Sevey v. American Federation of State etc. Employees

Decision Date15 April 1975
Citation121 Cal.Rptr. 341,48 Cal.App.3d 64
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Parties, 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3049, 77 Lab.Cas. P 53,730 Ferne E. SEVEY, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES LOCAL 715, SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, et al., Defendants and Respondents, County of San Mateo, Intervenors and Respondents. Civ. 34284.

Michael D. Silber, San Francisco, for petitioner-appellant.

Norback, Durard & Belkin, San Mateo, for the respondents-defendants (American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees AFL--CIO, Local Union No. 829, and others).

Keith C. Sorenson, Dist. Atty., Redwood City, for plaintiff in intervention (Local 715, Service Employees, International Union, and others).

Warren, Adell & Miller, Los Angeles, for respondent Jerry Wurf.

Van Bourg Allen, Weinberg, Williams & Roger, San Francisco, for intervenors (Local 715, Service Employees, International Union, Service Employees International Union & Robert P. Muscat).

GOOD, * Associate Justice.

Ferne E. Sevey was a member of Peninsula Association of Public Employees (PAPE), an independent employees' organization which had been certified in 1971 to represent employees of San Mateo County's clerical unit in negotiations with the county pursuant to California's Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (Gov.Code, § 3500 et seq.). PAPE later became affiliated with Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and became Local 715, SEIU, AFL--CIO. In March 1972, another union, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) filed a petition to decertify Local 715. An election was held. AFSCME won and became Local 829 AFSCME, AFL--CIO and the representative of said clerical unit.

There is indication in the record that PAPE's affiliation with SEIU occurred during the pendency of the election. Under national AFL--CIO policy, when a member union absorbs an independent employees' organization, the union succeeds to the representation rights of the independent organization.

An internal dispute arose and, pursuant to the AFL--CIO constitution, SEIU demanded arbitration of the question whether AFSCME had won its status in violation of article XX, the no-raiding clause, of the AFL--CIO constitution, article XX spells out arbitration procedures to resolve claimed violations. SEIU's petition was filed in Washington, D.C., AFL--CIO headquarters, and the proceedings were processed there. The union umpire found that AFSCME had violated the no-raiding clause. AFSCME accordingly sent letters to Ms. Sevey and other members of Local 829 informing them that it could no longer represent them. There is evidence that, until then, Sevey and other employees similarly affected were not aware of the arbitration.

On December 5, 1972, Sevey filed a petition in the Superior Court of San Mateo County wherein she sought a writ of mandate on behalf of herself and other members of Local 829 to require said union to continue its representation of the clerical unit. The petition contains no reference to Local 715. Local 829's answer, filed December 14, admitted virtually all of the key allegations of the petition but asked that the writ be denied. On December 15, Local 715 filed a complaint in intervention wherein it alleged that both unions were bound by said AFL--CIO constitution and that Sevey and others, by reason of their membership in Local 829, were also bound thereby. Details of their dispute and its arbitration were set forth. Intervenors prayed that the petition be dismissed, that the decision of the arbitrator be affirmed and that Local 829 be ordered to withdraw from seeking to represent the clerical unit. 1

On December 18, San Mateo County filed its complaint against both Locals 829 and 715. It alleged that it was then ready to negotiate employment terms for the clerical unit but could not do so until the dispute between the two locals was settled. It alleged that it had adopted rules and regulations pursuant to said section 3507 of the Government Code for the exclusive recognition of employee organizations formally recognized pursuant to a vote of employees in appropriate representation units and that such election was held between April 25 and May 2, 1972 and resulted in the recognition and certification of Local 829.

The county's rules and regulations provided that representation elections could not be held at intervals of less than three years. The forced withdrawal of Local 829 potentially left the county's clerical unit without representation because two years would have to elapse before another election could be called. The county asked that the court determine whether the 1972 election was valid and, if so, to order Local 829 to continue its representation in current negotiations; if invalid, that it order Local 715 to assume such representation; or, that the court formally order the county to recognize some employee organization as representing the clerical unit or make such other orders as might be necessary to protect the rights of the county and clerical unit in the untoward situation that had been created. It appears that the county was inviting the court possibly to order a new election in contravention of its own rules and regulations, if that appeared to be the only viable solution.

After hearings, judgment was entered which required Local 829 to continue representation of the clerical unit in the pending negotiation but any memorandum of understanding (contract) would be effective only upon ratification by majority vote of the clerical unit and should not be effective beyond December 31, 1973. It ordered that on or before June 15, 1973, the county should conduct an election to determine the employees' preference as to representation, after which the county was required to recognize the organization then chosen for not less than two years thereafter.

The judgment does not contain any recitals as to the validity of either the prior election or of the arbitration order but the judgment implies a finding that the arbitration was valid. The memorandum of decision states that Local 715 had advanced 'a number of reasons why it should not be shorn of the fruits of its arbitration victory' by the court and that the court was in agreement with a number of them. It also stated that although the county asked the court to ignore the arbitration order by determining the validity of the election won by Local 829 it 'could find no basis upon which to declare the election invalid . . . nor in equity . . . ignore the arbitration award inasmuch as both unions submitted to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.' The court's solution of the dilemma presented by the certification of Local 829 vis-a-vis the arbitration order that, because of 'raiding,' it could not represent the clerical unit, in effect, found the arbitration order binding on the unions but stayed its enforcement in order that the county and clerical unit could firm up a contract for the current year and then settle the matter of representation during the balance of the three year period of the old certification by a new election.

Appellant Sevey filed this appeal from that part of the judgment which recognized the arbitration order by providing for a new election, thus limiting Local 829's representation to the date of completing current negotiations. Her briefs contain an eloquent and sometimes witty dissertation on the rights of a member of a local union as against a parent international. The ideas advanced may be factually and sociologically sound but are more appropriately addressed to the legislative rather than to the judicial branch of government. The following legal issues are presented:

1. Do the arbitration provisions of AFL--CIO's constitution for the resolution of disputes arising under the no-raiding clause of article XX require that members of local AFL--CIO affiliated unions be joined as Indispensable parties? No.

The articles of agreement and constitutions of both local and international unions constitute a contract with union members that is binding on them. (Mandracio v. Bartenders Union Local 41 (1953) 41 Cal.2d 81, 85, 256 P.2d 927; DeMille v. American Fed. of Radio Artists (1947) 31 Cal.2d 139, 146, 187 P.2d 769; De Gonia v. Building Material etc. Union (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 573, 581, 318 P.2d 486; Miller v. Internat. Union etc. Engineers (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 66, 68--69, 257 P.2d 85.) Because he is bound by the union constitut...

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2 cases
  • Trustees of California State University & Colleges v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • June 7, 1978
    ...50 P. 763; DeMille v. American Fed. of Radio Artists (1947) 31 Cal.2d 139, 146, 187 P.2d 769; Sevey v. American Federation of State etc. Employees (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 64, 69, 121 Cal.Rptr. 341.) The language of the constitution providing for discipline of a member (see fn. 6, ante ) thus p......
  • Davey Tree Surgery Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • December 29, 1976
    ...Every reasonable intendment will be indulged to give effect to arbitration proceedings. (Sevey v. American Federation of State etc. Employees (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 64, 71, 121 Cal.Rptr. 341; Turner v. Cox, supra, 196 Cal.App.2d 596, 603, 16 Cal.Rptr. 644.) Therefore, an award will not be vac......

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