Sell v. Hotchkiss, s. 527-529
| Citation | 141 S.E.2d 259,264 N.C. 185 |
| Decision Date | 07 April 1965 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 527-529,s. 527-529 |
| Parties | Barbara SELL, by her Next Friend, William A. Bason, v. Arlo M. HOTCHKISS. Margaret M. COLLER v. Arlo M. HOTCHKISS. Marguerite M. HOTCHKISS v. Arlo M. HOTCHKISS. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina |
Yarborough, Blanchard & Tucker, Raleigh, for plaintiff appellees.
Lake, Boyce & Lake, Raleigh, for defendant appellant.
The essential terms of the covenant not to sue are these:
'(T)he undersigned * * * does hereby covenant and agree to forever refrain from instituting, prosecuting or in any way aiding any claim or suit against Frank Sylvester Hinkley * * * and all agents, successors, and assigns thereof, and all other persons, firms and corporations for whose acts or to whom they or any of them might be liable * * * for or on account of injuries or damages to person or property * * * sustained by or accruing to the undersigned * * * resulting from, or in any manner connected with or growing out of accident or occurrence on or about August 10, 1960, at or near U. S. Route 301 * * * Rocky Mount, North Carolina * * * All rights which the undersigned may have to proceed against all parties other than said parties are expressly reserved; and that the terms hereof are contractual and not mere recitals.'
The determinative question is: By this covenant did each plaintiff, as defendant contends, agree not to sue defendant, as well as Hinkley? Defendant's argument is:
(1) That plaintiff has covenanted not to sue:
(a) Hinkley 'and all agents, successors and assigns thereof,'
and (b) 'All other persons, firms and corporations for whose acts * * * they or any of them (i. e. Hinkley and his agents, successors, and assigns) might be liable,' (Italics ours)
or (c) 'All other persons, firms, and corporations * * * to whom they or any of them (i. e. Hinkley and his agents, successors and assigns) might be liable'; (Itlics ours)
(2) That Hinkley might be liable to defendant for contribution, since defendant is the only other possible active joint tort-feasor;
(3) That, therefore, under (1)(c) above, plaintiff has agreed not to sue defendant.
Plaintiffs' counter to this argument is that defendant's interpretation of the covenant is strained and ignores the clear intent of the parties. They correctly point out that defendant's argument ultimately hangs on the clause, 'and all other persons, firms and corporations for whose acts or to whom they or any of them might be liable,' (1)(c) above. They denominate this clause 'a perfect example of gobbledygook which sometimes creeps into stereotyped instruments.' For good measure plaintiffs then add that 'it would be a formidable challenge to the average law professor, an absurdity to the English student, and an absolute nullity to a layman of normal intelligence.'
We are compelled to agree that this covenant, at least upon first perusal, is certainly not the plain and unambiguous document which every painstaking craftsman attempts.
Since the three covenants under consideration here are in identical language, we are, we think, justified in assuming that the agreement was prepared by a representative of defendant. Indeed, we take notice that nowadays both covenants not to sue and releases are ordinarily prepared by attorneys representing the insurance company of the covenantee or releasee, and that they are intended for use in the several states, as this case illustrates. It is a rule of construction that 'an ambiguity in a written contract is to be inclined against the party who prepared the writing,' Jones v. Palace Realty Co., 226 N.C. 303, 305, 37 S.E.2d 906, 907, here defendant.
Had both parties to the covenant meant to take away the right of plaintiffs to sue defendant, how easily this result could have been accomplished by simply saying, 'The undersigned further covenants not to sue any person to whom Hinkley, his principal, or his agents, might be liable for contribution in any action growing out of the aforesaid accident.' This they did not say, but they did expressly stipulate that 'all rights which the undersigned may have to proceed against all parties other than 'said parties' are expressly reserved.' The 'said parties' are 'all other persons, firms and corporations for whose acts or to whom they or any of them might be liable.' 'They' means Hinkley, his agents, successors, and assigns.
If this final stipulation is to mean anything at all, it must mean that plaintiffs, covenantors, were reserving their rights of action against defendant. Who, then, specifically, are the 'said parties' for whose acts and to whom Hinkley, his agents, successors, and assigns (Hinkley et al.) might be liable and whom plaintiffs have agreed not to sue? The answer is, we think, that 'said parties' are those who stand in the relationship of either principal or agent to Hinkley. The 'said parties' to whom Hinkley, his agents, successors, and assigns (Hinkley et al.) might be liable would be Hinkley's principal, if any, who would be jointly and severally liable with Hinkley to third persons for Hinkley's primary negligence and whom Hinkley would be liable to indemnify for any loss Hinkley's negligence caused the principal. 'Said parties' for whose acts Hinkley et al. might be liable are their own agents, if any, for whose negligence Hinkley as principal would be similarly liable and entitled to indemnification. As to third persons, the principal and his agent are jointly and severally liable for the agent's negligent acts committed within the scope of his employment; but, when a principal's liability rests solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, he may recover over against the agent if compelled to pay damages for the agent's negligence. Steele v. Moore-Flesher Hauling Co., 260 N.C. 486, 490, 133 S.E.2d 197, 200. See Cox v. Shaw, 263 N.C. 361, 367, 139 S.E.2d 676, 681.
On the question whether a covenant not to sue the master or the servant will likewise bar a suit against the other, courts are not in agreement. 35 Am.Jur., Master and Servant § 535 (1941). See Annot., Release of (or covenant not to sue) one tort-feasor as affecting liability of others, 124 A.L.R. 1298, 1312; Annot., Release of (or covenant not to sue) master or principal as affecting liability of servant or...
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