Serafin v. William C. Earhart Co.
| Decision Date | 28 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:18-cv-00192-YY |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER SERAFIN, Plaintiff, v. THE WILLIAM C. EARHART COMPANY, INC., CASCADE GENERAL, INC., LABORER'S LOCAL UNION 296, OREGON LABORERS'-EMPLOYERS PENSION PLAN TRUST, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Plaintiff Christopher Serafin ("Serafin") has brought an action against defendants—The William C. Earhart Company, Inc. ("Earhart"), Cascade General, Inc. ("Cascade General"), Laborers Local 737 ("Local 737"), as successor in interest to Laborers Local 296 ("Local 296"), and Oregon Laborers-Employers Pension Trust Fund ("OLEPTF")—alleging several claims under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., as well as common law fraud and negligence claims. Second Am. Compl. ("SAC"), ECF #71.
All defendants have filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF ##72-75. Given the exhaustive briefing by the parties, the court finds these motions suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to L.R. 7-1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED.1
From 1993 to 2004, Serafin was a member of Local 296, the predecessor to Local 737, and worked as a laborer for Cascade General. SAC ¶ 19, ECF #71. The applicable collective bargaining agreement required Cascade General to make contributions to Serafin's group pension plan, including disability benefits, based on the number of hours Serafin worked. Id. at ¶¶ 48-49. OLEPTF "provides disability benefits to participants who meet certain conditions." Op. and Award 6, ECF #1-4. "A board of six trustees appointed by [Local 737] and employers oversees the operations of the trust." Id. at 5. Earhart handles "the day-to-day administration of the trust[.]" Id.; SAC ¶ 14, ECF #71.
Serafin injured his right hand at the workplace in February 2002, and again in December 2002, but he was able to return to work after his doctor placed him on limited periods of light duty restrictions. SAC ¶¶ 23-24, ECF #71. In August 2003, Serafin was struck by a car from behind while riding his bicycle home from work. Id. at ¶ 25. The accident reaggravated his right-hand injury, and he was placed on periods of light duty and lifting restrictions. Id. On July 8, 2004, Serafin was given a termination notice that indicated he needed to obtain a full medical release before he could be recalled for work. Id. at ¶ 27.
Serafin applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits in 2005. Id. at ¶ 31. In January 2008, the Social Security Administration issued a decision finding Serafin disabled as of August 1, 2005. Id. at ¶¶ 31, 33; Op. and Award 7, ECF #1-4.
In February 2008, Serafin submitted a claim to OLEPTF for disability benefits under his pension plan. SAC ¶ 29, ECF #71; Op and Award 4, ECF #1-4. On June 10, 2008, OLEPTF awarded Serafin disability benefits effective April 1, 2008. Op. and Award 8, ECF #1-4. Serafin appealed by letter dated June 24, 2008, informing the plan administrator, Earhart, that he disagreed with the April 1, 2008 effective date. Id.; SAC ¶ 13, ECF #71. Serafin argued that because OLEPTF had accepted the Social Security disability determination as proof of his disability, it should have awarded him disability benefits as of August 1, 2005. Op. and Award 8, ECF #1-4; SAC ¶ 30, ECF #71.
OLEPTF issued a written denial of Serafin's appeal on October 10, 2008. SAC ¶ 13, ECF #71. OLEPTF explained that under the terms of the pension plan, disability benefits begin on the month after the claimant establishes disability to the satisfaction of the trustees. Op. and Award 8, ECF #1-4. Because Serafin provided the information establishing his disability on March 25, 2008, his disability benefits became effective on April 1, 2008. Id.
On November 26, 2008, Serafin's attorney sent Earhart a letter challenging OLEPTF's decision and requesting arbitration. Id. An arbitration hearing was held on June 30, 2009. Id. at 3; SAC ¶ 13, ECF #71. In an Opinion and Award issued on August 10, 2009, the arbitrator found that OLEPTF did not act arbitrarily in exercising its discretion to set Serafin's disability eligibility date as April 1, 2008, and not August 1, 2005. Op. and Award 15, ECF #1-4.
At some point in 2009, Serafin discovered that Cascade General underreported his hours used to calculate his benefits under the pension plan. SAC ¶ 34, ECF #71. On September 22, 2009, Serafin and Local 737 submitted additional records to Earhart for a recalculation of Serafin's benefits. Id. at ¶ 73. Serafin's benefits amount was increased based on the higher hours reflected in those documents. Id. Serafin also began settlement negotiations withOLEPTF and Earhart on September 22, 2009. Id. On September 18, 2013, upon reviewing the latest settlement offer from OLEPTF and Earhart, Serafin "noticed that the hours recorded on his paystubs did not match the hours reported by [Local 737] to Earhart," and objected to the fact that his hours had not been properly recalculated. Id. at ¶ 74. After settlement negotiations broke down in January 2018, Serafin filed this action. Id. at ¶¶ 43-44.
To state a claim for relief, a pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." F.R.C.P. 8(a)(2). This standard "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,'" but does demand "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether there is a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Taylor v. Yee, 780 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2015). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "the complaint must allege 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court must accept "all allegations of material fact as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). In addition to the allegations in the complaint, the court may also consider documents whose authenticity no party questions which are attached to or incorporated by reference into the complaint. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068,1076 (9th Cir. 2005). The court need not accept as true allegations in the complaint that contradict these sources. Lazy Y Ranch, Ltd., v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008).
Defendants contend that plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. "If the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint, the defense may be raised by a motion to dismiss" pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Jablon v. Dean Witter Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). However, "[w]hen a motion to dismiss is based on the running of the statute of limitations, it can be granted only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled." Id. (citation omitted). "In fact, a complaint cannot be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim." Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). "For this reason, [the Ninth Circuit has] reversed dismissals where the applicability of the equitable tolling doctrine depended upon factual questions not clearly resolved in the pleadings. Id. (citing Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1993); Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1199 (9th Cir. 1988); Donoghue v. Orange County, 848 F.2d 926, 931 (9th Cir. 1987)). "Similarly, [a motion to dismiss cannot be granted] if the factual and legal issues are not sufficiently clear to permit [the court] to determine with certainty whether the doctrine could be successfully invoked." Id.
As discussed more thoroughly below, the majority of Serafin's claims for relief are time-barred. Recognizing that he has waited too long to bring this action, Serafin argues the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled for two reasons. The court analyzes those arguments before discussing whether the statute of limitations bars Serafin's individual claims.
Equitable tolling is allowed "only if the litigant establishes two elements: '(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.'" Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750, 755 (2016) (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)); see also Utecht v. Diamond Lake, Inc., No. CV 16-118 (JRT/FLN), 2017 WL 6734178, at *5 (D. Minn. Dec. 29, 2017) (). "The doctrine of equitable tolling is applied sparingly." Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'n v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 210 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
Serafin first asserts that his participation in settlement negotiations with OLEPTF and Earhart from 2009 to 2018 serves as a basis for equitably tolling the statute of limitations. Pl.'s Resp. 6, ECF #77; SAC ¶¶ 63, 87, 96, 107, ECF #71. "As a general rule, a defendant will be estopped from setting up a statute-of-limitations defense when its own prior representations or conduct have caused the plaintiff to run afoul of the statute and it is equitable to hold the defendant responsible for that result."...
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