Service Armament Co. v. Hyland

• Decision Date: 15 July 1976
• Citation: 362 A.2d 13,70 N.J. 550
• Parties: SERVICE ARMAMENT CO., a New Jersey Corporation, et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. William F. HYLAND, Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 550

70 N.J. 550

362 A.2d 13

SERVICE ARMAMENT CO., a New Jersey Corporation, et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. William F. HYLAND, Attorney General of the State of New

Jersey, Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued April 29, 1975.

Decided July 15, 1976.

Solomon Rosengarten, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellant (William F. Hyland, Atty. Gen., attorney pro se; Solomon Rosengarten, of counsel and on the brief).

Charles J. Irwin, Newark, for plaintiffs-respondents (Irwin & Post, Newark, attorneys).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

CLIFFORD, J.

We are called upon in this litigation to construe that section of the New Jersey Gun Control Law of 1966 (L.1966, c. 60; N.J.S.A. 2A:151--1 Et seq.) which exempts antique firearms from the regulatory provisions and sanctions of the statute. Specifically we must determine if the replicas of antique muzzle-loading pistols, revolvers, and rifles which the corporate plaintiffs manufacture and sell and the associational and individual plaintiffs collect are indeed 'antique firearms' and thus excluded from the Act.

The history behind this case is set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Division, 131 N.J.Super. 38, 43--45, 328 A.2d 246 (1974). Briefly, that history reveals that for seven years after the Gun Control Law was passed, it was the position of the Attorney General's office that replicas of antique firearms were, by virtue of N.J.S.A. 2A:151--18, not subject to regulation. On July 10, 1973, in response to an inquiry by the Bergen County Prosecutor, then Attorney General Kugler advised law enforcement officials that the replicas were to be treated as any other regulated firearm and hence were to be made subject to the licensing, recording, and permit provisions of the statute. Firearms dealers in New Jersey were duly notified by the State Police of the applicable restrictions. Plaintiffs--four corporations dealing in muzzle-loading firearms using black powder, a sportsmen's organization, an association of Civil War firearms enthusiasts, and an individual collector of Revolutionary War antique firearms--brought an action in the Appellate Division seeking a review of the Attorney General's opinion and challenging the State Police notification based thereon. That case was dismissed on the grounds that neither the Attorney General's opinion nor the notification was a final decision or action reviewable by the court within the contemplation of R. 2:2--3(a).

Plaintiffs then, by a separate proceeding in the Law Division, sought (a) a declaration that the exemption applied to replicas and (b) an injunction against enforcement of the Gun Control Law's regulations as interpreted in the revised position of the Attorney General's office. On cross-motions for summary judgment plaintiffs prevailed. Thereupon the State applied for a stay of the trial court's judgment, which was granted by the Appellate Division. We reviewed that stay on an emergent basis and declined to dissolve it. Subsequently the Appellate Division heard argument and affirmed the Lower court's decision in plaintiffs' favor. 131 N.J.Super. 38, 328 A.2d 246 (1974). We granted the State's petition for certification. 67 N.J. 80, 335 A.2d 33 (1975). We now reverse.

I

The statute at issue, N.J.S.A. 2A:151--18, ¹ exempts three types of antique firearms while leaving the term 'antique firearm' undefined. Excluded from the Gun Control Law are: (1) antique firearms which are inoperable; (2) antique firearms which do not fire fixed ammunition; and (3) antique firearms manufactured before 1898 for which catridge ammunition is unavailable commercially. These guns must be possessed as curiosities or for their ornamental or historical value to qualify for the exception.

Plaintiffs manufacture, sell, and collect replicas of black powder muzzle-loaders, and they argue that these firearms, which are operable but which do not fire fixed ammunition, are identified in N.J.S.A. 2A:151--18 and thus fall within the exception set out by the statute. This contention is supportable if the term 'antique' contemplates a replica.

Our concern, then, being with the meaning of what the Legislature said, we resort to that overriding principle of statutory construction that in the absence of an explicit indication of special meaning, words will be given their ordinary and well-understood meaning. Safeway Trails Inc. v. Furman, 41 N.J. 467, 487, 197 A.2d 366, Cert. den., 379 U.S. 14, 85 S.Ct. 144, 13 L.Ed.2d 84 (1964); Fahey v. City of Jersey City, 52 N.J. 103, 107, 244 A.2d 97 (1968). The pertinent definitions of the term 'antique' when used as an adjective are set forth in Websters' Third New International Dictionary as follows: ²

1: existing since ancient or former times; among the oldest of its class. * * * 2: of or belonging to earlier periods: ANCIENT. * * * 3: exhibiting the sytle or fashion of ancient or former times: OLD-FASHIONED, ARCHAIC. * * * 5: * * * b: having the appearance of age: suggesting the crafts of an older period. * * *

Plaintiffs champion the third sense, 'exhibiting the style or fashion of ancient or former times'; and the fifth sense, 'having the appearance of age,' also lends credibility to their argument. We discern an emphasis on age, however, permeating the senses listed in Webster's. For example, Webster's directs the reader to the adjective 'old' as a synonym of the word 'antique.' This stress on age extends through the pertinent definitions of 'antique' when it is used as a noun:

1a: A relic or object of ancient times or of an earlier period than the present b: a work of art, piece of furniture, or decorative object made at a much earlier period than the present and according to U.S. customs laws at least 100 years old. * * *

Further, it strains the general conception of an antique to apply the term to an unlimited series of artifacts in various stages of present production. At least part of the real value of an antique lies in its age and hence in its uniqueness. The meaning plaintiffs assert isolates style as the determinative factor and eliminates longevity and finiteness.

Satisfied as we may be that without further clarification the term 'antique' in its conventional, accepted sense means 'old,' we are fully aware that others engaged in the same legal inquiry have disagreed. It would be disingenuous to insist, therefore, that the term is not under a cloud, at least in this context.

II

Before undertaking to resolve whatever ambiguity may be said to attach to the statutory language, we pause here to observe that in other jurisdictions with gun control legislation, the exception for antique weapons may expressly include replicas in the category. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(16), defining an antique firearm as 'any firearm * * * manufactured in or before 1898; and * * * any replica * *'; and the Florida statute, F.S.A. § 790.001(1): 'any firearm manufactured in or before 1898 * * * or replica thereof, whether actually manufactured before or after the year 1898; * * *.' See also Missouri Statutes, V.A.M.S. § 564.630(5), and Tennessee Statutes, Tenn.Code Ann. § 39--4917(f). Twice our Legislature has declined to act on bills undertaking to impose a revised gun control scheme which would have indicated that replicas were not exempted by the antique firearm provision, facts of legislative history which we do not read as an index to legislative intent. They do, however, suggest an awareness on some legislators' part--an awareness shared by the language of the federal and the other states' acts--that replicas do not fall automatically into the category of antique firearms.

III

We move past the threshold examination of the plain meaning of the language mindful that N.J.S.A. 2A:151--18 sets forth an exception to the provisions of a comprehensive statutory scheme. Therefore, when we construe this section, we are guided by both the legislative intent and the general principle that exceptions in a legislative enactment are to be strictly but reasonably construed, consistent with the manifest reason and purpose of the law. Wright v. Vogt, 7 N.J. 1, 6, 80 A.2d 108 (1951); Palkoski v. Garcia, 19 N.J. 175, 181, 115 A.2d 539 (1955). Emphasizing these considerations, the United States Supreme Court has held that where the purpose of legislation is remedial and humanitarian, any exemption must be narrowly construed, giving due regard to the plain meaning of the language and the legislative intent. 'To extend an exemption to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the interpretative process and to frustrate the announced will of the people.' Phillips v. Walling,324 U.S. 490, 493, 65 S.Ct. 807, 808, 89 L.Ed. 1095, 1099 (1945) (construing exceptions to employers' responsibilities under the Fair Labor Standards Act). See Yellow Cab Co. v. New Jersey, 126 N.J.Super. 81, 86, 312 A.2d 870 (App.Div.1973), where the court used a similar approach in construing our Wage and Hour Law, N.J.S.A. 34:11--56a Et seq.

We have characterized the Gun Control Law as 'highly purposed and conscientiously designed toward preventing criminal and other unfit elements from acquiring firearms while enabling the fit elements of society to obtain them with minimal burdens.' Burton v. Sills, 53 N.J. 86, 105, 248 A.2d 521, 530 (1968). The remedial nature of the legislation, its paramount social purpose, and its passage after considerable effort and lobbying by its supporters and attackers all give weight to the proposition that the Legislature meant precisely what it said, and therefore an exception to the Gun Control Law must be given a narrow construction. Practically speaking, it is far more likely in light of the aims of the Act that the Legislature carved out an exception for a limited number of weapons--those which are genuine antiques--than that it excluded from the statute's reach an open-ended series of weapons whose number, while not limitless, is nevertheless largely...