Setchfield v. St. Charles Cnty.
| Decision Date | 05 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 4:21-CV-923 RLW |
| Parties | JAMES W. SETCHFIELD, Plaintiff, v. ST. CHARLES COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Nicholas Seiverling Scott Ronald, and John Williams's motion for summary judgment, which is fully briefed and ripe for review. (ECF No. 41). In his Memorandum in Opposition, Plaintiff James W Setchfield concedes Defendant Williams should be dismissed from the case. The Court, therefore, grants the motion for summary judgment as to Defendant Williams. Plaintiff opposes the motion as to Defendants Seiverling and Ronald. For the reasons that follow, Defendants Seiverling and Ronald's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
This case arises out of an incident that took place on August 18, 2020, in St. Charles County, Missouri. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that officers of the St. Charles County Police Department (“SCCPD”) arrested his son, David Setchfield, during a traffic stop. Plaintiff was phoned to pick up his son in the parking lot of the Outback Steakhouse in O'Fallon, Missouri. When Plaintiff arrived on the scene, he spoke with officers and, after some words were exchanged, Defendants Seiverling and Ronald, officers of SCCPD, subjected Plaintiff to a beating without cause and falsely arrested and detained him.
Plaintiff filed suit on July 27, 2021, against St. Charles County (“the County”), and three police officers - Defendants Nicholas Seiverling, Scott Ronald, and John Williams (collectively the “Officer Defendants”). The Complaint alleges the following civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: excessive force against Defendants Seiverling and Ronald (Count I); unlawful arrest against Defendants Seiverling and Ronald (Count II); false imprisonment against Defendants Seiverling, Ronald, and Williams (Count III); failure to intervene against Defendant Williams (Count IV); municipal liability against the County (Count V); and failure to train/instruct/supervise and discipline against the County (Count VI). Plaintiff also raises the following supplemental state law claims: battery against Defendants Seiverling and Ronald (Count VII); assault against Defendants Seiverling and Ronald (Count VIII); and negligence against all Defendants (Count IX).
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, which the Court granted in part and denied in part. In a Memorandum and Order dated February 25, 2022, the Court found, based on the allegations in the Complaint, that the Officer Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's § 1983 claims in Counts I through IV. The Court dismissed Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the County in Counts V and VI, as Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to establish the County's liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York City, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), and its progeny. The Court dismissed Plaintiff's state law claim of negligence in Count IX. The Court further found, based on the allegations in the Complaint, that Defendants Seiverling and Ronald were not entitled to dismissal of the state law battery and assault claims in Counts VII and VIII on the basis of official immunity or the public duty doctrine.
Following discovery in the case, Defendants Seiverling and Ronald now move for summary judgment as to the remaining claims against them. Once again, Seiverling and Ronald argue they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's § 1983 claims in Counts I and II. With regard to Count III, false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim because false imprisonment is not cognizable under the Fourth Amendment; it is a state law tort. As for Plaintiff's state law claims of assault and battery, Defendants Seiverling and Ronald argue Plaintiff is unable to present prima facie evidence to support the claims and, in any event, the claims are barred by official immunity and the public duty doctrine. Plaintiff responds that there remain disputes of fact that preclude the entry of summary judgment as to all of his claims against Defendants Seiverling and Ronald.
The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The substantive law determines which facts are critical and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome will properly preclude summary judgment. Id. Summary judgment is not proper if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
A moving party always bears the burden of informing the Court of the basis of its motion. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts demonstrating there is a dispute as to a genuine issue of material fact, not the “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “The nonmoving party may not rely on allegations or denials,” but rather “must substantiate [its] allegations with sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in [its] favor on more than mere speculation or conjecture.” Carter v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 956 F.3d 1055, 1059 (8th Cir. 2020) (). “Small factual disputes about the underlying events . . . could only create the ‘metaphysical' kind of doubt that the Supreme Court decried in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).” Main v. Ozark Health, Inc., 959 F.3d 319, 327 (8th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up; quoted case omitted).
In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 331. The Court's function is not to weigh the evidence but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “‘Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.'” Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)).
It is undisputed that on the evening of August 18, 2020, David Setchfield telephoned his father, Plaintiff James Setchfield, asking to be picked up following his arrest by two officers of the SCCPD, Defendants Seiverling and Ronald. David Setchfield had been stopped and arrested for DUI and was placed in the back of a patrol car. Defendant Ronald told David Setchfield that he could call and have someone pick him up. David Setchfield called his father and instructed him to come to the parking lot of the Outback Steakhouse. What happened when Plaintiff arrived at the Outback Steakhouse parking lot is hotly contested by Plaintiff and Defendants Seiverling and Ronald.
The Court has reviewed Plaintiff's First Amended Response to Defendants' Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and the supporting evidence.[1] As discussed below, Plaintiff's version of the facts has changed, and there are discrepancies between Plaintiff's deposition testimony and his affidavit. Furthermore, there are paragraphs in Plaintiff's First Amended Response to Defendants' Statement of Uncontroverted Facts for which the cited evidence does not support the facts asserted. The Court has taken these issues into account and finds that for purpose of summary judgment, Plaintiff has presented evidence of the following:
Plaintiff, who was 68 years old at the time, was confused when he arrived at the scene because he did not know where his son was and why he was arrested. He pulled up next to a police car, and while he was seated in his car with the window rolled down, he asked Defendant Ronald where his son was and why he was arrested. Defendant Ronald was curt and responded that it was none of Plaintiff's business the reason his son was arrested. Plaintiff asked again, and Defendant Ronald responded, “It's none of your fucking business.” Plaintiff admits that heated words were exchanged, but he remained seated in his car and did not threaten anyone in any way. Defendant Ronald then approached Plaintiff's vehicle and asked Plaintiff, who was still seated in the car, if he had a gun, to which Plaintiff responded he did not. Plaintiff admits he called Defendant Ronald a “prick” and a “jerk,” and that he shouted.
At some point during this exchange between Plaintiff and Defendant Ronald, Defendant Seiverling rushed toward Plaintiff's vehicle. In his affidavit, Plaintiff avers that Defendant Seiverling was “shouting in a manner I could not hear nor understand.” (ECF No. 55-5 at 2). Defendant Seiverling reached through the rolled down window into Plaintiff's car. Plaintiff moved his left arm in what he describes as a protective manner. Defendant Seiverling delivered a number of punches to Plaintiff's face. Plaintiff testified at his deposition that both officers hit him while he was still seated in his car...
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