Commissioner of Labor v. CJM Services, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 March 2004
• Docket Number: (SC 16880).
• Citation: 842 A.2d 1124,268 Conn. 283
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: COMMISSIONER OF LABOR v. C.J.M. SERVICES, INC., ET AL.

268 Conn. 283

842 A.2d 1124

COMMISSIONER OF LABOR v. C.J.M. SERVICES, INC., ET AL.

(SC 16880).

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 2, 2003.

Officially released March 23, 2004.

Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Katz, Palmer and Vertefeuille, Js.

Steven B. Kaplan, with whom, on the brief, was Paul R. Fitzgerald, for the appellants (named defendant et al.).

Glenn A. Woods, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Judith A. Brown, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Charles D. Ray and Timothy S. Fisher filed a brief for the Connecticut Construction Industries Association, Inc., as amicus curiae.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This appeal arises from an action by the plaintiff, the commissioner of labor (commissioner), against the defendants C.J.M. Services, Inc. (general contractor), and Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania (ICSP), the general contractor's surety on the bond for a public works project. The commissioner brought an action against the defendants on behalf of the employees of a subcontractor, Big Bell Development Corporation (subcontractor), in order to recover the employees' unpaid prevailing and overtime wages.¹ The trial court granted the defendants' motions to strike all counts of the commissioner's amended and second amended complaints. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment in part and affirmed it in part. Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., 73 Conn. App. 39, 66, 806 A.2d 1105 (2002). We reverse the Appellate Court's judgment in part and affirm it in part.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following procedural history. "In his amended complaint, the commissioner alleged, inter alia: (1) ICSP was liable, as surety on the payment bond, for the payment of labor performed on the project (count one); (2) the general contractor was liable, as a matter of statutory law, as an `employer,' as defined in General Statutes § 31-71a(1),² for payment of wages under General Statutes §§ 31-53³ (prevailing wage statute) and 31-76c⁴ (overtime wage statute) (count two); and (3) the general contractor, as a matter of contract law, was liable for payment of wages pursuant to its contract for the project (count three). In each count, the commissioner relied on his authority to bring an action pursuant to the wage collection statute [General Statutes § 31-72]."⁵ Id., 41-43.

"[T]he trial court granted the defendants' motion to strike each count of the amended complaint. The court did so on two grounds. First, the court concluded that the commissioner had no authority to bring suit, on behalf of a subcontractor's employees, against the general contractor or its bonding company. Second, the court concluded that the general contractor was not an `employer' as statutorily defined and, therefore, was not liable as alleged by the commissioner. Because the general contractor was not liable, its surety, ICSP, also was not liable." Id., 43-44.

"[W]ithout waiving his appellate rights to challenge the court's striking of the counts in the earlier complaint, the commissioner filed a second amended complaint. In that complaint, count one (amended count one) was brought against only the general contractor and alleged that, as was previously alleged against ICSP, the general contractor was liable pursuant to the payment bond. It also alleged that the general contractor was an `employer' as statutorily defined. On January 31, 2000, the court granted the general contractor's motion to strike amended count one." Id., 44.

The commissioner then appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that "each of the stricken counts was legally sufficient to survive the defendants' motions to strike. Specifically, he argue[d] that: (1) he has authority under the wage collection statute to collect unpaid wages on behalf of the subcontractor's employees; (2) ICSP, as a surety on the labor and materials bond, is liable for payment of wages to the subcontractor's employees; (3) the general contractor is liable for payment of wages to the subcontractor's employees; (4) there were disputed factual issues about the general contractor's alleged liability as a de facto direct employer of the subcontractor's employees; and (5) the amended prayer for relief, which included a request for injunctive relief, made all the stricken counts legally sufficient to withstand a motion to strike." Id., 44-45.

The Appellate Court concluded that the commissioner had authority under § 31-72 to bring any legal action necessary to recover the lost wages on behalf of the subcontractor's employees, including an action against the general contractor and its surety on the payment bond pursuant to General Statutes §§ 49-41⁶ and 49-42.⁷ Id., 56. With respect to the first count of the amended complaint and the first count of the second amended complaint, respectively, the Appellate Court concluded that: (1) the surety could be held liable for the unpaid wages on the payment bond; id., 58; and (2) the general contractor could be held liable for the unpaid wages on the payment bond. Id., 61. With respect to the second count of the amended complaint, the Appellate Court concluded that the prevailing wage statute, § 31-53, does not authorize the commissioner to bring an action seeking the recovery of unpaid wages and, therefore, that the second count was legally insufficient to withstand the defendants' motion to strike. Id., 61-64. With respect to the third count of the amended complaint, which alleged that the general contractor had breached the public works contract, the Appellate Court concluded that the commissioner had pleaded insufficient facts to withstand the defendants' motion to strike. Id., 64. Finally, the Appellate Court concluded that it need not address the commissioner's claim for additional relief in the form of an affirmative injunction to enforce the state wage laws as the court already had found the first count legally sufficient. Id., 65.

We granted the defendants' petition for certification limited to the following issues: (1) "Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the [commissioner] has statutory authority under General Statutes § 31-72 to bring suit for unpaid wages on behalf of a subcontractor's employees against a general contractor and its bonding company pursuant to General Statutes §§ 49-41 and 49-42?" and (2) "Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the [commissioner] has statutory authority for imposing liability on the defendant surety under a payment bond where it is argued that the general contractor is not the employer of the subcontractor's employees?" Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., 262 Conn. 921, 812 A.2d 862 (2002). The commissioner presents one alternate ground for affirmance and two adverse rulings for our consideration pursuant to Practice Book § 84-11.⁸ We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court with respect to both certified questions; accordingly, we do not reach the alternate ground for affirmance. We reverse the first adverse ruling and affirm the second.

Our examination of the record and briefs and our consideration of the arguments of the parties persuades us that the judgment of the Appellate Court concerning both certified questions should be affirmed. The issues were resolved properly in the Appellate Court's concise and well reasoned opinion. Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., supra, 73 Conn. App. 39. Because that opinion fully addresses all arguments raised with respect to those issues in this appeal,⁹ we adopt it as a proper statement of the applicable law concerning those issues. It would serve no useful purpose for us to repeat the discussion contained therein. See Davis v. Freedom of Information Commission, 259 Conn. 45, 55-56, 787 A.2d 530 (2002). We, therefore, do not reach the commissioner's alternate ground for affirmance that General Statutes § 31-2 (d) provides the commissioner with authority to seek injunctive relief against a general contractor and its surety to recover wages due to a subcontractor's employees.

We next consider the first adverse ruling made by the trial court and affirmed by the Appellate Court, review of which the commissioner seeks pursuant to Practice Book § 84-11. Specifically, the commissioner claims that the trial court and the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the commissioner's third count was pleaded insufficiently to withstand a motion to strike. We agree with the commissioner.

"We begin by setting out the well established standard of review in an appeal from the granting of a motion to strike. Because a motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court, our review of the court's ruling on the [plaintiff's motion] is plenary. See Napoletano v. CIGNA Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc., 238 Conn. 216, 232-33, 680 A.2d 127 (1996) [cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103, 117 S. Ct. 1106, 137 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1997)].. . . We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency. Bohan v. Last, 236 Conn. 670, 674, 674 A.2d 839 (1996); see also Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108-109, 491 A.2d 368 (1985). Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied. Waters v. Autuori, 236 Conn. 820, 826, 676 A.2d 357 (1996). Moreover, we note that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged. Clohessy v. Bachelor, 237 Conn. 31, 33 n.4, 675 A.2d 852 (1996). . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted. . . . Amodio v. Cunningham, 182 Conn. 80, 83, 438 A.2d 6 (...