Sessions v. Jelks, I--1

Citation194 So.2d 307
Decision Date19 January 1967
Docket NumberNo. I--1,I--1
PartiesDonald U. SESSIONS, as Administrator of the Estate of John Robert Parkinson, deceased, Appellant, v. Ruth G. JELKS, as Administratrix of the Estate of Katherine Goddard Parkinson, deceased, Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Florida (US)

Batchelor, Brodnax, Guthrie & Kindred, Miami, and Parkinson, Sessions, Duffett & Barry, Daytona Beach, for appellant.

Nichols, Gaither, Beckham, Colson, Spence & Hicks, Miami, and Black, Cobb, Cole & Crotty, Daytona Beach, for appellee.

WIGGINTON, Judge.

This appeal seeks review of an order entered by the County Judge of Volusia County, in probate, extending the time within which appellee may institute suit or other appropriate proceeding to enforce the claims filed by her against the estate of which appellant is administrator, to each of which claim objection was timely filed.

The sole question presented for our determination is whether the county judge abused his discretion in holding that appellee had shown just cause for having failed to institute suit on her claims to which objection was made by appellant within the time required by the statute applicable to this situation. The facts in the case may be summarized as hereinafter set forth.

Appellee filed two claims against the estate administered by appellant. In addition to being the administrator of the estate in question, appellant is also the principal attorney representing that estate. In his representative capacity he timely filed proper objection to each of the claims asserted by appellee. Thereafter, counsel for appellee engaged in three conversations with appellant's law partner who had been detailed to handle one specific phase of a proceeding brought against the estate by appellee which had a direct bearing upon the claims filed by her. Two of these conversations took place within the two month period following the filing of objection to appellee's claims, being the period provided by statute within which appellee was required to institute action on her claims. 1

In these conversations appellee's counsel expressed the view that settlement negotiations between the parties should be fully explored before action on the claims is instituted; that since the filing of suit would necessitate the assertion of contentions likely to create an acrimonious feeling between the parties, the filing of suit would be delayed until settlement negotiations were concluded. In these conversations appellant's law partner agreed that the filing of suit would likely prejudice the chances of a successful settlement and indicated that in no event would appellant be in position to resume settlement negotiations until certain reports then being prepared by governmental authorities were received, and further research on the questions of law involved was completed. It seems clear from the record that although associate counsel never explicitly agreed that the institution of suit by appellee should or would be delayed until settlement negotiations were completed, he nevertheless understood from appellee's counsel that such was the procedure which he intended to follow, and to which associate counsel for appellant expressed no objection or dissent. The substance of these conversations was promptly related to appellant by his associate counsel. It seems equally clear that appellee's counsel received the definite impression from these conversations that it was agreeable with appellant for appellee to withhold institution of suit until after appellant had procured all needed information bearing on the claims, completed his research on the questions of law relating thereto, and settlement negotiations concluded.

Three days after the two month period of limitation had expired, appellee's counsel again talked with appellant's associate counsel and suggested the execution of a written stipulation agreeing that it would not be necessary that suit on the claims be commenced until settlement negotiations were concluded. This request was refused, as a result...

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10 cases
  • Doepke v. Smith
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • April 13, 1970
    ... ... Yanity, 14 Ohio St.2d 202, 237 N.E.2d 611 (1968); Sessions v. Jelks, (Dist.Ct.App., Fla., 1967), 194 So.2d 307. One of them involves a situation where the ... ...
  • Sale's Estate, In re
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • September 24, 1969
    ...of the estate, his agent or attorney, constitute 'good cause' for an extension of time under the statute. See Sessions v. Jelks, Fla.App.1st 1967, 194 So.2d 307; In re Estate of Norregaard, Fla.App.3d 1969, 220 So.2d 653; cf. In re Kamp's Estate, Fla.App.1st 1965, 177 So.2d 757. And in In r......
  • Wilisch's Estate, In re, 79-1694
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • May 27, 1980
    ...Estate of Herskowitz, 342 So.2d 530 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); In re Estate of Norregaard, 220 So.2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); Sessions v. Jelks, 194 So.2d 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967). There remains to be answered Seck's contention that if, arguendo, Headley was lulled from February 20 (the date upon wh......
  • Stanton v. Kruse
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 16, 1969
    ...his home in New York, but failed to also advise that the will was being probated in decedent's resident state, Florida); Sessions v. Jelks, Fla.App.1967, 194 So.2d 307 (claimant held to have shown good cause for filing claim two months late; evidence showed that parties' attorneys had agree......
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