Sessions v. Skelton

• Decision Date: 01 June 1955
• Docket Number: No. 34007,34007
• Citation: 56 O.O. 370,127 N.E.2d 378,163 Ohio St. 409
• Parties: , 56 O.O. 370 SESSIONS, Trustee, et al., Appellants, v. SKELTON, The Columbus Gallery of Fine Arts et al., Appellees, et al., Appellants.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 409

163 Ohio St. 409

127 N.E.2d 378, 56 O.O. 370

SESSIONS, Trustee, et al., Appellants, v. SKELTON, The Columbus Gallery of Fine Arts et al., Appellees, et al., Appellants.

No. 34007.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

June 1, 1955.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The remedy afforded by the Declaratory Judgments Act is to be liberally construed and freely applied.

2. By virtue of Section 10501-53, General Code (Section 2101.24, Revised Code), and Section 12102-4, General Code (Section 2721.05, Revised Code), one who as trustee under a will and as an individual is interested in a provision of the will authorizing the removal of certain of testator's real estate from the trust and the substitution of a sum of money to take its place may bring and maintain an action for a declaratory judgment in the Probate Court to secure a determination and declaration as to his obligations as trustee and as an individual with respect to such matter and as to the rights of the trust beneficiaries, where there is a present bona fide dispute between or among those concerned as to the interpretation of the will and doubt exists as to the proper interpretation.

3. An action for a declaratory judgment is sui generis in the sense that it is neither one strictly in equity nor one strictly at law; it is purely a procedural remedy wherein the court having jurisdiction may apply such principles of equity or of law as may be necessary to adjudicate the issues presented.

4. Pleadings are to be construed liberally in favor of the pleader to promote and facilitate the statement of a cause of action or defense.

5. Where in his petition in an action for a declaratory judgment the plaintiff alleges in effect that there are existing differences between him, as trustee under a will and as an individual, and the trust beneficiaries with respect to the removal of real property from the trust and the substitution of a sum of money in lieu thereof, and that he 'desires to exercise his right to discontinue the testatmentary trust' by the removal of such real estate and the substitution of a sum of money therefor upon the adoption by the court of his interpretation of the will, the word, 'desires,' as used in the petition may and should be treated as the expression of a present purpose and intent to act rather than as indcative of some possible contemplated future action.

6. An art gallery organized as a corporation not for profit and a student loan foundation also organized as a corporation not for profit and engaged in assisting needy students at a university are charitable organizations, and a testamentary trust created for their benefit and support is a charitable trust.

7. An action for a declaratory judgment which has as a principal purpose the interpretation of a will establishing a charitable trust is equitable in nature and constitutes a chancery case, and an appeal on questions of law and fact lies to the Court of Appeals from a judgment of the Probate Court interpreting such will and declaring thereunder the obligations and rights of the parties to the action.

In May of 1946, Frank L. Sessions, as trustee under the will of Juliette Sessions, deceased, and as an individual, brought an action 'for declaratory judgment and construction of a will' in the Probate Court of Franklin County, Ohio, where such will had been admitted to probate. Named as defendants were Mary Skelton, The Columbus Gallery of Fine Arts, an Ohio corporation not for profit, and The Ohio Student Loan Foundation, an Ohio corporation not for profit organized to assist needy students at The Ohio State University.

Item VIII of the will is the subject of this action. In such item the testatrix directed the continuance of a trust involving one-half of her undivided one-half interest in a business property in the city of Columbus which trust was created for the benefit of designated beneficiaries, including the three defendants above named, 'until my brother, Frank L. Sessions, or his heirs or assigns, shall pay, or cause to be paid, to a solvent bank or trust company, in trust, for each of the beneficiaries hereinafter named, a sum which, at five per cent (5%), will yield the annuities hereinafter granted.'

Item VIII then directs that $5,000 per annum be paid to The Columbus Gallery of Fine Arts; that $200 per year be paid to Mary Skelton, during her lifetime; and that 'the remainder of the income * * * be paid to The Ohio Student Loan Foundation * * * to be used by said foundation for loans to women students.'

The petition asks for the 'determination, judgment, decree and direction of the court in answer' to nine questions, all of which relate directly or indirectly to the amount of money which Frank L. Sessions or his heirs would have to supply to enable them to remove the real property from the trust estate, become the owners thereof. and comply with the terms of item VIII of the will.

In the questions propounded the sum of $104,000 is proposed as an amount sufficient to satisfy the requirements of such item.

An answer and cross-petition was filed by The Ohio Student Loan Foundation in which it denies and opposes the right of Frank L. Sessions or his heirs to terminate the trust created in its favor by item VIII of the will without first making provision for it as intended by the testatrix and asks that its rights as a beneficiary be protected. In such answer and cross-petition The Ohio Student Loan Foundation propounds 11 questions for the court's determination.

In its order and decree the Probate Court made the following determinations '6. That at this time the following persons are basically interested in the controversy: Frank L. Session, The Columbus Gallery of Fine Arts, and The Ohio Student Loan Foundation.

'7. That, by virtue of a former order and decree that is now binding upon all the parties, Frank L. Sessions has the right to exercise the power of termination given him under section A of item VIII of the will, but that the details connected therewith must either be determined and fixed by this court or be approved by this court.

'8. That The Ohio Student Loan Foundation has a vested and continuing interest of which it cannot be deprived by the exercise of any right given to Frank L. Sessions or his heirs or assigns.

'* * *

'10. That the termination of the present trust in respect of the real estate and the substitution of new assets in trust must be with the approval and under the direction of this court.

'* * *

'12. That the will and the right to terminate the trust do not permit Frank L. Sessions to make a profit, and that he must pay full value for the real estate through the substitution of assets.

'13. That, unless the parties mutually agree upon the value of the real estate at the time of termination, it will be necessary for the court to fix that value at the time of termination.

'14. That, if the present rentals be taken as a base for that determination, the value might possibly be determined to be an amount that at five per cent (5%) would produce the present rental income.

'15. That, even if there be a new trustee, with substituted assets, the income should be distributed to The Columbus Gallery of Fine Arts and The Ohio Student Loan Foundation just as it is now distributed first $5,000 annually to The Columbus Gallery of Fine Arts and, then, the remainder annually to The Ohio Student Loan Foundation.'

Frank L. Sessions, as trustee and individually, and the individual defendants being dissatisfied by the judgment and decree of the Probate Court perfected separate appeals on questions of law and fact to the Court of Appeals, whereupon The Ohio Student Loan Foundation and The Columbus Gallery of Fine Arts separately moved 'for the dismissal of this appeal on questions of law and fact and, if it be retained that it be restricted to questions of law only.'

In response to such motions the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on questions of law and fact but retained the cause for determination on questions of law only. In its opinion, however, that court expressed the view 'that there is no justiciable issue before the court.'

The cause now finds lodgment in this court under our Rule XXIV and the matter to be decided is whether the Court of Appeals acted properly in retaining the cause for determination on questions of law alone.

Calfee, Fogg, McChord & Halter, Cleveland, for plaintiff appellants.

Butler, Addison & Werum, Francis J. Wright and Jenkins, Williams, Wendt, Murray & Deeg, Columbus, for appellees.

Gingher & Christensen, Columbus, for defendant appellants.

ZIMMERMAN, Judge.

Although the precise problem now engaging the attention of this court is whether the Court of Appeals was correct in retaining the cause for disposition on questions of law alone, we think it at least appropriate and expedient to discuss and decide the following question:

Does this action for a declaratory judgment present justiciable issues cognizable by the Probate Court in the first instance and, if so, are the matters which the Court of Appeals is asked to decide of an equitable nature constituting a chancery case, thus requiring that court to entertain the appeal on questions of law and fact?

If the first part of the above question is answered in the affirmative, the Probate Court of Franklin County was the proper forum. The will of Juliette Sessions had been admitted to probate in that court, her estate was being administered there, and Frank L. Sessions was acting as trustee under appointment by such court.

By the terms of Section 10501-53, General Code, Section 2101.24, Revised Code, the Probate Court is given jurisdiction to construe wills, to render declaratory judgments and to direct and control the conduct of fiduciaries. That section provides further:

'The probate court shall have plenary power at law and in equity fully to dispose of any matter properly before the court, unless the power is expressly otherwise limited or denied by sta...