Sensible Hous. Co. v. Town of Minturn

• Decision Date: 19 August 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09CA1824.,09CA1824.
• Parties: SENSIBLE HOUSING CO., INC., Plaintiff–Appellant, v. TOWN OF MINTURN, Colorado; Ginn Battle North, LLC; Ginn Battle South, LLC; and Ginn–LA Battle One, Ltd., LLLP, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

280 P.3d 36

SENSIBLE HOUSING CO., INC., Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF MINTURN, Colorado; Ginn Battle North, LLC; Ginn Battle South, LLC; and Ginn–LA Battle One, Ltd., LLLP, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 09CA1824.

Colorado Court of Appeals,
Div. IV.

Aug. 19, 2010.

[280 P.3d 38]

Appel & Lucas, P.C., Garry R. Appel, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Holland & Hart, LLP, Arthur B. Ferguson, Jr., Aspen, Colorado; Allen C. Christensen, Attorney at Law, P.C., Allen C. Christensen, Edwards, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellee Town of Minturn, Colorado.

Berg Hill Greenleaf & Ruscitti, LLP, Josh A. Marks, Michel C. Walter, Boulder, Colorado; Sarah J. Baker, P.C., Sarah J. Baker, Edwards, Colorado, for Defendants–Appellees Ginn Battle North, LLC; Ginn Battle South, LLC; and Ginn–LA Battle One, Ltd., LLLP.

Opinion by Judge DAILEY.

In this C.R.C.P. 106 action, plaintiff, Sensible Housing Company, Inc. (Sensible), appeals the district court's order dismissing on jurisdictional grounds its complaint against defendant Town of Minturn for approving the annexation of nine parcels of land allegedly owned by defendants Ginn Battle North, LLC, Ginn Battle South, LLC, and Ginn–LA Battle One, Ltd., LLLP (collectively, Ginn Battle). We reverse and remand with directions.

I. Background

In November 2005, Ginn Battle submitted to Minturn petitions for Minturn to annex nine parcels of land located in Eagle County (the disputed properties). In February 2008, after numerous public hearings, Minturn approved each petition for annexation by separate ordinance. An integral part of each ordinance was the conclusion that Ginn Battle was the titled owner of each of the disputed properties.

Prior to, and during, the annexation proceedings, however, Ginn Battle was involved in litigating title to the disputed properties with Sensible and its predecessors in interest in Eagle County District Court. See Ginn Battle Lender, LLC v. Battle Mountain Corp., Case No. 98CV374 (Battle Mountain Litigation). In pertinent part, this litigation included a quiet title counterclaim by Sensible and its predecessors in interest against Ginn Battle related to the disputed properties.

At the outset of the annexation proceedings, and once thereafter, Sensible's predecessors in interest sent Minturn letters alerting Minturn of the Battle Mountain Litigation

[280 P.3d 39]

and objecting to the annexation petitions. After Minturn annexed the disputed properties, Sensible filed the present action in Eagle County District Court, alleging that Minturn exceeded its jurisdiction and abused its discretion by approving the annexation of the disputed properties while title to those properties was being litigated in the Battle Mountain Litigation.

On June 3, 2009, the district court entered an order in the Battle Mountain Litigation granting partial summary judgment to Ginn Battle based upon its conclusion that Sensible did not have title to any of the disputed properties. Sensible has since appealed that order.

On July 21, 2009, the district court entered an order dismissing the present case under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Relying solely on its earlier order in the Battle Mountain Litigation, the court concluded that “Sensible ... has no standing, because it is neither a landowner nor a qualified elector” under section 31–12–116, C.R.S.2009; indeed, “as the situation stands now, Sensible has been found not to possess any interest in any property annexed by Minturn,” and “[t]he [c]ourt ... takes sua sponte notice of Sensible's lack of standing, and hereby dismisses this case pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1).”

II. Standard of Review

In considering a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we review the trial court's factual determinations for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Consumer Crusade, Inc. v. Affordable Health Care Solutions, Inc., 121 P.3d 350, 352 (Colo.App.2005). “Because standing is necessary to invoke jurisdiction, we review the trial court's determination [of standing] de novo.” Syfrett v. Pullen, 209 P.3d 1167, 1169 (Colo.App.2008).

III. Standing

Sensible contends the district court erroneously determined that it lacked standing to challenge Minturn's annexation of the disputed properties based upon the court's decision in the Battle Mountain Litigation. We agree.

“[T]he question of standing is really an inquiry into ‘whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief.’ ” State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. & Occupational Educ. v. Olson, 687 P.2d 429, 434 (Colo.1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). Under the Municipal Annexation Act of 1965, sections 31–12–101 to –123, C.R.S.2009 (Annexation Act), only a landowner or a qualified elector in the area proposed to be annexed has standing to request judicial review of a municipality's annexation proceedings. § 31–12–116(1)(a), C.R.S.2009.

Here, we must determine whether the district court's conclusion that Sensible lacked standing could properly be based upon its determination in a separate proceeding that Sensible had no ownership interest in the disputed properties.

A court may rely on a determination made in a separate legal proceeding and bar parties from relitigating that matter under the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. See Smeal v. Oldenettel, 814 P.2d 904, 907 (Colo.1991) (discussing doctrines under their former names, that is, res judicata and collateral estoppel, and, noting that prior judgments are deemed conclusive of claims or issues if those doctrines apply).

“Claim preclusion works to preclude the relitigation of matters that have already been decided as well as matters that could have been raised in a prior proceeding but were not.” Argus Real Estate, Inc. v. E–470 Public Highway Auth., 109 P.3d 604, 608 (Colo.2005). For a claim in a second judicial proceeding to be precluded by a previous judgment, there must exist:

(1) finality of the first judgment,

(2) identity of subject matter,

(3) identity of claims for relief, and

(4) identity or privity between parties to the actions.

Id.

Issue preclusion applies “[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and

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