Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward

• Decision Date: 26 November 1982
• Docket Number: No. 5729,5729
• Citation: 655 P.2d 1293
• Parties: 8 Ed. Law Rep. 825 SEWARD CHAPEL, INC., Thomas Reese, Barry Hildebrand, Michael Van Deusen, Leslie Dooley, May Dooley and Conrad Oberg, Appellants, v. CITY OF SEWARD, Alaska and Kenai Peninsula Borough, Appellees.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Page 1293

655 P.2d 1293

8 Ed. Law Rep. 825

SEWARD CHAPEL, INC., Thomas Reese, Barry Hildebrand, Michael

Van Deusen, Leslie Dooley, May Dooley and Conrad

Oberg, Appellants, v. CITY OF SEWARD, Alaska and Kenai Peninsula Borough, Appellees.

No. 5729.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

Nov. 26, 1982.

Richard W. Garnett, III, Erwin, Smith & Garnett, Anchorage, for appellants.

Kenneth P. Jacobus and James F. Klasen, Hughes, Thorsness, Gantz, Powell & Brundin, Anchorage, for appellees.

Before BURKE, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, CONNOR, MATTHEWS and COMPTON, JJ.

OPINION

RABINOWITZ, Justice.

I. OVERVIEW

This appeal presents a zoning dispute of constitutional magnitude between Seward Chapel, Inc. ¹ and the City of Seward. ² The principal issue on appeal is whether the federal or Alaska constitutions, or both, compel the city to allow Seward Chapel to operate a parochial school in its church building notwithstanding a zoning ordinance which excludes all nonpublic schools from the residential area in which Seward Chapel's building is located. We conclude that the ordinance is constitutionally permissible.

II. FACTS

The case is set in a residential subdivision of the City of Seward called Forest Acres, an area described by the superior court as "the premier residential subdivision on the Kenai Peninsula." The area has a rural character and, according to the city, affords residents a "peaceful seclusion." From the record it appears that a majority of the residents of Forest Acres would prefer that their peaceful seclusion not be disturbed by a parochial school.

Seward Chapel's dispute with the city over zoning began in 1974, when Pastor Paul Pichotta and Michael Van Deusen of the Abbott Loop Christian Center in Anchorage came to Seward to establish a church. Pastor Pichotta located two adjacent lots in Forest Acres which were owned by a fellow church member and purchased the lots ³ after the city approved his application for a permit to build a church on the lots. Although Pastor Pichotta expressed his intent to operate a parochial school as well as a church on the premises, the city made it clear that a parochial school was not permitted in Forest Acres under the then-existing zoning laws. ⁴ Notwithstanding the limitation on parochial schools, Seward Chapel constructed a church on the Forest Acres site; the church flourished and, at the time of trial in 1980, had a congregation of ninety to one-hundred members.

The applicable zoning ordinance has been amended several times since Seward Chapel acquired its site in Forest Acres. In 1978 the ordinance, which then allowed churches and accessory uses by permit, was amended to create a new "Rural Residential" ("RR") zone; ⁵ Forest Acres, which comprises seven to eight percent of the city, was zoned RR, and was the only area so zoned within the city. The RR classification provided for minimum lot sizes of one-half acre and limited the use of lots largely to single-family residences. The pertinent change for purposes of this appeal is that churches and nonpublic schools were excluded from the newly created RR zone and from some other residential zones.

In May 1979, the zoning ordinance was again amended; this amendment restored the earlier provision permitting churches in residential areas ⁶ after the borough's senior planner advised that zoning ordinances which wholly exclude churches from residential areas occasionally have been declared unconstitutional. ⁷ The provision excluding nonpublic schools remained unchanged.

In July 1979, Seward Chapel commenced the proceedings which led to this appeal. The church filed suit in superior court, seeking an injunction against enforcement of the zoning restriction on nonpublic schools and a determination that exclusion of parochial schools contravenes the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal constitution and Article I, sections 1 and 4 of the Alaska Constitution. Shortly after filing suit Seward Chapel began operating a parochial school with about a dozen students; pending the outcome of a motion for a preliminary injunction, the church operated its school in a carpenter's shop owned by a church member and located several miles from the church rather than in the church building.

In April 1980, the superior court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the zoning ordinance's prohibition of nonpublic schools in Forest Acres, and Seward Chapel for the first time began operating its school in its church building. The court did not then pass upon the constitutional issues raised by Seward Chapel but instead required the church to apply for a contract zoning agreement which would allow operation of a school on its premises. ⁸ Seward Chapel's application for a contract zoning agreement was denied; ⁹ the denial was appealed through appropriate administrative channels and found its way back to the superior court, where it was consolidated with the prior declaratory judgment action. Prior to trial, the city's zoning ordinance was amended a third time in response to Seward Chapel's contention that the city could not exclude only nonpublic schools from Forest Acres; the amended ordinance excluded all schools, public and nonpublic, from areas zoned Rural Residential. ¹⁰

The superior court affirmed the administrative denial of Seward Chapel's application for a contract zoning agreement and, after a bench trial, ruled that the zoning ordinance, as finally amended, did not abridge Seward Chapel's rights under the state and federal constitutions. ¹¹ For the reasons set forth below we affirm the superior court's rulings.

III. DUE PROCESS

Seward Chapel first challenges the city's zoning ordinance on the ground that an ordinance which excludes church schools from a residential area contravenes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ¹² and Article I, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution. ¹³ Seward Chapel argues that the city's zoning rule bears no relation to the public welfare and hence is beyond the scope of the city's zoning power. ¹⁴

The right of a governmental entity to restrict the use of land--without compensating landowners for reductions in the value of property or for the fact that they may be precluded from using their property in a particular manner--was established in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). The Euclid due process rule permits a zoning restriction unless the restriction is "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Id. at 395, 47 S.Ct. at 121, 71 L.Ed. at 314.

In the case at hand, no one seriously disputes that a Christian school, like a variety of other institutions, contributes to the public welfare. In our view, however, the pertinent question for due process purposes is not whether the Seward Chapel school confers a benefit upon the community but whether a municipal body may reasonably conclude that a school may also generate an adverse impact, such as noise, increased traffic, litter, and the like, which makes it a form of land use which is incompatible with an area populated by single-family residences.

For federal constitutional purposes, a zoning ordinance enjoys a presumption of validity when challenged on due process grounds, ¹⁵ and an ordinance which limits an area largely to single-family residences is not inherently unreasonable. ¹⁶ As the Supreme Court has explained,

a quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs.... The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.

Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1541, 39 L.Ed.2d 797, 804 (1974). In our view a municipal body does not act arbitrarily and beyond its powers when it concludes that a residential area should be free of the noise, traffic, and other nuisances which a school may engender. ¹⁷

We emphasize that this is not a case in which the city has elected to decide the question of zoning for schools in Rural Residential areas on a case-by-case basis by way of a permit system. Had the city so elected we would be inclined to examine more closely the city's grounds for denying a permit in a given case. ¹⁸ Here, however, we are dealing instead with the city's legislative judgment that schools are a suitable form of land use in some areas but not in others. Of necessity this judgment--and, indeed, any classifications in a zoning scheme--must draw distinctions between one form of land use and another, between one area and another, and of necessity the distinctions drawn may be imperfect. That a given classification might result in an imperfect fit in a given situation ¹⁹ is not alone a sufficient basis for concluding that the zoning classification must be set aside as unreasonable. "[E]very line drawn by a legislature leaves some out that might well have been included. That exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative, not a judicial, function." Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 8, 94 S.Ct. at 1540, 39 L.Ed.2d at 803-04 (footnote omitted).

Similarly, we hold that the zoning scheme does not contravene Article I, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution. As we have explained,

[s]ubstantive due process is denied when a legislative enactment has no reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. It is not a court's role to decide whether a particular statute or ordinance is a wise one; the choice between competing notions of public policy is to be made by elected representatives of the people. The constitutional guarantee of substantive due process assures only that a legislative body's decision is not arbitrary but instead based upon some rational policy.

Concerned...