Serrano v. Chicken-Out Inc.

• Citation: 209 F.Supp.3d 179
• Decision Date: 22 July 2016
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 15-cv-0276 (KBJ)
• Parties: Maria SERRANO, Plaintiff, v. CHICKEN-OUT INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)

209 F.Supp.3d 179

Maria SERRANO, Plaintiff,

v.CHICKEN-OUT INC., et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 15-cv-0276 (KBJ)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed July 22, 2016

Dennis A. Corkery, Matthew K. Handley, Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights & Urban Affairs, Jennifer I. Klar, Sasha Samberg-Champion, Jamie L. Crook, Relman, Dane & Colfax PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Richard Hindin, Chevy Chase, MD, pro se.

MEMORANDUM OPINION ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

KETANJI BROWN JACKSON, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Maria Serrano ("Plaintiff") filed her complaint in this matter on February 24, 2015, alleging that defendants Chicken-Out, Inc. ("Chicken-Out"), Chicken Out the Door Inc. ("Chicken Out the Door"), Nicholas Cordone, Richard Hindin, and Joseph Marinucci failed to pay her overtime and other wages that were due to her under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and D.C. and Maryland wage laws. Plaintiff has since voluntarily dismissed her claims against defendants Cordone, Hindin, and Marinucci. (See Mot. to Dismiss Claims Against Defs. Nicholas Cordone, Joseph Marinucci, & Richard Hindin Without Prejudice ("Mot. to Dismiss"), ECF No. 28; Minute Order of Jan. 12, 2016 Granting Mot. to Dismiss.)¹

Plaintiff served the complaint on Chicken Out the Door on April 1, 2015, and later served Chicken-Out on May 5, 2015. (See Return of Service/Affidavit, ECF No. 10; Return of Service/Affidavit, ECF No. 17.) On May 11, 2015, the Clerk of Court filed an entry of default against Chicken Out the Door, noting that that defendant had failed to respond to the complaint or otherwise defend itself in this litigation. (See Entry of Default, ECF No. 14.) The Clerk of Court similarly filed an entry of default against Chicken-Out on June 29, 2015. (See Entry of Default, ECF No. 20.) Plaintiff moved for default judgment with respect to her claims against Chicken Out the Door and Chicken-Out on February 24, 2016 (see ECF No. 31), and on April 12, 2016, this Court referred Plaintiff's motion for default judgment to a Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation (see Minute Order of April 12, 2016).²

The assigned Magistrate Judge, G. Michael Harvey, issued a Report and Recommendation regarding Plaintiffs' motion on May 13, 2016 (R & R, ECF No. 12, attached hereto as Appendix A), which reflects his belief that Plaintiff's motion for default judgment should be granted in part and denied in part. (R & R. at 1.) Specifically, Magistrate Judge Harvey found that Chicken Out the Door and Chicken-Out "willfully violated the FLSA, DCMWA, MWHL, and MWPCL when they failed to pay Plaintiff overtime compensation and failed to pay her for her last two-and-a-half weeks of work[,]" (id. at 10), and that Plaintiff is entitled to the full amount of unpaid wages, overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorney's fees, and costs that she requests in her motion, as well as post-judgment interest (id. at 10–25). Magistrate Judge Harvey recommended that this Court deny Plaintiff's request for prejudgment interest under the FLSA because that statute delineates the exclusive remedies for any violations—specifically, unpaid wages, unpaid overtime, and liquidated damages—and the Report and Recommendation recommends that this Court award those remedies. (Id. at 25–26.)

Magistrate Judge Harvey's Report and Recommendation also specifically advised the parties that failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of further review of the matters addressed in the Report and Recommendation. (Id. at 26.) Under this Court's local rules, any party who objects to a Report and Recommendation must file a written objection with the Clerk of the Court within 14 days of the party's receipt of the Report and Recommendation. LCvR 72.3(b).

As of the current date—more than two months after the Report and Recommendation was issued—no objections have been filed. Moreover, this Court has reviewed Magistrate Judge Harvey's Report and Recommendation, and it agrees with the report's analysis and conclusions. Therefore, as set forth in the separate order that accompanies this Memorandum Opinion, the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge entered in this matter on May 13, 2016, is ADOPTED in its entirety. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part , and JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF in the amount of $5,628.00 in unpaid wages, overtime compensation, and liquidated damages; $1,609.30 in attorney's fees; and $574.50 in costs, plus post-judgment interest as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1961.³

Appendix A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MARIA SERRANO Plaintiff,

v.

CHICKEN-OUT, INC. et al., Defendants.

Case No. 15–cv–276 (KBJ/GMH)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter was referred to the undersigned for a report and recommendation on Plaintiff's motion for default judgment. Defendants Chicken-Out, Inc. and Chicken Out the Door, Inc. employed Plaintiff in their fast-food restaurants. They did not pay her overtime and other wages she was due under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and D.C. and Maryland law. As a result, she brought the instant suit. Defendants failed to appear, forcing Plaintiff to seek a default judgment against them. After reviewing the entire record,¹ the undersigned recommends that the Court grant in part and deny in part Plaintiff's motion.

BACKGROUND

Defendants operated fast-food chicken restaurants in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia. Compl. ¶ 23. Plaintiff initially worked at one of Defendants' D.C. locations as a salad and sandwich maker and as a cashier. Id. ¶ 37. She worked at this restaurant beginning in the summer of 2010. Id. She was paid a wage of $9.00 per hour. Id. She regularly worked forty-two hours per week but was never paid overtime wages. Id. ¶ 38. The D.C. restaurant where she worked closed in October 2013, at which time Plaintiff's employment ceased. Id. ¶ 41.

Approximately five weeks later, Defendants asked Plaintiff to work in the same capacity at one of their Rockville, Maryland locations. Id. ¶ 42. She worked at the Maryland restaurant from late November 2013 through May 15, 2014, when that restaurant too closed. Id. ¶¶ 43, 48. For the period from her start at the Rockville restaurant through March 2014, Plaintiff again consistently worked forty-six hours per week but was never paid overtime wages. Id. Defendants justified this failure by telling Plaintiff that they did not pay overtime and that "she should be grateful for the extra hours of work." Id. ¶ 46. For the period from April 2014 to the restaurant's closure, Plaintiff did not work any overtime. Id. ¶ 48. However, she claims that she was never paid at all for her work from April 28, 2014, to May 15, 2014. Id. ¶ 49. After the Rockville location closed, Defendants asked Plaintiff to work at their restaurant in McLean, Virginia. Id. ¶ 50. Because she had not been paid for her two-and-a-half weeks of work, she refused. Id.

In this suit, Plaintiff claims that Defendants' failure to pay her overtime wages violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. , the D.C. Minimum Wage Act Revision Act ("DCMWA"), D.C. Code § 32–1001 et seq. , and the Maryland Wage and Hour Law ("MWHL"), Md. Code Lab. & Empl. § 401 et seq. Compl. ¶¶ 75–93. She further claims that Defendants' failure to pay her at all for her last two-and-a-half weeks of work at the Rockville restaurant violated the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law ("MWPCL"),² Md. Code Lab. & Empl. § 3-501 et seq. Compl. ¶¶ 94–99. As relief, Plaintiff requests that the Court award her: (1) the unpaid wages and overtime compensation which she is owed, plus an additional amount as liquidated damages; (2) prejudgment interest on all amounts owed; and (3) her reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred in this action. Compl. at 18–20.

Plaintiff originally brought these claims against three additional defendants—individuals whom Plaintiff alleged were owners or managers of the two corporate defendants. See id. ¶¶ 17–19. On Plaintiff's motion, those three defendants have been dismissed from this case. See Jan. 13, 2016 Minute Order. Plaintiff also originally brought her claims under the FLSA, the DCMWA, and the MWHL on her own behalf and on behalf of those similarly situated—known in the wage-law world as a "collective action"—she has requested that those claims be voluntarily dismissed. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Class and Collective Action Claims [Dkt. 30].³

The instant motion seeks a default judgment against the remaining two defendants—Chicken-Out, Inc. and Chicken Out the Door, Inc. Mot. at 1. The Clerk of the Court entered default against Chicken Out the Door on May 11, 2015, and against Chicken-Out on June 29, 2015. See Clerk's Entry of Default as to Chicken Out the Door, Inc. [Dkt. 14]; Clerk's Entry of Default as to Chicken-Out, Inc. [Dkt. 20]. Because Defendants have not appeared, as a matter of course no response to Plaintiff's motion has been filed.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Default Judgment

Obtaining a default judgment requires two steps. Lanny J. Davis & Assocs. LLC v. Republic of Equatorial Guinea , 962 F.Supp.2d 152, 161 (D.D.C.2013). First, the plaintiff must request that the Clerk of the Court enter default against a party who has "failed to plead or otherwise defend." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, the plaintiff must move for entry of a default judgment. Id. 55(b). Default judgment is available when "the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party." Boland v. Elite Terrazzo Flooring, Inc. , 763 F.Supp.2d 64, 67 (D.D.C.2011). "Default establishes the defaulting party's liability for the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint."Id.

However, "[t]he court has considerable latitude in determining the amount of damages." Id. (citation omitted). "Although the default establishes a defendant's liability, the court is required to make an...