Seolas v. Bilzerian

• Decision Date: 28 January 1997
• Docket Number: Civil No. 2:96-CV-372W.
• Citation: 951 F.Supp. 978
• Parties: Waldron Keith SEOLAS, Individually and Derivatively on behalf of Cimetrix, Inc., Plaintiff, v. Paul A. BILZERIAN, et al., Defendants, and Cimetrix Inc., Nominal Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Utah

951 F.Supp. 978

Waldron Keith SEOLAS, Individually and Derivatively on behalf of Cimetrix, Inc., Plaintiff, v. Paul A. BILZERIAN, et al., Defendants and Cimetrix Inc., Nominal Defendant.

Civil No. 2:96-CV-372W.

United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Division.

January 28, 1997.

Richard R. Mainland, John A. O'Malley, Judith A. Holiber, Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., Los Angeles, CA David B. Watkiss, Watkiss, Dunning & Watkiss, Salt Lake City, UT, for Waldron Keith Seolas.

Max D. Wheeler, Kory D. Rasmussen, Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, UT, for Cimetrix, Inc.

Paul A. Bilzerian, Tampa, FL.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, OR ALTERNATIVELY FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ON PLAINTIFF'S THIRD AND EIGHTH CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

WINDER, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the court on Defendant Cimetrix's motion for judgment on the pleadings, or alternatively for summary judgment, on Plaintiff Dr. Waldron K. Seolas' third and eighth claims for relief.¹ The court heard counsels' argument on January 3, 1996. At the hearing, David B. Watkiss represented Plaintiff and Max D. Wheeler and Korey D. Rasmussen represented Cimetrix. Before the hearing, the court had carefully considered all pleadings, memoranda, and other materials submitted by the parties. Following the hearing, the court has further considered the parties' materials, the argument of counsel, and the law and facts relevant to Cimetrix's Motion. Now, being fully advised and good cause appearing, the court enters the following memorandum decision and order.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has charged Cimetrix with violating § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 78j, and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993), and with common-law fraud. The facts of this case are fully laid out in the court's orders of August 20, 1996, and October 9, 1996. Those facts are incorporated into this order and, unless necessary, will not be repeated herein.

Plaintiff claims that in November or December 1994, Paul A. Bilzerian, acting as an agent for Cimetrix, wrongfully induced Plaintiff and his family to return approximately 215,000 shares of Cimetrix stock back to Cimetrix without monetary consideration. Plaintiff alleges that Bilzerian represented to Plaintiff that he had discovered a discrepancy between Cimetrix shareholder records regarding Plaintiff's holdings and what had been reported in prior filings with the Securities Exchange Commission. Bilzerian allegedly told Plaintiff that filing corrected SEC reports would not solve the problem. Instead, Plaintiff contends that Bilzerian represented to him that, to protect Cimetrix from an SEC investigation and a decline in the value of Cimetrix stock, Plaintiff and his family would have to return approximately 215,000 shares back to Cimetrix.

Plaintiff now claims that Bilzerian's statements were fraudulent and that he wrongfully induced the transfer of those shares. According to Plaintiff, Bilzerian overstated any possible discrepancy between the shareholder records and the SEC filings, and that if a discrepancy existed, it could have easily been corrected by an amended SEC filing. Plaintiff also contends that there was no danger to Cimetrix whatsoever as a result of such discrepancies. Plaintiff argues that Bilzerian made all of the representations knowing that they were false and for the purpose of pressuring Plaintiff and his family into returning the 215,000 shares to Cimetrix to inflate the value of Bilzerian's own stock options in the company and to use those shares in funding an employee stock option plan without diluting his own interest in Cimetrix.

II. LEGAL STANDARD UNDER RULE 12(c)

The court will treat Cimetrix's motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is governed by the same standards as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. McHenry v. Utah Valley Hosp., 927 F.2d 1125, 1126 (10th Cir.1991). The court will dismiss a cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted "`only when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. In making this determination, [the court] must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and must construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Roman v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 542, 543 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting Sharp v. United Airlines, 967 F.2d 404, 406 (10th Cir.1992)). "[I]f as a matter of law `it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,' a claim must be dismissed, without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailable one." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1832, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (citation omitted) (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5

Plaintiff's third cause of action alleges that Bilzerian, acting as an agent of Cimetrix, violated § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5, and that Cimetrix is liable for Bilzerian's alleged violation under a theory of respondeat superior. Section 10(b) states:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange —

....

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe.

15 U.S.C. § 78j.

Rule 10b-5, the parallel regulation to § 10(b), frames the prohibited conduct in similar terms:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,

(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,

(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).

Cimetrix advances three arguments in favor of dismissing this claim.² First, Cimetrix argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994), extinguishes all forms of secondary or vicarious liability under § 10(b), including liability based on respondeat superior. Second, Cimetrix asserts that even if Plaintiff's theory of respondeat superior survives the Central Bank decision the claim fails because Bilzerian's alleged misstatements were not in connection with a "purchase or sale" of securities as required by § 10(b). Third, Cimetrix challenges the sufficiency of Plaintiff's allegations.

1. Central Bank's Effect on Respondeat Superior

It is well established that § 10(b) implicitly creates a private cause of action against parties who commit a manipulative or deceptive act in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 166, 114 S.Ct. at 1443; Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n. 9, 92 S.Ct. 165, 169 n. 9, 30 L.Ed.2d 128 (1971). Before Central Bank, it was also well settled that aiding and abetting a § 10(b) violation itself gave rise to a private cause of action under § 10(b). See Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir.1992). In Central Bank, however, the Supreme Court eliminated aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b), holding that § 10(b) "prohibits only the making of a material misstatement (or omission) or the commission of a manipulative act." 511 U.S. at 177, 114 S.Ct. at 1448. Section 10(b) liability does not extend "to those who do not engage in the manipulative or deceptive practice, but who aid and abet the violation." Id. at 166-67, 177, 114 S.Ct. at 1443, 1448.

The Supreme Court's primary reasoning in the Central Bank decision was that the text of § 10(b) did not provide for aiding and abetting liability. Id. at 177, 114 S.Ct. at 1448. In determining the scope of conduct prohibited by § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the text of the statute controls. Id. at 173, 114 S.Ct. at 1446.³ Thus, because the text of § 10(b) only proscribes "manipulative or deceptive" acts, and "does not in terms mention aiding and abetting," the Court refused to extend § 10(b) liability to a party who did not itself commit a manipulative or deceptive act regardless of whether that party assisted another to commit such an act. Id. at 175, 114 S.Ct. at 1447. This is consistent with the Court's prior rulings concerning attempts by plaintiffs and the SEC to broaden the statute's reach to include conduct not prohibited by § 10(b)'s text. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235, 100 S.Ct. 1108, 1118, 63 L.Ed.2d 348 (1980) (trading securities without disclosing inside information does not violate § 10(b) unless the trader has an independent duty to disclose); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476, 97 S.Ct. 1292, 1302, 51 L.Ed.2d 480 (1977) (section 10(b) does not prohibit "a breach of fiduciary duty by majority stockholders, without any deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure" because such an act is not manipulative or deceptive conduct); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 1384-85, 47 L.Ed.2d 668 (1976) (recognizing that...