Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Inc.
| Decision Date | 22 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-958 |
| Citation | 599 F.Supp.3d 426 |
| Parties | Robert Stephen SENTILLES v. HUNTINGTON INGALLS INC., et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
David Ryan Cannella, Benjamin David Rumph, Baron & Budd, P.C., New Orleans, LA, Christopher C. Colley, J. Burton LeBlanc, IV, Baron & Budd, P.C., Baton Rouge, LA, Kristopher Lynn Thompson, Baron & Budd, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Robert Stephen Sentilles.
Gustave A. Fritchie, III, Amanda Marie Crowley Fraser, David Michael Melancon, Michael Scott Minyard, Michael Kevin Powell, Timothy Farrow Daniels, Edward Winter Trapolin, Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Huntington Ingalls Incorporated.
Barrye Panepinto Miyagi, Amy Collier Lambert, John P. Murrill, T. Coulter McMahen, Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips LLP, Baton Rouge, LA, David Mark Bienvenu, Jr., John Allain Viator, Melissa Jade Shaffer, Thomas Clay Naquin, Bienvenu, Bonnecaze, Foco, Viator & Holinga, APLLC, Baton Rouge, LA, for Pelnor LLC.
McGready Lewis Richeson, David M. Stein, Francis Xavier deBlanc, III, Ernest G. Foundas, Milele N. St. Julien, Pugh, Accardo, Haas, Radecker & Carey, New Orleans, LA, Kathleen Jordan Brien, McGlinchey Stafford, Houston, TX, for Union Carbide Corporation, Bayer CropScience, Inc.
Christopher Kelly Lightfoot, Edward J. Lassus, Jr., Gabriel J. Veninata, Hailey, McNamara, Hall, Larmann & Papale, LLP, Metairie, LA, for Taylor-Seidenbach, Inc.
Mary Reeves Arthur, Forman, Watkins & Krutz LLP, New Orleans, LA, for Uniroyal Inc.
Edward T. Hayes, Marc E. Devenport, McNeil James Kemmerly, Leake & Andersson, LLP, New Orleans, LA, for Zurich American Insurance Company.
Mary Reeves Arthur, Elizabeth Riddell Penn, Forman, Watkins & Krutz LLP, New Orleans, LA, for Uniroyal Holding, Inc.
John Joseph Hainkel, III, Angela M. Bowlin, Kelly L. Long, Kelsey Eagan, Lacey Taylor McCoy, Magali Ann Puente-Martin, Roth Martin Hainkel, Frilot L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, for ViacomCBS Inc.
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Huntington Ingalls Inc. ("Avondale") seeking dismissal of plaintiff's state-law tort claims against it pursuant to the exclusivity provision of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 - 950.1 Plaintiff Robert Stephen Sentilles and defendant Pelnor, L.L.C. ("Pelnor") respond in opposition.2 Avondale replies in further support of its motion.3 Having considered the parties’ memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court issues this Order & Reasons granting the motion and dismissing Sentilles's state-law tort claims as preempted by the LHWCA's exclusivity provision.
This case involves claims of asbestos exposure. On October 27, 2020, Sentilles was diagnosed with mesothelioma.4 Sentilles filed this suit asserting Louisiana state-law tort claims against several defendants, alleging that his disease was caused by exposure to asbestos that occurred from the 1950s to the 1980s.5
More specifically, Sentilles claims that he was exposed to asbestos when he worked as a yard clerk in the insulation shop at Avondale's shipyard along the Mississippi River from May 28, 1969, to June 23, 1969.6 Sentilles testified at his deposition that the insulation shop was a hot and dusty "big tin shed on the wharf" where he made amosite insulation blankets that were used in shipboard applications to cover equipment, such as pipes and machinery.7 Sentilles remained employed at Avondale until 1972, but he was moved to an office job on June 24, 1969.8
Sentilles also claims that he was secondarily exposed to asbestos from his brother Thomas's clothes when his brother Thomas worked at Avondale.9 At his deposition, Thomas testified that he worked in Avondale's paint department for two months, beginning on May 26, 1969.10 Thomas worked on the ships, taping off areas in preparation for painting.11 There were other crafts working at the same time, including insulators, so Thomas assumes that he was exposed to asbestos at Avondale.12 Thomas and Sentilles did not ride to work together.13 The brothers shared a bedroom in the family home.14 Thomas sometimes left his clothes on the bedroom floor and their mother would do the laundry.15
Finally, Sentilles alleges that he was exposed to asbestos when he worked at Pelnor from July 31, 1974, through 1983.16
Avondale filed the instant motion for summary judgment arguing that Sentilles's Louisiana state-law tort claims against it are preempted pursuant to the exclusivity provision of the LHWCA.17 Avondale argues that the version of the LHWCA that was in effect at the time Sentilles's mesothelioma manifested in 2020 applies and, as a result, Sentilles's employment in Avondale's insulation shop meets the LHWCA's status and situs test.18 Thus, argues Avondale, Sentilles's state-law tort claims are preempted by the LHWCA.19 Avondale further argues that Sentilles's take-home exposure claim related to his brother Thomas's employment is covered by the LHWCA because that exposure was incidental to Sentilles's own employment or, alternatively, the LHWCA's non-apportionment rule applies since at least part of Sentilles's claim is covered by the LHWCA.20
In opposition, Sentilles and Pelnor argue that the "first significant exposure," not the "time of manifestation," rule should be used to determine which version of the LHWCA applies.21 And, Sentilles's first significant exposure to asbestos at Avondale occurred in 1969, meaning that an older version of the LHWCA applies, which does not cover Sentilles's work at Avondale.22 Sentilles also argues that his take-home exposure claim is not preempted by the LHWCA because it is separate and distinct from his employment at Avondale.23 Further, Pelnor argues that Avondale is taking inconsistent litigation positions by bringing this motion for summary judgment after pleading crossclaims and third-party claims for virile share liability.24
In its reply, Avondale distinguishes the cases relied upon by Sentilles and Pelnor with respect to the LHWCA preemption issue.25 Avondale also argues that Sentilles's take-home exposure claim is preempted by the LHWCA because the statute covers the occupational disease itself, not each individual injury that led to it, and apportionment of covered versus non-covered exposures is impossible.26 Finally, Avondale argues that there is nothing inconsistent about pleading rights and affirmative defenses in the alternative.27
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ). " Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. A party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the basis for summary judgment and identifying those portions of the record, discovery, and any affidavits supporting the conclusion that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the moving party meets that burden, then the nonmoving party must use evidence cognizable under Rule 56 to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
A genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. Material facts are not genuinely disputed when a rational trier of fact could not find for the nonmoving party upon a review of the record taken as a whole. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd. , 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014). Unsubstantiated assertions, conclusory allegations, and merely colorable factual bases are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Little v. Liquid Air Corp. , 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) ; Hopper v. Frank , 16 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). In ruling on a summary-judgment motion, a court may not resolve credibility issues or weigh evidence. See Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co. , 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, a court must assess the evidence, review the facts, and draw any appropriate inferences based on the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See Tolan v. Cotton , 572 U.S. 650, 656-57, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) ; Daniels v. City of Arlington , 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001). Yet, a court only draws reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant "when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little , 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n , 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990) ).
After the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmovant must articulate specific facts showing a genuine issue and point to supporting, competent evidence that may be presented in a form admissible at trial. See Lynch Props., Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co. , 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (c)(2). Such facts must create more than "some metaphysical doubt as...
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