

UTTER, Justice.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted in favor of appellees, defendants below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Initially, appellant brought suit against appellees in trespass to try title, alleging that it owned the riverbed of a certain man-made section of the Colorado River upon which appellees each built piers extending from their respective riverside properties. The section of the Colorado River in question flows through what is commonly known as Right-of-Way Tracts Nos. 44A and 44B. In a combined Right-of-Way and Spoil-Easement Deed ("easement deed"), dated February 17, 1960, and recorded February 23, 1960, Wyatt O. Selkirk, the parties' common source of title, granted a perpetual easement to Matagorda County to use Right-of-Way Tracts Nos. 44A and 44B to construct, maintain and improve a new man-made watercourse for the Colorado River. Right of Way Tracts Nos. 44A and 44B were originally part of the western portion of Lot 4 of the Selkirk Island Subdivision.

At the time of trial, appellant owned Lot 4 of the Selkirk Island Subdivision, the unsubmerged part of which is located on the east side of the Colorado River; whereas, appellees owned respectively Lots 51 and 53 of the Exotic Isle Subdivision, the unsubmerged part of which is located on the west side of the Colorado River, adjacent to Lot 4 of the Selkirk Island Subdivision.

Both appellees claim their title to their respective riverside properties through a Warranty Deed ("warranty deed"), dated June 11, 1969, and recorded June 16, 1969, and a Correction Deed ("correction deed"), dated June 11, 1969, and recorded February 17, 1970. In said deeds, Wyatt O. Selkirk, the parties' common source of title, conveyed to T. Keith Schier a certain tract of land ("Exotic Isle"), which later became Exotic Isle Subdivision, wherein appellees' riverside properties, Lots 51 and 53, are located.

At trial, appellant filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, alleging that the summary judgment evidence established, as a matter of law, that appellees constructed their piers upon the riverbed of the Colorado River in Right-of-Way Tracts Nos. 44A and 44B, to which appellant owned fee title. Appellant alleged that it owned fee title to Lot 4 of the Selkirk Island Subdivision, including fee title to all of Right-of-Way Tracts Nos. 44A and 44B, by virtue of a Deed ("deed"), dated March 22, 1971, and recorded April 7, 1971. By said deed, Wyatt O. Selkirk conveyed Lot 4 to appellant "subject to" the warranty and correction deeds to T. Keith Schier and the easement deed to Matagorda County.

In response to appellant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, appellees each filed written responses and motions for summary judgment. In their written responses and motions for summary judgment, each appellee alleged that, by virtue of the warranty deed and correction deed to T. Keith Schier, appellees' predecessor in title, Wyatt O. Selkirk, the parties' common source in title, passed title to the center of the Right-of-Way easement and/or navigable stream, the Colorado River, by having conveyed fee title abutting said right-of-way and/or said navigable stream; therefore, as successors in title to T. Keith Schier to the riverside properties, Lots 51 and 53 of the Exotic Isle Subdivision, appellees, and not appellant, were the owners of the west half of riverbed, upon which appellees built their piers. Appellees further alleged that appellant was without right to "control" appellees' construction of the piers upon the navigable waters of the Colorado River, the control over which is vested in the State of Texas. After considering the summary judgment evidence, the trial court granted appellees' motions for summary judgment and denied appellant's motion for partial summary judgment.

In its first and third points of error, appellant, in essence, contends (1) that there existed a genuine issue of material fact regarding the ownership of the riverbed in question; and, alternatively, (2) that, as a matter of law, it was the owner of fee title to the entire riverbed in question.

By the warranty deed, Wyatt O. Selkirk, the parties' common source of title, conveyed to T. Keith Schier, appellees' predecessor in title, fee title to Exotic Isle. The warranty deed particularly described the property conveyed in a metes and bounds description, which included certain course and distance calls ("meanders") meandering "the West bank of the Dredged Channel." Subsequent to and correcting the warranty deed, the correction deed was executed by Selkirk and Schier and recited that "the specific calls for course and distance in the metes and bounds description contained in said Deed were in error inasmuch as they did not fully enclose all of the surface area of the island to the shorelines thereof.... It is the desire of the said Wyatt O. Selkirk and the said T. Keith Schier that the description in the original Deed ... be corrected." The correction deed particularly described the property conveyed in a metes and bounds description, including course and distance calls "following the meander of the Westerly shore of the New dredged channel." Both the warranty deed and correction deed were expressly made "subject to" the easement deed.

The summary judgment evidence contains the deeds to Lots 51 and 53 of the Exotic Isle Subdivision under which appellees received title to their respective riverside properties; however, neither the deeds or any other summary judgment evidence contains metes and bounds descriptions of Lots 51 and 53 showing the exact extent to which the lots extend towards the river or right-of-way easement. However, the affidavits of both appellees state that "My land borders the Colorado River which is the subject of a 'Combined Right-of-Way and Spoil Disposal Easement' granted to Matagorda County to use Right-of-Way tracts 44A and 44B." (Emphasis added.)

Appellant argues that the warranty and correction deeds reflected a definite intent on the part of the grantor, Wyatt O. Selkirk, to limit the conveyance to just the land specifically described by the course and distance calls in the metes and bounds description of the...