Semple v. Semple
| Decision Date | 09 June 1925 |
| Citation | 105 So. 134,90 Fla. 7 |
| Parties | SEMPLE v. SEMPLE. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
En Banc.
Suit by John S. Semple against Marguerite O. Semple. From an order overruling a plea to complainant's bill, defendant appeals.
Reversed with directions.
Syllabus by the Court
Intention to create trust on part of grantor, not revealed to grantee at time of conveyance, held not sufficient to create trust. The intention to create a trust with which the grantor in a deed of conveyance executes a deed to another, not revealing to the grantee at the time of the conveyance such intention and of which the grantee knows nothing, and the circumstances of the transaction are not of such character that an intention of the parties to create a trust may be presumed is not sufficient to create a trust.
If intention of grantor was that grantee should enjoy beneficial interest in land, idea that resulting trust was created is inconsistent. In a transaction involving the conveyance of land, where it appears to have been the intention of the grantor that the grantee should enjoy the beneficial interest in the property, the idea that a resulting trust was created is wholly inconsistent.
Evidence to establish resulting trust must be clear, strong, and unequivocal, removing every reasonable doubt from mind of chancellor as to existence of trust. Evidence to establish a resulting trust must be so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to remove from the mind of the chancellor every reasonable doubt as to the existence of the trust.
Facts alleged in bill to declare resulting trust must show clearly intention to create trust existed between parties at time of conveyance. The ultimate facts alleged in a bill to declare a resulting trust must show clearly, strongly, and unequivocally that an intention to create a trust existed between the parties at the time of the conveyance, else the bill will be defective.
In conveyance by husband to wife, with whom he was living presumption arises that no trust was intended to be created. When a husband conveys land to his wife, with whom he is living, at the time of the conveyance, the presumption arises from the relation of the parties that no trust was intended to be created upon the land in favor of the grantor.
If cause is set down for hearing on bill and plea, facts pleaded are, for purposes of hearing, assumed true. Where a cause is set down for hearing on bill and plea, the facts pleaded are for the purposes of the hearing, assumed to be true.
On bill to declare deed of conveyance void, complainant may, under general prayer, have decree declaring conveyance to create trust; if complainant, seeking to declare conveyance void, seeks no decree declaring it a trust, he may not maintain another cause to declare it to create resulting trust. Where a bill is filed to declare a deed of conveyance, absolute and valid upon its face, to be void and of no effect, the complainant may, under the general prayer, have a decree declaring the conveyance to create a trust, if the facts warrant such a decree. But, if he neither seeks nor obtains any such relief, he may not, after an adverse final decree against him, declaring the deed to be a valid conveyance of the lands maintain another cause against the same party upon the same conveyance, to declare it to create a resulting trust in his own favor.
Plea averring former adjudication should be specific as to existence of former judgment or decree. A plea averring a former adjudication should be specific in its averments as to the existence of a former judgment or decree.
Appeal from Circuit Court, De Soto County; George W. Whitehurst, judge.
Edwin R. Dickenson, of Tampa, for appellant.
Leitner & Leitner, of Arcadia, for appellee.
In October, 1922, John S. Semple exhibited his bill in chancery against his wife, Marguerite, and prayed that the bonds of matrimony existing between them 'be declared null and void'; that the custody of their three children, a girl 17 years of age and two boys of 11 and 10 years of age, respectively, be given to him, and that a certain tract of land described as the 'northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of section 24, in township 37 south, of range 24 east, in De Soto county, Florida,' be decreed to be his property; and that the defendant, in whom rested the title to the same, be declared 'a trustee only.'
The date upon which it is stated in the transcript of the record that the bill was filed is an error. It should have been the 13th of October, 1922. The subpoena was issued upon the latter date, was served upon the defendant the following day, she entered her appearance on the 6th day of November, 1922, and interposed a plea to a part of the bill on the 29th of that month, and the transcript was filed in this court in July, 1923.
The plea was interposed to that portion of the bill alleging the conveyance of the land, described to the defendant by the complainant in December, 1906, and the prayer that it be declared to be held in trust for the complainant by the defendant. To the remaining portion of the bill the defendant answered.
The plea was overruled. From that order the defendant appealed.
The plea averred that prior to the 13th day of October, 1922, the complainant exhibited his bill of complaint against the defendant, in which he 'sought to have the same deed of conveyance described in the present bill of complaint, dated December, 9, 1906, conveying to this defendant the same land described in his bill of complaint * * * declared to be null and void and of no effect, and set aside and canceled and vacated by the court;' that, in the bill first filed, the complainant described the land as his homestead; that, on final hearing of the cause, the chancellor decreed the cancellation of the record of the deed; that, on appeal by the defendant from that order, the Supreme Court reversed the 'decision and final decree of the circuit court,' and thereby adjudicated that the 'deed here sought to be declared invalid was and is a valid deed of conveyance to this defendant, and should be so decreed, and the said matters and things were thereby finally adjudicated.'
It is contended by appellant that the plea was one of res adjudicata, because it averred that the same subject-matter was involved between the same parties, and the cause was tried on its merits, and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction in favor of complainant, one of the parties to the litigation in the instant case, on the issue that the land conveyed was the 'home place and homestead' of the complainant, and on appeal the decree of the court was reversed by the Supreme Court, which held the conveyance to be valid and should be so decreed.
The appellee contends that the issues involved in the first case were different from those presented in the instant case, in that in the former the conveyance was attacked as invalid as being an attempted conveyance of the homestead by the complainant to the defendant, there being children of their marriage, while in the instant case the conveyance is not attacked as invalid, but it is sought to impress a trust upon the land in complainant's favor because the defendant had violated the conditions on which the conveyance was made and thus destroyed its purpose.
It is alleged in the bill of complaint that the land was conveyed by the complainant to the defendant 'for the purpose of making it a home place and homestead for him and his wife and their family,' but that the 'said defendant has deserted him and has carried away his children'; that complainant is living upon the land as 'was his custom and as it was understood he should.'
It is not alleged in the bill that the defendant, in accepting the deed of conveyance, did so with any such purpose, and agreed, as consideration for the conveyance, to hold and use the land as a home place and homestead for the complainant, herself and children.
The theory of that portion of the bill relating to the conveyance of the land, and the prayer which rests upon it, is that a trust was created when the deed was executed, a trust in favor of the grantor. It is not contended that it was an express trust, because no mention of it is made in the conveyance, nor did any agreement, express or implied exist between the parties evincing an intention that the property was to be held by the grantee for the purpose alleged. It is not contended that it was an implied trust, because none of the elements of such a trust are alleged to have existed. The bill's allegations show no resultant trust, because it is not deducible from the mere nature of the transaction--the conveyance of a lot of land by a husband to his wife--nor are any facts alleged from which the...
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