Sessa v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co.

• Decision Date: 02 May 2016
• Docket Number: CV156030881
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Dora Sessa v. Amica Mutual Insurance Company et al

Dora Sessa v. Amica Mutual Insurance Company et al

No. CV156030881

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Britain, New Britain

May 2, 2016

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE #114

Cynthia K. Swienton, J.

The issue presented is whether the court should grant Amica Mutual Insurance Company's motion to strike counts one and two of the complaint because New York law applies and renders the counts legally insufficient.

FACTS

The plaintiff, Dora Sessa, filed a four-count complaint on September 28, 2015, against the defendants Raffaella Coler and her auto insurance carrier, Amica Mutual Insurance Company (" Amica"), for injuries arising out of a motor vehicle accident.^[1] The complaint alleges the following facts. On July 5, 2014, the plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Coler traveling in New York. Coler fell asleep at the wheel and lost control of her vehicle, causing injuries to the plaintiff. At the time of the accident Coler was insured by Amica. Sessa and Coler are residents of Connecticut, Amica is licensed insurance agency in Connecticut and Coler's auto insurance policy was issued in Connecticut. Count one of the complaint alleges " common law bad faith" against Amica for denied reimbursement of the plaintiff's medical bills. Count two alleges violation of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (" CUIPA"). Counts three and four sound in negligence and recklessness, respectively, against Coler for losing control of her vehicle and causing the accident.

Amica filed a motion to strike counts one and two of the complaint. The plaintiff filed an objection. A reply was filed to the objection by the defendant and the plaintiff filed a supplemental brief. Parties presented oral argument at short calendar.

DISCUSSION

Motion to Strike

" [A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court . . . [The court] construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Moreover, [the court notes] that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coppola Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enterprises Ltd Partnership, 309 Conn. 342, 350, 71 A.3d 480 (2013).

Furthermore " [i]t is well established that a motion to strike must be considered within the confines of the pleadings and not external documents, such as the agreement between the parties. We are limited . . . to a consideration of the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zirinsky v. Zirinsky, 87 Conn.App. 257 268-69 n.9, 865 A.2d 488, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 916, 871 A.2d 372 (2005); see also Rowe v. Godou, 209 Conn. 273, 278, 550 A.2d 1073 (1988) (in ruling on motion to strike, court cannot resort to information outside of complaint). " Where the legal grounds for . . . a motion [to strike] are dependent upon underlying facts not alleged in the plaintiff's pleadings, the defendant must await the evidence which may be adduced at trial, and the motion should be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Comm'r of Labor v. C.J.M. Servs., 268 Conn. 283, 293, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004).

In its motion, Amica argues that counts one and two should be stricken because " New York law does not recognize . . . common-law bad faith in connection with the handling of no-fault claims, " nor does CUIPA apply in a New York no-fault claim; therefore, the counts fail to state legally sufficient causes of action. In her opposition, the plaintiff contends that under a choice of law analysis, Connecticut law should be applied because the parties are Connecticut residents and the insurance policy was issued in Connecticut.

Analysis

At issue is whether Connecticut or New York law applies in determining the legal sufficiency of counts one and two of the plaintiff's complaint. Some superior courts have determined that motions to strike are premature in a choice of law analysis when facts are insufficiently pleaded or disputed. " [C]ourts have refused to address choice of law issues in a motion to strike because it is premature to conduct the requisite searching case-by-case contextual inquiry into the significance of the interests that the law of competing jurisdictions may assert in [the] particular controvers[y]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Financial Consulting, LLC v. Illinois Mutual Life Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-09-5013143-S, (October 28, 2010). " Where a choice of law issue is present on a motion to strike . . . it is unusual to determine the issue at this procedural stage." DiMauro v. Aiardo, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-97-0401576-S, (April 20, 1998). " In light of the 'searching case-by-case contextual inquiry' that is encouraged under the Restatement, it would be inappropriate to decide the choice of law issue at this stage in the proceedings in the absence of a more complete set of facts." Ffolkes v. Pasko, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-96-0154395-S (May 13, 1997) (19 Conn. L. Rptr. 442, 443).^[2]

Contrastingly, other superior courts have conducted choice of law analyses to determine a motion to strike when there are sufficient underlying facts. Boston Property Exchange Transfer Co., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X04-CV-11-6026660-S (May 13, 2013) (56 Conn. L. Rptr. 125, 127) (" [T]he plaintiff has pointed to nothing beyond the complaint that the court needs or should consider in doing the choice of law analysis . . . [T]his is the unusual case where the court has all of the information it needs from the complaint to conduct the choice of law analysis." [Footnote omitted.]).

In the present matter, no dispositive facts in the complaint are disputed by the parties. Sessa and Coler are Connecticut residents, Amica is licensed to do business in Connecticut and the auto insurance policy was issued in Connecticut. The accident and injuries occurred in New York. Because there are sufficiently pleaded undisputed facts in the complaint, this court proceeds through a choice of law analysis to determine whether the counts are legally sufficient under the appropriate state's law.^[3]

Choice of Law

" Under Connecticut choice of law rules, for the plaintiff's claims that sound in tort, namely, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment and CUTPA, we apply the law of the state in which the plaintiff was injured, unless to do so would produce an arbitrary or irrational result. See O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 649-50, 519 A.2d 13 (1986). For the plaintiff's contract claim, we adopt the 'significant relationship' test, and presume the application of the law of the state in which the bulk of the transaction took place. See Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 243 Conn. 401, 406-07, 703 A.2d 1132 (1997), on appeal after remand, 252 Conn. 774, 750 A.2d 1051 (2000)." Macomber v. Travelers Property & Casualty Corp., 277 Conn. 617, 640, 894 A.2d 240 (2006).^[4]

Count One--Bad Faith

In count one of the complaint, titled " common law bad faith, " the plaintiff asserts that " [w]ithout investigation, [Amica] willfully and maliciously claimed plaintiff had a pre-existing condition as reason not to pay the above captioned bills . . . As a result of [Amica's] bad faith handing of plaintiff's medical bills, plaintiff has been further harmed . . ." Generally, Connecticut courts recognize bad faith as a claim sounding in tort law. Buckman v. People Express, Inc., 205 Conn. 166, 170 530 A.2d 596 (1987) (" this court recognizes an independent cause of action in tort arising from an insurer's common law duty of good faith").^[5] Under Connecticut choice of law rules, for a claim sounding in tort, the court applies the law of the state in which the plaintiff was injured, unless to do so would produce an arbitrary or irrational result. See Macomber v. Travelers Property & Casualty Corp., supra, 277 Conn. 640.

Here the accident and the plaintiff's injuries occurred in New York. Thus, applying New York law, " [a] claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is generally actionable only where wrongs independent of the express terms of the contract are asserted and demands for the recovery of separate damages not intertwined the damages resulting from a breach of a contractual are advanced . . . Where a contractual party is merely seeking to reap the benefits of its contractual bargain, the implied covenant breach claim will not lie . . . as it is considered duplicative of the . . . breach of contract claim . . ." J. Kokolakis Contracting Corp. v. Evolution Piping Corp., 46 Misc.3d 544, 547-48, 998 N.Y.S.2d 788 (2014). " New York law . . . does not recognize a separate cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when a breach of contract claim, based upon the same facts, is also pled." Harris v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2002). See also Alexander v. Geico Ins. Co., 35 A.D.3d 989, 990, 826 N.Y.S.2d 777 (2006) (" no separate cause of action exists in tort for an insured's...