Sexton v. First Nat. Mercantile Bank & Trust Co. of Joplin, 14424

• Decision Date: 07 July 1986
• Docket Number: No. 14424,14424
• Citation: 713 S.W.2d 30
• Parties: Harold G. SEXTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL MERCANTILE BANK & TRUST CO. OF JOPLIN, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 30

713 S.W.2d 30

Harold G. SEXTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL MERCANTILE BANK & TRUST CO. OF JOPLIN Defendant-Respondent.

No. 14424.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division Two.

July 7, 1986.

David H. Dunlap, West Plains, for plaintiff-appellant.

William H. Burden, Jr., Santa Fe, N.M., Daniel E. Scott, Joplin, for defendant-respondent.

PREWITT, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff filed his "Second Amended Petition for Breach of Contract" on January 28, 1985. It stated that plaintiff was damaged "by reason of Bank's [defendant's] breach of its loan commitment to Plaintiff", causing plaintiff to lose an automobile dealership.

Defendant's answer included an allegation that plaintiff "is estopped from claiming Defendant breached any obligations to Plaintiff or Sexton Motors, Inc. by agreeing to and executing that certain Agreement, dated April 18, 1972, between First National Bank and Trust Company of Joplin, Sexton Motors, Inc., Chrysler Credit Corporation, Harold Glen Sexton, and Barbara Jane Sexton".

On May 10, 1985, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment stating, in part, that "Plaintiff is estopped from asserting such cause of action by virtue of a Settlement Agreement executed on April 18, 1972." The trial judge, on July 15, 1985, granted summary judgment for defendant. The basis of this ruling was the trial court's determination that "[a]s to the issue of 'estoppel by settlement,' the Court finds there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that defendant is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law". Plaintiff appeals.

Summary judgment should not be granted where there is doubt as to material facts. Kennon v. Citizens Mutual Insurance Co., 666 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Mo.App.1983). In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court should scrutinize the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was rendered. Id.

England v. Yellow Transit Co., 240 Mo.App. 968, 225 S.W.2d 366 (1949), and Eberting v. Skinner, 364 S.W.2d 829 (Mo.App.1963), considered the effect of a claimant receiving a release from the party against whom the claim was being made. Both cases involved automobile collisions and held that absent an express reservation, if a party has been released from all claims arising from the collision, that party is estopped from suing the party who gave the release for damages arising out of the collision. 225 S.W.2d at 369; 364 S.W.2d at 834-835. Although these, and most of the other cases discussing this type of estoppel, involve automobile collisions, no reason is advanced or known to us why this principle should not be applicable to a document settling debts, security interests, and other financial matters.

"In the absence of words in the operative part of a general release which indicate an intention to limit or restrict its effect, it must be concluded that the instrument was contemplated and intended to be a complete settlement of all matters between the parties to the release." Lugena v. Hanna, 420 S.W.2d 335, 341 (Mo.1967). For a party to retain certain legal rights relating to the dispute, there must be an express reservation of such rights in the settlement agreement. Swope v. General Motors Corp., 445 F.Supp. 1222, 1228 (W.D.Mo.1978). See also Butters v. Kane, 347 A.2d 602, 604 (Me.1975); Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 37 Wash.App. 690, 682 P.2d 317, 319-320 (1984).

Written contracts of compromise and settlement are often termed a "release". See Stahly Cartage Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 475 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Mo.App.1971). A compromise and settlement agreement like any contract requires consideration. 15A Am.Jur.2d, Compromise and Settlement, § 7, p. 779 (1976). See also 15A C.J.S. Compromise and Settlement, § 2, p. 174 (1967) (settlement, to have legal validity, must possess the essential elements of any other contract).

There is no dispute in the facts here. The dispute relates to the legal effect of the document dated April 18, 1972. The document consists of 6 pages and is entitled, "AGREEMENT". The parties to the agreement were defendant, Sexton Motors, Inc., Chrysler Credit Corporation, Harold Glen Sexton, and Barbara Jane Sexton, his wife. A part of the agreement provided that upon receipt of $43,600, defendant would release plaintiff, his wife, and Sexton Motors, Inc. "from all claims and liabilities owed by them to" defendant, except for a note which plaintiff and his wife had signed, payable to defendant in the original amount of $6,187.20.

In effect, plaintiff contends that there was no consideration for the release to him, the agreement was therefore invalid, and he is not estopped by the agreement from bringing this action. Plaintiff contends that there was no...