Seramonte Assocs., LLC v. Town of Hamden

• Decision Date: 18 October 2022
• Docket Number: SC 20571
• Citation: 345 Conn. 76,282 A.3d 1253
• Parties: SERAMONTE ASSOCIATES, LLC v. TOWN OF HAMDEN
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

345 Conn. 76

282 A.3d 1253

SERAMONTE ASSOCIATES, LLC

v.TOWN OF HAMDEN

SC 20571

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 4, 2022

Officially Released October 18, 2022

Brenden P. Leydon, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Zachary J. Phillipps, with whom, on the brief, was Adam J. Blank, for the appellee (defendant).

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Alexander, Js.

KAHN, J.

The sole question in this certified appeal is whether General Statutes § 12-63c (a), which requires the owners of certain rental property to "submit" income and expense information to their municipal tax assessor "not later than the first day of June," is satisfied when that information is postmarked but not delivered by that date. The plaintiff, Seramonte Associates, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, the town of Hamden. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court erred in determining that the word "submit" in § 12-63c (a) unambiguously requires that an assessor receive income and expense forms by June 1. We agree with the Appellate Court's construction of the relevant statutory text and, accordingly, affirm its judgment.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff owns three rental properties located on Mix Avenue in Hamden. The plaintiff used these three properties for the primary purpose of producing rental income during the 2015 calendar year. On February 1, 2016, the assessor for the defendant assessed 520 Mix Avenue at $15,683,080, 609 Mix Avenue at $2,927,890, and 617 Mix Avenue at $10,521,560.

On or before April 15, 2016, the assessor provided the plaintiff with separate forms on which to disclose the plaintiff's income and operating expenses for each of these three properties. Pursuant to § 12-63c (a), the plaintiff was required to complete and "submit" these forms by June 1, 2016. The assessor included a cover letter with each set of forms containing the following statement: "It should be clearly understood that if the attached report is not completed and submitted to the [a]ssessor's [o]ffice by June 1, 2016, it will result in a 10 [percent] penalty being applied to your assessment per [ § 12-63c (d) ]." (Emphasis omitted.) The cover letter also stated that "[s]ubmission means this form is physically in the [a]ssessor's office by 4:30 on June 1, 2016, faxes, emails and postmarks WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED."¹ (Emphasis omitted.)

The plaintiff mailed the income and expense forms to the assessor via the United States Postal Service on May 31, 2016. The assessor received the forms on June 2, 2016, one day after the June 1 deadline set forth in § 12-63c (a). The assessor then imposed a 10 percent penalty on the plaintiff pursuant to § 12-63c (d), amounting to $132,145.16.²

The plaintiff subsequently commenced the present action pursuant to General Statutes § 12-119, alleging that the assessor's valuation of the three properties and the 10 percent penalty imposed under § 12-63c (d) were excessive. On February 27, 2017, the plaintiff withdrew its excessive valuation claim and, instead, continued to pursue only its claim that the 10 percent penalty was improper. The plaintiff simultaneously appealed from the assessment of the penalty to the defendant's board of assessment appeals (board), which conducted a hearing on March 2, 2017, and denied the plaintiff's appeal on March 21, 2017.

On May 1, 2017, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint to include a challenge to the board's decision.³ The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment relating to the validity of the 10 percent penalty on December 21, 2017. In support of that motion, the defendant argued that the penalty was properly imposed on the plaintiff because the assessor did not receive the income and expense forms by June 1, 2016, as required under § 12-63c (a). The plaintiff, in its motion for summary judgment, argued that the penalty was improper because the statute only requires it to "submit" the materials, which, according to the plaintiff, means "to send" the materials. Thus, the plaintiff argued that its timely mailing was sufficient under the statute.

On February 5, 2019, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. In its memorandum of decision on those motions, the trial court determined that the word "submit," as it is utilized in § 12-63c (a), "is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations." Looking to various dictionary definitions of that term, the trial court concluded that the word "submit" "could mean the [assessor] must receive the forms by June 1 or that the forms must be mailed to the [assessor] by June 1." The trial court then looked to extratextual evidence of the word's meaning and resolved the ambiguity in favor of the defendant. Specifically, the trial court noted that, although the legislative history does not make it clear what the word "submit" means, it was clear that the purpose of the penalty was to "ensure that municipal assessors could accurately and equitably assess the value of commercial properties ...." The trial court also looked to this court's decision in PJM & Associates, LC v. Bridgeport , 292 Conn. 125, 971 A.2d 24 (2009), a case in which this court held that the purpose of the 10 percent penalty under § 12-63c (d) "is to compel the submission of information to assist the assessor in performing his duties." Id., at 145, 971 A.2d 24. The trial court further held that construing the word "submit" to require receipt would ensure uniformity in the tax process and consistency in enforcing the tax code, whereas the plaintiff's interpretation would frustrate the statute's fundamental purpose. The trial court also relied on a prior Superior Court decision that interpreted the language of § 12-63c to mean that an assessor must receive the tax forms by June 1. See MSK Properties, LLC v. Hartford , Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-15-6029158-S, 2017 WL 3332728 (July 3, 2017) ( 64 Conn. L. Rptr. 747, 753 ). Ultimately, the trial court rendered judgment in the defendant's favor, concluding that the word "submit," as used in § 12-63c (a) "means that the [assessor] must receive the tax forms by June 1 of each year."

The plaintiff subsequently appealed from the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court.

Seramonte Associates, LLC v. Hamden , 202 Conn. App. 467, 468, 246 A.3d 513 (2021). In that appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in its interpretation of § 12-63c by reading the word "submit" to require receipt of the income and expense forms by the assessor. Id., at 469, 246 A.3d 513. The plaintiff renewed its assertion that the ordinary meaning of the word "submit" in § 12-63c means "to send ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 474–75, 246 A.3d 513.

The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment on a different basis. The Appellate Court noted that the trial court, in concluding that the word "submit" was ambiguous based on its dictionary definition alone, failed to consider, as required under General Statutes § 1-2z, both the text of the statute and its relationship to other statutes. Id., at 477, 246 A.3d 513. On the basis of its own examination of tax statutes, the Appellate Court concluded that, when the legislature intends for the date of mailing or postmarking to be the date of submission, it includes the phrase "or postmarked ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The court held that, viewed in the context of other tax statutes, the word "submit," as used in § 12-63c (a), unambiguously requires delivery of the forms by June 1. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 479–80, 246 A.3d 513. Because there was no dispute that the plaintiff's forms were not delivered to the assessor by June 1, 2016, the court concluded that the trial court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id., at 480, 246 A.3d 513. This court subsequently granted in part the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly construe the phrase ‘who fails to submit such information,’ as it is used in ... § 12-63c (d) ?" Seramonte Associates, LLC v. Hamden , 336 Conn. 923, 246 A.3d 492 (2021).⁴

In the present appeal, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court erred in concluding that the phrase "submit ... not later than the first day of June" in § 12-63c (a) requires the assessor's receipt of the income and expense forms by that date, and not simply mailing or postmarking. The plaintiff urges that the word "submit" means "to send" and requests that the Appellate Court's judgment be reversed. The defendant, in response, claims that the Appellate Court properly interpreted the word "submit" to require that the assessor receive the income and expense forms by June 1, and urges affirmance. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the Appellate Court that § 12-63c requires receipt of the income and expense information by June 1.

Because our review of the Appellate Court's legal determination turns on a question of statutory interpretation, we exercise plenary review. See, e.g., Graham v. Commissioner of Transportation , 330 Conn. 400, 416, 195 A.3d 664 (2018). "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other...