Sequoia Park Associates v. County of Sonoma

• Decision Date: 21 August 2009
• Docket Number: No. A120049.,A120049.
• Citation: 176 Cal.App.4th 1270,98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 669
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: SEQUOIA PARK ASSOCIATES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SONOMA, Defendant and Respondent.

176 Cal.App.4th 1270

98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 669

SEQUOIA PARK ASSOCIATES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SONOMA, Defendant and Respondent.

No. A120049.

Court of Appeals of California, First District, Division Two.

August 21, 2009.

[176 Cal.App.4th 1274]

Bien & Summers, Elliot L. Bien and Catherine Meulemans for Plaintiff and Appellant.

The Loftin Firm, L. Sue Loftin and Michael Stump for Rancho Sonoma Partners, Eden Gardens, Sundance Estates and Capistrano Shores as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Steven M. Woodside, County Counsel, Sue A. Gallagher and Debbie F. Latham, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent.

Aleshire & Wynder, William W. Wynder and Sunny K. Soltani for California State Association of Counties, League of California Cities, City of Carson and the City of Los Angeles as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

RICHMAN, J.

One of the subjects covered by the Subdivision Map Act (Gov. Code, § 66410 et seq.) is the conversion of a mobilehome park from a rental to a resident-ownership basis. One of the provisions on that subject is Government Code section 66427.5 (section 66427.5), which spells out certain steps that must be completed before the conversion application can be approved by the appropriate local body. Although it is not codified in the language of section 66427.5, the Legislature recorded its intent that by enacting section 66427.5 it was acting "to ensure that conversions . . . are bona fide resident conversions." (Stats. 2002, ch. 1143, § 2.)

The County of Sonoma (County) enacted an ordinance with the professed aim of "implementing" the state conversion statutes. It imposed additional obligations upon a subdivider submitting a conversion application to those required by section 66427.5. The ordinance also imposed criteria that had to be satisfied by the subdivider before the application would be presumed bona fide and thus could be approved.

A mobilehome park operator brought suit to halt enforcement of the ordinance on the ground that it was preempted by section 66427.5. The trial court declined to issue a writ of mandate, concluding that the ordinance was not preempted. As will be shown, we conclude that the ordinance is expressly preempted because section 66427.5 states that the "scope of the hearing" for approval of the conversion application "shall be limited to the issue of compliance with this section." (Id., subd. (e).)We further conclude that the ordinance is impliedly preempted because the Legislature, which has established a dominant role for the state in regulating mobilehomes, has indicated its intent to forestall local intrusion into the particular terrain of mobilehome conversions, declining to expand section 66427.5 in ways that would authorize local government to impose additional conditions or requirements for conversion approval. Moreover, the County's ordinance duplicates several features of state law, a redundancy that is an established litmus test for preemption. We therefore reverse the trial court's order and direct entry of a new order declaring the ordinance invalid.

BACKGROUND

On May 15, 2007, the County's board of supervisors unanimously enacted ordinance No. 5725 (the Ordinance). Sequoia Park Associates (Sequoia) is a limited partnership that owns and operates a mobilehome park it desires to subdivide and convert from a rental to a resident-owner basis. Within a month of the enactment of the Ordinance, Sequoia sought to have it overturned as preempted by section 66427.5. Specifically, Sequoia combined a petition for a writ of mandate with causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages for inverse condemnation of its property.

The matter of the Ordinance's validity was submitted on the basis of voluminous papers addressing Sequoia's motion for issuance of a writ of mandate. The court heard argument and filed a brief order denying Sequoia relief. The court concluded that section 66427.5 "largely does appear . . . by its own language" to impose limits on local authority to legislate on the subject of mobilehome conversions. "However, Ordinance 5725 seems merely to comply with, and give effect to, the requirements set forth in section 66427.5 rather than imposing additional requirements. This is certainly true for the language on bona fide conversions, tenant impact reports, and even general plan requirements. It is possibly less clear regarding health and safety, but even on this issue, the Ordinance does not appear to exceed [the County's] authority since, contrary to [Sequoia's] contention, it does not intrude on the [state Department of Housing and Community Development's] power in the area." This order is the subject of Sequoia's appeal.¹

DISCUSSION

The parties agree that our review of the trial court's order is de novo because it involves a pure issue of law, namely, whether the Ordinance is preempted by section 66427.5. (Apartment Assn. of Los Angeles County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 119, 132 ; Roble Vista Associates v. Bacon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 335, 339 .) But the parties do not agree on how far our analysis may, or should, extend.

Sequoia argues we should restrict our inquiry to the current version of section 66427.5, in particular paying no attention to an uncodified expression of the Legislature's intent passed at the same time that version was enacted. At the same time Sequoia also argues that we should look to a provision in a version of an amendment to the statute that the Legislature rejected in 2002.

The County's approach is similarly compressed: noting that because Sequoia challenged the legality of the Ordinance on its face, the County argues that our analysis must be confined to the four corners of that enactment, and nothing else. Yet the County ranges far afield in marshalling the statutes which it incorporates in its arguments, and tells us that section 66427.5 must be considered in the context of the "entire continuum of state regulation of mobilehome park subdivisions." And the County has no hesitation in arguing that the substance of the uncodified provision actually works to the County's benefit.

Our view of our inquiry is that it is hardly as narrow as the parties believe. The authorities cited by the County involve situations where local ordinances were challenged on federal constitutional grounds (e.g., Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 402, 892 P.2d 1145] [vagueness]; Sanchez v. City of Modesto (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 660, 679-680 [equal protection]), not that they were preempted by state law. As for Sequoia's approach, it would appear feasible only if the state statute has language stating the unambiguous intent by the Legislature expressly forbidding cities and counties from acting.

(1) But for the great number of preemption issues—particularly if the emphasis is on implied preemption—the state and the local legislation must be considered together. Only by looking at both can a court know if the local law conflicts with, contradicts, or is inimical to the state law. As will now be shown, this is an established rule of preemption analysis.

Principles of Preemption

(2) In California, preemption of local legislation by state law is a constitutional principle. "A county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws." (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7.) The standards governing our inquiry are well established. According to our Supreme Court: "The party claiming that general state law preempts a local ordinance has the burden of demonstrating preemption. [Citation.] We have been particularly `reluctant to infer legislative intent to preempt a field covered by municipal regulation when there is a significant local interest to be served that may differ from one locality to another.' [Citations.] `The common thread of the cases is that if there is a significant local interest to be served which may differ from one locality to another, then the presumption favors the validity of the local ordinance against an attack of state preemption.' [Citations.]

"Thus, when local government regulates in an area over which it traditionally has exercised control, such as . . . particular land uses, California courts will presume, absent a clear indication of preemptive intent from the Legislature, that such regulation is not preempted by state statute. [Citation.] The presumption against preemption accords with our more general understanding that `it is not to be presumed that the legislature in the enactment of statutes intends to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such intention is made clearly to appear either by express declaration or by necessary implication.' [Citations.]

(3) "Moreover, the `general principles governing state statutory preemption of local land use regulation are well settled. . . . "`Local legislation in conflict with general law is void. Conflicts exist if the ordinance duplicates [citations], contradicts [citation], or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication [citations].'"' [Citation.]

"Local legislation is `duplicative' of general law when it is coextensive therewith and `contradictory' to general law when it is inimical thereto. Local legislation enters an area `fully occupied' by general law when the Legislature has expressly manifested its intent to fully occupy the area or when it has impliedly done so in light of recognized indicia of intent. [Citation.]" (Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1149-1150 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 136 P.3d 821], fn. omitted (Big Creek).)

There are three "recognized indicia of intent": "`(1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general law as to clearly indicate that is has become exclusively a matter of state concern; ...