Sexton v. State

• Decision Date: 18 October 1909
• Citation: 121 S.W. 1075
• Parties: SEXTON v. STATE.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 1075

121 S.W. 1075

SEXTON v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

October 18, 1909.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Independence County; Charles Coffin, Judge.

Charles Sexton was convicted of assault with intent to rape, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Oldfield & Cole, for appellant. Hal L. Norwood, Atty. Gen., and C. A. Cunningham, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

McCULLOCH, C. J.

Defendant, Charles Sexton, was indicted for the crime of rape, alleged to have been committed by having carnal knowledge of one Maud Bethel forcibly and against her will, and on trial therefor he was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape, his punishment being fixed by the jury at confinement in the penitentiary for three years.

Maud Bethel testified that the defendant on the day named in the indictment came to her home, and forcibly and against her will had sexual intercourse with her. The defendant denied this, and testified, on the contrary, that he had never had sexual intercourse with Maud Bethel either with or without her consent. The jury settled the issue by their verdict, which the evidence was sufficient to sustain. The tendency of the evidence was to show that the defendant was successful in his attempt and committed the crime of rape, if he made any assault at all on the girl, but the jury released him from the penalty of the higher crime, and found him guilty only of the lower crime of assault with intent to commit rape; and he cannot complain at this leniency. Benton v. State, 78 Ark. 284, 94 S. W. 688; Price v. State, 82 Ark. 25, 100 S. W. 74.

The defendant objected to the introduction of certain testimony by the state, and saved his exceptions to the ruling of the court in admitting it. The first exception insisted on here is that to a portion of the testimony of a witness named Birmingham. This witness was in the neighborhood where the offense is alleged to have been committed, and testified that, after having heard that the offense had been committed, he went over to see the girl, and, after having heard her complaint, went with her father to procure a warrant for defendant's arrest. The portion of his testimony quoted by counsel for defendant as objectionable is as follows: "Q. Where was it she made the complaint? A. At Riley Milligan's. Q. Who was present? A. Riley Milligan and Riley's wife. Q. In getting a complaint from her at the time, were Riley Milligan and his wife present at the time? A. That she gave me the complaint? Q. Yes. A. Yes; they were both present. Q. If questions were asked her concerning this affair, who asked them? A. Riley Milligan. (Objected to by defendant, overruled, exceptions saved.) Q. Where were you at the time, and where were these other parties at the time she made the complaint? A. I was at Riley Milligan's in the house, or on the little porch between the houses, rather, and they were there, too. Q. What was done in reference to this matter? (Objected to by defendant.) Q. In other words, was the process issued or asked for for the apprehension of this defendant? (Objected to by defendant, overruled, and exceptions saved.) A. Yes, sir. Q. Where did you go after that? A. I went back to the meeting ground, and learned that the boy had his gun and was gone. (Objection sustained.) Q. What did you go to the meeting ground for? A. I went over there for church, and to see if he (defendant) was there, and he was gone. I had understood that he was going over there to meeting." Further statements along the same line were made by the witness, but the above serves to show the part objected to by the defendant. The basis of defendant's objection to this testimony is that, in effect, it was allowing the witness to state that the girl in making her complaint to him gave the name or description of her assailant, and that on the strength of it the witness at once caused a warrant of arrest to be issued for the defendant's apprehension. Such is not, we think, the effect of his statements. He merely stated that she made complaint in his presence, and that immediately thereafter he went with her father to procure a warrant. His testimony does not show that he obtained from her information as to her assailant's identity, for he expressly stated that, before he went to see the girl, he had already heard about the commission of the crime, and had been over to defendant's house to see him. This court in a similar case said: "The rule on this subject is that the officer making the arrest, as in this case, should testify on the stand no further as to his reason for seeking and arresting the criminal than that there was an outcry or information furnished him in other ways of the commission of the crime, and that thereupon he proceeded to search for and apprehend the criminal. Whatever information he may obtain as to the description and identity of the alleged criminal is for...