Sevin v. State Bar
| Decision Date | 05 January 1973 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 504 P.2d 449 Marshall H. SEVIN, Petitioner, v. The STATE BAR of California, Respondent. L.A. 29947. In Bank |
Ryan & Traxler and Sidney Traxler, Beverly Hills, for petitioner.
F. LaMar Forshee, Ronald W. Stovitz and Christopher M. Reuss, San Francisco, for respondent.
This is a proceeding to review a recommendation of the Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of California that petitioner be disbarred from the practice of law.
Facts: In August 1967, petitioner was employed by Sam Reiter and William Schorin to settle a controversy with regard to a trust deed. In March 1968, pursuant to that employment, petitioner filed on his clients' behalf an action to foreclose their security interest in the property. On February 20, 1969, the case went to trial, and petitioner's clients prevailed. Petitioner arranged with counsel for the judgment debtor, Bergquist Properties, the terms of payment and instructed that the check be made payable as follows: 'Marshall H. Sevin, Trustee Account.' Accordingly, on February 25, 1969, Bergquist's check for $16,966.36 was delivered to petitioner with a covering letter, specifying that the check should be deposited and held in petitioner's trust account until petitioner's delivery of a full satisfaction of judgment. The next day, petitioner endorsed and deposited the check in his trust account. Of this amount, $1,600 represented an award of attorney's fees; and the balance, $15,366.36, belonged to petitioner's clients, Reiter and Schorin.
Petitioner did not report receipt of this check to his clients. Between February 26 and May 29, 1969, petitioner wrote several checks on the deposited sum--either to himself or to his creditors--reducing it ultimately to a balance of $36.81. Meanwhile, petitioner's clients visited his office several times inquiring as to the status of their case, and each time petitioner advised them that the matter was proceeding in the usual course. In July and August 1969, they were unable to make any contact at all with petitioner; efforts to see him failed, and telephone calls were unanswered. Finally, on August 28, 1969, they reported the matter to the State Bar, expressing their desire to know the present status of their case. On September 11, 1969, the State Bar by letter advised petitioner of his clients' complaint. Petitioner did not reply; so the State Bar sent another letter to petitioner on September 29, 1969. In this second letter, petitioner was advised that if a statement was not forth-coming from him by October 14, 1969, the matter would be referred to a local administrative committee for investigation. Again petitioner did not reply.
Meanwhile, in early October 1969, because of their failure to reach petitioner, Reiter and Schorin requested another attorney to look into the matter. This attorney contacted counsel for Bergquist Properties, learned of the check of February 25, 1969, delivered to petitioner, and so reported to Reiter and Schorin on October 16, 1969. This was the first information that they had of the payment, a delay of almost eight months. On October 23, 1969, Reiter and Schorin met with petitioner. He then admitted his deposit of the settlement check in February 1969 and his subsequent use of the funds for his personal benefit. Petitioner then gave his clients a personal note calling for repayment by the end of the year, with the first installment of $5,000 due October 30, 1969. Petitioner inquired of his clients whether they had asked the attorney who had investigated the matter for them to report it to the State Bar. They responded that they had not; and at petitioner's insistence on written substantiation, they obtained a letter from that attorney so advising petitioner. Meanwhile, counsel for Bergquist Properties began looking into the matter, wrote to petitioner asking for delivery of a satisfaction of judgment within five days (as petitioner had promised when he received the settlement check on February 25, 1969); and on October 31, 1969, petitioner sent a copy of the satisfaction, which he had filed the previous day.
On October 30, 1969, petitioner failed to pay his clients, Reiter and Schorin, the first installment on the note. On November 14, 1969, they went to petitioner's office, discussed the terms of repayment, settled on the total amount of $17,500, and agreed to return in three days for payment thereof. On November 17, 1969, when they returned to petitioner's office, petitioner showed them a draft in letter form of an agreement whereby they purported 'to loan' to petitioner the moneys owing to them on their judgment. After a few minor corrections, the draft was typed in final form on petitioner's office stationery, addressed to his clients, predated to February 21, 1969, and signed by them. It provided for payment with 10 percent interest on or before August 31, 1969. At the same time, petitioner had his clients sign a letter addressed to the State Bar, dated November 17, 1969, stating that they had received full repayment of their loan to petitioner, had no further complaint against him, and would not appear at any hearings, and requesting any scheduled proceedings to be cancelled. After Reiter and Schorin signed both letters, petitioner endorsed to them a cashier's check for $17,500. On that same day, petitioner mailed to the State Bar his clients' letter repudiating their complaint against him. A couple of days later, the State Bar advised petitioner by letter that its preliminary hearing on his clients' complaint would be conducted as scheduled.
According to petitioner, his clients, Reiter and Schorin, were in his office on February 21, 1969; they agreed to a loan to him of the proceeds of their judgment; the draft was prepared; it was retyped in final form and signed by them. Petitioner's secretary testified that he dictated the loan agreement and she transcribed it 'probably' the 'day it was dated'; that she thought she saw the signed agreement in the office file of Reiter and Schorin 'probably a few days or a few weeks, maybe' after February 21, 1969; but when questioned further as to whether she could remember seeing the agreement...
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