Sernovitz v. Dershaw
| Decision Date | 18 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 123 MAP 2014,124 MAP 2014,s. 123 MAP 2014 |
| Citation | 127 A.3d 783 |
| Parties | Rebecca SERNOVITZ and Lawrence Sernovitz, Individually and as Parents and Natural Guardians of Samuel Sernovitz v. Stuart Z. DERSHAW, M.D., John Stack, M.D., Laura Borthwick–Scelzi, M.D., Margaret M. Fillinger, CRNP, Women's Care of Montgomery County, Holy Redeemer Hospital and Medical Center and Holy Redeemer Health System, Inc. The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Intervenor. Appeal of Stuart Z. Dershaw, M.D., John Stack, M.D., Laura Borthwick–Scelzi, M.D., Margaret M. Fillinger, CRNP, Women's Care of Montgomery County, Holy Redeemer Hospital and Medical Center and Holy Redeemer Health System, Inc. Rebecca Sernovitz and Lawrence Sernovitz, Individually and as Parents and Natural Guardians of Samuel Sernovitz v. Stuart Z. Dershaw, M.D., John Stack, M.D., Laura Borthwick–Scelzi, M.D., Margaret M. Fillinger, CRNP, Women's Care of Montgomery County, Holy Redeemer Hospital and Medical Center and Holy Redeemer Health System, Inc. The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Intervenor. Cross Appeal of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Intervenor. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Jonathan F. Bloom, Esq., Ian Michael Long, Esq., Karl Stewart Myers, Esq., Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young, L.L.P., Philadelphia, David E. Somers III, Esq., for General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Richard P. Abraham, Esq., Theodore J. Caldwell Jr., Esq., Young Ricchiuti Caldwell & Heller, L.L.C., Philadelphia, for Rebecca & Lawrence Sernovitz.
Donald N. Camhi, Esq., Sheila Ann Haren, Esq., Barbara S. Magen, Esq., Post & Schell, P.C., Philadelphia, for Stuart Z. Dershaw, M.D., Holy Redeemer Health System, Inc., et al.
OPINION
In this discretionary appeal, we address a legislative-process challenge to a 1988 enactment raised in the context of a professional negligence lawsuit filed in 2010 and asserting causes of action for wrongful birth.
By way of background, the legislation in issue—Act 47 of 1988 ("Act 47")—began as a bill which contained a single provision relating to the appointment of substitute bail commissioners in Philadelphia. During its passage through the General Assembly, it was amended several times. In its final form, the bill contained multiple substantive sections, all amending Title 42 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, that is, the Judicial Code. In addition to its original provision, the bill encompassed sections which: repealed the Post Conviction Hearing Act ("PCHA") and enacted the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") in its place; conferred on this Court exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals in capital cases; mandated minimum sentences for offenses committed while impersonating a law enforcement officer; precluded the dismissal of felony charges at a preliminary hearing solely due to the prosecutor's or victim's failure to appear; limited defenses against claims for injuries sustained while in utero; and precluded causes of action for wrongful birth and wrongful life. The bill was approved by both Houses and signed into law by Governor Casey on April 13, 1988. The section barring wrongful birth claims, which is at the center of this litigation, was codified at Section 8305 of the Judicial Code.1
Section 8305 has been consistently upheld against substantive constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Dansby v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 424 Pa.Super. 549, 623 A.2d 816 (1993), appeal denied, 539 Pa. 650, 651 A.2d 538 (1994) (per curiam ). The attack on its validity here arises as part of a broader argument that Act 47 is constitutionally infirm in its entirety due to a failure to comply with legislative-process requirements contained in Article III of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The context for this challenge, as noted, is a professional negligence action, as set forth below.
Rebecca Sernovitz sought medical care after becoming pregnant.2 Because she and her husband are both of Ashkenazi Jewish heritage, their child was at increased risk of suffering from a genetic disorder known as familial dysautonomia
("F.D."). Therefore, as part of her prenatal care Mrs. Sernovitz underwent genetic testing, which showed she was a carrier of the gene mutation for F.D. Her treating physicians, however, negligently misinformed her about the test results, telling her she was not a carrier. Thereafter, Mrs. Sernovitz gave birth to a son, Samuel, who suffers from F.D. and will suffer from the disorder for the rest of his life. Mrs. Sernovitz later learned that both she and her husband are carriers of the mutation. If she had been correctly informed of the results of her test in a timely manner, further testing would have ensued, which would eventually have revealed Samuel's condition while he was still in utero. Had that occurred, Mrs. Sernovitz would have obtained an abortion.
In October 2010, Mr. and Mrs. Sernovitz ("Plaintiffs") filed an amended complaint against the health-care providers and their employers and corporate parents ("Defendants"), asserting claims for wrongful birth and seeking damages for medical expenses and emotional distress.3 Although Section 8305(a) of the Judicial Code bars such claims, see supra note 1, Plaintiffs alleged that Act 47 was unconstitutional in its entirety on several grounds. In particular, they averred that: the act's original purpose was changed during its passage through the General Assembly, contrary to Article III, Section 1; it contained more than one subject, in violation of Article III, Section 3 ; and, in its final form, it was not considered on three days in each House, thus failing to conform with Article III, Section 4. See PA. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 3, 4 ().4
Defendants filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, stating that Plaintiffs' claims were precluded by Section 8305. In a supporting brief, Defendants argued that Act 47's enactment complied with Article III and, moreover, a finding of unconstitutionality more than 22 years after the act became law would have far-reaching effects relative to potentially thousands of cases that have been adjudicated since 1988. In response, Plaintiffs suggested that the court could invalidate Section 8305 and sever it from the remainder of Act 47. In this regard, Plaintiffs observed that, in Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 583 Pa. 275, 877 A.2d 383 (2005) ("PAGE "), this Court upheld most of the challenged enactment because virtually all of its provisions related to a single subject—regulation of the gaming industry—but severed two sections which disbursed monies from the State Gaming Fund to causes unrelated to gambling. See id. at 307–08, 877 A.2d at 402–03. As applied here, Plaintiffs proffered that most of Act 47 relates to a single subject, but that Section 8305 is distinct from that subject. However, Plaintiffs did not identify the single subject to which they believed most of Act 47 pertained.
The common pleas court determined that the act complied with Article III, sustained the preliminary objections on the basis that the wrongful-birth claims were barred by Section 8305, and dismissed the amended complaint. Plaintiffs appealed, repeating their substantive arguments grounded on Article III, Sections 1, 3, and 4, and reiterating their position that Section 8305 could be severed from Act 47 if necessary.
A three-judge panel of the Superior Court reversed in a published decision. See Sernovitz v. Dershaw, 57 A.3d 1254 (Pa.Super.2012). Focusing on the single-subject claim, the court determined that there was no unifying topic to which all aspects of Act 47 pertained. Thus, the intermediate court held that the act violated the single-subject rule. See id. at 1263–64. The court concluded, however, that in spite of the single-subject violation, the principal topic of the legislation was "post-trial matters in criminal cases," an area which was addressed by items such as the PCRA and the mandatory-minimum sentencing provision. Id. at 1266. Based on that premise, and applying a germaneness analysis, the court left those aspects of Act 47 in force while invalidating and severing four provisions that it viewed as unrelated to such purpose—including Section 8305.5
Having stricken Section 8305, the Superior Court reversed the common pleas court's order dismissing the amended complaint and remanded for further proceedings.See id.6
Defendants requested reconsideration or reargument en banc, stating, among other things, that the court should have applied the laches doctrine to avoid setting aside, on procedural grounds, a statute that had been enacted 22 years earlier and whose provisions had been relied on by hundreds, if not thousands, of litigants and potential litigants—including felony defendants whose charges were not dismissed at a preliminary hearing and individuals who elected not to assert wrongful-birth claims due to the substantive validity of Section 8305. See generally Stilp v. Hafer, 553 Pa. 128, 134, 718 A.2d 290, 293 (1998) (). Defendants additionally argued that, in rejecting the concept that amending Title 42 could constitute a valid single subject, the court overlooked that all of Act 47's provisions relate to the narrower topic of "civil and criminal proceedings in Pennsylvania courts."
After obtaining leave to intervene, the General Assembly also applied for reargument en banc.7 The Assembly agreed with Defendants' argument that laches should have rendered Act 47 immune to procedural...
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Sernovitz v. Stuart Z. Dershaw, M.D., John Stack, M.D., Laura Borthwick-Scelzi, M.D., Margaret M. Fillinger, CRNP, Women's Care of Montgomery Cnty., Holy Redeemer Hosp. & Med. Ctr. & Holy Redeemer Health Sys., Inc.
...127 A.3d 783Rebecca SERNOVITZ and Lawrence Sernovitz, Individually and as Parents and Natural Guardians of Samuel Sernovitzv.Stuart Z. DERSHAW, M.D., John Stack, M.D., Laura Borthwick–Scelzi, M.D., Margaret M. Fillinger, CRNP, Women's Care of Montgomery County, Holy Redeemer Hospital and Me......