Sessions v. Columbus County
| Decision Date | 04 January 1939 |
| Docket Number | 606. |
| Citation | 200 S.E. 418,214 N.C. 634 |
| Parties | SESSIONS et al. v. COLUMBUS COUNTY. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Columbus County; E. H. Cranmer, Judge.
Action by T. G. Sessions and others against Columbus County, to enjoin proposed issuance of bonds for a county hospital. From a judgment enjoining the issue of the bonds, the County appeals.
Affirmed.
Civil action to restrain the issuance of certain proposed bonds.
The facts are these:
1. On August 23, 1938, the Board of Commissioners of Columbus County, at a regular public meeting, adopted the following resolution:
"Resolution Authorizing $55,000.00 County Hospital Bonds.
Whereas it is deemed advisable to construct a County Hospital, and it is expected that the County will receive a grant from the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works, for paying a portion of the costs thereof; and
Whereas it is necessary to issue bonds to pay the balance of such cost:
Now, Therefore, Be It Ordered by the Board of Commissioners of the County of Columbus:
Section 1. That the County of Columbus issue its bonds pursuant to law of the State controlling said bond issue, in an amount not to exceed $55,000.00, for the purpose of constructing a County Hospital.
Section 2. That a tax sufficient to pay the principal and interest of said bonds shall be annually levied and collected.
Section 3. That a statement of the debt of the said County has been filed with the Clerk and is open to public inspection.
Section 4. That this resolution shall take effect when approved by the voters of the County of Columbus at an election as provided by law."
2. Pursuant to the above resolution, a special election was duly held in Columbus County on September 26, 1938, and out of the total number of 14,900 registered and qualified voters eligible to vote therein, 2,831 cast their ballots in favor of the resolution, and 1,007 voted against it.
3. Thereafter, on September 28, the Board of Commissioners declared that said resolution had been duly approved as provided in section 4 thereof and caused the results to be published in the News Reporter on the following day. They propose to issue the bonds in accordance with said resolution and for the purpose designated.
4. It is admitted that the amount of the proposed bonds is in excess of two-thirds of the amount by which the outstanding indebtedness of the county was reduced during the preceding fiscal year ending June 30, 1938.
5. This suit was instituted November 30 to restrain the issuance of said proposed bonds.
From the evidence submitted, the court found (1) that the proposed hospital was not a necessary expense of the county within the meaning of Art. 7, Sec. 7, of the Constitution, and (2) that the resolution submitted to the voters of the county in the special election was not carried by a majority of the qualified voters registered therein; whereupon the prayer of the plaintiff was granted and the proposed issuance of the bonds restrained.
The defendant appeals, assigning errors.
Greer & Greer, of Whiteville, for appellant.
Joe W. Brown, of Whiteville, for appellee.
It is conceded that as the amount of the proposed bonds is in excess of two-thirds of the amount by which the outstanding indebtedness of the county was reduced during the preceding fiscal year ending June 30, 1938, the bonds in question may not be issued under Art. 5, Sec. 4, of the Constitution without a vote of the people and unless "approved by a majority of those who shall vote thereon." Gill v. Charlotte, 213 N.C. 160, 195 S.E. 368. It is further conceded that in the circumstances this approval was necessary regardless of the purpose for which the bonds were to be used, unless the purpose was: (1) to fund or refund a valid existing debt; (2) to borrow in anticipation of the collection of taxes due and payable within the fiscal year to an amount not exceeding fifty per centum of such taxes; (3) to supply a casual deficit; (4) to suppress riots or insurrections, or to repel invasions. Hallyburton v. Board of Education, 213 N.C. 9, 195 S.E. 21.
The defendant alleges, and the plaintiff admits, that the requirements of Art. 5, Sec. 4, of the Constitution have been met in the instant case. They join issue on whether Art. 7, Sec. 7, which requires a favorable "vote of the majority of the qualified voters", except for necessary expenses, is also applicable. We think it is. Hallyburton v. Board of Education, supra.
It is provided by Art. 7, Sec. 7, of the Constitution that "No county, city, town, or other municipal corporation shall contract any debt, pledge its faith or loan its credit * * * except for the necessary expenses thereof, unless by a vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein."
It is further provided in Art. 5, Sec. 6, of the Constitution that "The total of the State and county tax on property shall not exceed fifteen cents on the one hundred dollars value of property, except when the county property tax is levied for a special purpose and with the special approval of the General Assembly."
It is established by the authoritative decisions interpreting these sections:
1. That within the limitations fixed in Article 5, section 6, the county commissioners of the several counties may levy taxes for the "necessary expenses" of the county without a vote of the people or special legislative approval. Glenn v. Com'rs, 201 N.C. 233, 159 S.E. 439.
2. That for a special purpose and with the special approval of the General Assembly the county commissioners of the several counties may exceed the limitations set out in Article 5, section 6, without a vote of the people: Provided, the special purpose so approved by the General Assembly is for a necessary expense of the county. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Lenoir County, 200 N.C. 494, 157 S.E. 610.
3. That for a purpose other than a necessary expense, whether special or general, a tax may not be levied by the commissioners of any county, either within or in excess of the limitations fixed in Article 5, section 6, except by a vote of the people under special legislative authority. Southern R. Co. v. Com'rs, 148 N.C. 220, 61 S.E. 690.
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