Sermons v. State
| Decision Date | 25 June 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. S92A0259,S92A0259 |
| Citation | 262 Ga. 286,417 S.E.2d 144 |
| Parties | SERMONS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Jack E. Boone, Jr., Benjamin A. Jackson, Augusta, Stephen B. Bright, Barry J. Fisher, Atlanta, for Sermons.
Michael C. Eubanks, Dist. Atty., Augusta, for State.
Richard E. Thomas, Asst. Dist. Atty., Augusta.
Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Paula K. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., State Law Dept., Atlanta, for amicus curiae appellee.
Susan V. Boleyn, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Law, Atlanta.
This is an interlocutory appeal in a case in which the state seeks a death sentence. We address two issues: (1) the scope of permissible "victim impact" evidence, and (2) whether the defendant was entitled to a preliminary expert evaluation of hospital records to determine if the cause of one victim's death might legitimately be disputed.
1. We first address the scope of permissible "victim impact" evidence. Victim impact evidence has been defined as "simply another form or method of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2608, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). The type of evidence offered as victim impact evidence may vary, and has included evidence of the personal characteristics of the defendant and of the emotional impact of the crime on the victim's family, Payne, supra, 111 S.Ct. at 2604, as well as evidence of a victim's "family members' opinions and characterizations of the crimes and the defendant," Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987).
In the instant case, the state seeks to introduce evidence not only of the personal characteristics of the two victims and of the emotional impact of the crimes on the victims' families, but also of the emotional impact of the crimes on the community and of the psychological and physical impact of the crimes on the victims' families and community. All of this evidence is properly characterized as victim impact evidence. Sermons moved to prohibit the introduction of such evidence. The trial court denied the motion.
The state relies upon Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 111 S.Ct. 2597, in support of its contention that its victim impact evidence is admissible. In Payne, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled much of both Booth v. Maryland, supra, 482 U.S. 496, and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989). Booth and Gathers had relied on the Eighth Amendment to seriously restrict the use of victim impact evidence in death-penalty cases. Although Payne left undisturbed Booth's holding that the state could not use information or testimony concerning "a victim's family members' characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence," Payne, supra, 111 S.Ct. at 2611 (fn. 2), 1 the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the Eighth Amendment does not erect a per se bar to evidence relating to the victim's personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the crime on the victim's family, Payne, supra, 111 S.Ct. at 2604, 2609. Moreover, we also agree with Justice O'Connor's assessment that the Eighth Amendment is not a per se bar to evidence of the impact of the crime or crimes on the community. Payne, supra, 111 S.Ct. at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
However, as the defendant argues, Payne does not require that victim impact evidence be admitted in death penalty cases; it merely holds
that if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact evidence ... the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar. [Payne, supra, 111 S.Ct. at 2609.]
The question to be answered, then, is the extent to which Georgia law permits the introduction of victim impact evidence.
In Muckle v. State, 233 Ga. 337, 338-39(2), 211 S.E.2d 361 (1974), this Court reversed the sentence imposed in a rape case because the state had introduced testimony "concerning the psychological effect of the crime on the victim." We held that such evidence was not admissible as evidence in aggravation under (what is now codified as) OCGA § 17-10-2. 2 The Muckle rule is intended to avoid confusion and prejudicial digression in sentencing. Thus, although the facts of Muckle involved only psychological impact evidence, its rationale precludes the introduction of testimony at the sentencing trial for the specific purpose of demonstrating the personal characteristics of the victim and the psychological, emotional, and physical impact of the crime on the victims' families and community.
We emphasize, however, that Muckle does not preclude the state...
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...phase concerning the "personal characteristics of the victim," including his bad character and criminal record. Sermons v. State, 262 Ga. 286, 288, 417 S.E.2d 144 (1992). The general rule is that the character of the victim is not relevant, and the defendant is no more entitled to present s......
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