Seye v. Lamar
| Decision Date | 20 April 2010 |
| Citation | 900 N.Y.S.2d 112,72 A.D.3d 975 |
| Parties | In the Matter of Susan SEYE, appellant, v. Katoya C. LAMAR, respondent. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Rayaaz N. Khan, Jamaica, N.Y., for appellant.
Seymour Zager, New York, N.Y., for respondent.
FRED T. SANTUCCI, J.P., DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, and PLUMMER E. LOTT, JJ.
In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Family Court, Queens County (O'Connor, J.), dated April 13, 2009, which, without a hearing, dismissed the petition, with prejudice.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
On or about September 8, 2008, the petitioner commenced the instant proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8 seeking, inter alia, an order of protection against the respondent. In her petition, the petitioner alleged that she and the respondent, who do not reside together, "have an intimate relationship" by virtue of the fact that the respondent is the sister of the petitioner's boyfriend and the aunt of the petitioner's daughter.
After various court appearances, but without a hearing, the Family Court determined that the petitioner and the respondent do not have an "intimate relationship" within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e), and dismissed the petition on the ground that the parties are not members of the same family or household within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1). The petitioner appeals, and we affirm.
The Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and, thus,it "cannot exercise powers beyond those granted to it by statute" ( Matter of Johna M.S. v. Russell E.S., 10 N.Y.3d 364, 366, 859 N.Y.S.2d 594, 889 N.E.2d 471; see N.Y. Const., art. VI, § 13; Family Ct. Act § 115). Pursuant to Family Court Act § 812(1), the Family Court's jurisdiction in family offense proceedings is limited to certain proscribed criminal acts that occur "between spouses or former spouses, or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household " (family ct. act § 812[1][EMPHASIS ADDED] ).
Here, it is undisputed that the parties are not spouses, former spouses, or parent and child. Thus, the Family Court would have jurisdiction over the instant proceeding only if the petitioner and the respondent are "members of the same family or household" (Family Ct. Act § 812[1] ). In that regard, until July 21, 2008, for purposes of Family Court Act article 8, "members of the same family or household" meant:
It is undisputed that the petitioner and the respondent do not fall within any of the foregoing categories and, thus, would not have been "members of the same family or household" under the statute as it existed prior to July 21, 2008. Although the respondent is related to the petitioner's child by consanguinity, the petitioner is not seeking the order of protection on behalf of her child, who was in foster care at the time of the incident giving rise to the family offense petition.
However, on July 21, 2008, the Legislature expanded the definition of "members of the same family or household" to include, among others, "persons who are not related by consanguinity or affinity and who are or have been in an intimate relationship regardless of whether such persons have lived together at any time" (Family Ct. Act § 812[1][e][emphasis added] ). The Legislature expressly excluded, from the definition of "intimate relationship," a "casual acquaintance" and "ordinary fraternization between two individuals in business or social contexts" (Family Ct. Act § 812[1][e] ). Beyond those exclusions, the Legislature left it to the courts to determine on a case-by-case basis what qualifies as an "intimate relationship" within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e), suggesting factors which the court may consider, including "the nature or type of relationship, regardless of whether the relationship is sexual innature; the frequency of interaction between the persons; and the duration of the relationship" (Family Ct. Act § 812[1][e] ).
Although in some instances the determination as to whether persons are or have been in an "intimate relationship" within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e) may require a hearing, here, the Family Court possessed sufficient relevantinformation to allow it to make an...
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