Seyler v. Seyler
| Decision Date | 12 September 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 86912.,ED 86912. |
| Citation | 201 S.W.3d 57 |
| Parties | Jannie M. SEYLER, Petitioner/Respondent/Cross-Appellant, v. John Eugene SEYLER, Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Keffe & Brodie, Maia Brodie, Robin L. Kaiser, co-counsel, St. Louis, MO, Ariane K. Moore, co-counsel, Kirkwood, MO, for appellant.
Gary M. Siegel, Siegel Sevastianos, LLP, R. Bradley Griffin, co-counsel, St. Louis, MO, for respondent/cross-appellant.
Before CLIFFORD H. AHRENS, P.J., and MARY K. HOFF, J., and NANNETTE A. BAKER, J.
John Eugene Seyler (Husband) appeals and Jannie M. Seyler (Wife) cross-appeals from an amended trial court judgment entered in their dissolution of marriage action. Husband alleges trial court error in its classification of certain pending workers' compensation claims as solely marital property. Wife alleges trial court error in: its determination of child custody by sustaining Husband's objection to Wife's discovery request for Husband's prior mental health records based upon the physician-patient privilege; in ordering the parties' minor child to attend a Catholic school, if the parties could not agree on the choice of school, and in ordering Wife to pay fifty percent of the cost for the child to attend the Catholic school; and in denying Wife's motion to reopen or amend the amended judgment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and reverse and remand in part.
The parties were married in October 1990. One child (Child) was born of the marriage in July 1992. In December 2003, Wife filed a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage, to which Husband filed a Counter-Petition for Dissolution of Marriage. Wife filed her petition after Husband's younger brother accused Husband of sexually abusing him when he was a child, about thirty years ago. In her petition, Wife sought primary physical and legal custody of Child.
Also in December 2003, Wife obtained an Ex Parte Order of Child Protection (Order of Protection), which remained in effect for forty-two days. While the Order of Protection was in effect, Husband could not be at the family residence or at Child's school. Pursuant to the Order of Protection, the trial court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for Child. In January 2004, Wife took Child to meet with Kolleen Simons (Simons), a licensed clinical social worker, because Wife was concerned Husband was possibly abusing Child.1
In March 2004, the trial court entered a pendente lite order (PDL) awarding the parties joint legal and joint physical custody of Child, which included unsupervised, overnight custody periods for Husband, and ordering Husband to pay to Wife $200 per month for child support. The court also entered an order by consent under Rule 60.012 directing the parties and Child to undergo psychological evaluations by Dr. Dean Rosen (Dr. Rosen). Subsequently, the court entered a protective order restricting the production of Dr. Rosen's medical records.
During discovery, Wife requested Husband to produce properly executed medical authorizations "for each and every hospital, doctor, psychiatric center, treatment center or health care provider of any shape, matter, or form from whom [Husband has] received care, counseling and/or treatment with regard to any type of mental, nervous and/or emotional illness, problem, or disorder, or for drug abuse, illness, or addiction." Husband objected to the release of this information on the basis of physician-patient privilege. The trial court sustained Husband's objection. The trial court also declined to order Husband to produce the requested documents under Rule 60.01. Subsequently, Wife amended her Petition for Dissolution of Marriage to seek sole physical and legal custody of Child with Husband to have only supervised visitation. The amended petition alleged, among other things: Husband was and had been abusive, physically, emotionally and mentally; Husband engaged in inappropriate conduct with Child, including taking recent showers with Child; and Husband had a history of substance abuse, violence, and sexually inappropriate conduct.
In March 2005, the trial court held a dissolution hearing and subsequently entered a judgment dissolving the parties' marriage. Both parties filed motions to amend the judgment, and the trial court entered an amended judgment in September 2005.3 In the amended judgment, the trial court classified as marital property a pending workers' compensation claim that Husband had against Energy Petroleum for which he received temporary total disability payments during the parties' marriage and anticipated receiving an additional lump sum payment after dissolution of the marriage. In determining the claim to be marital property, the court found that Husband introduced no evidence of the nature of the lump sum payment, including what amount, if any, would represent lost earnings. The court then awarded each party fifty percent of all sums received by Husband in connection with the claim.
In the amended judgment, the trial court awarded the parties joint legal and joint physical custody of Child, with Child residing primarily with Wife, and ordered Husband to pay to Wife $200 per month for child support. The court also stated that if the parties were unable to agree upon the high school that Child would attend, then Child would attend St. John the Baptist Catholic School (the Catholic School).4 The court ordered each parent to pay directly to the educational institution fifty percent of the cost for Child to attend a private or parochial high school.
Subsequently, Wife filed a motion to reopen or amend the amended judgment, which the trial court denied after a hearing.
Husband appeals and Wife cross-appeals from the amended judgment.
In his sole point on appeal, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to set aside as separate property to Husband the portion of Husband's pending workers' compensation claims against Energy Petroleum attributable to future loss of earnings accrued after the dissolution of the parties' marriage.5
A trial court has broad discretion in identifying marital property. N.M.O. v. D.P.O., 115 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Mo.App. E.D. 2003). If the evidence supports the trial court's classification, we will not find error in the trial court's decision. Id.
Section 452.330.16 provides in relevant part that "the court shall set apart to each spouse such spouse's nonmarital property and shall divide the marital property ... in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors...." A statutory presumption exists that all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage is marital property. Section 452.330.2.
We follow the analytical approach to classification of property, including whether or not a lump sum workers' compensation award is marital or nonmarital property. Pauley v. Pauley, 771 S.W.2d 105, 109 (Mo.App. E.D.1989). Under the analytical approach, we do not depend on a formalistic view that looks only to the timing of the acquisition of the award; instead, the inquiry focuses on the elements of damages the particular award was intended to remedy, the purpose of the award. Id. In other words, we focus on what the award was designed to replace. Heslop v. Heslop, 967 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Mo.App. W.D.1998). Compensation is marital to the extent that it compensates for loss of earnings during the marriage; compensation is nonmarital to be set aside as separate property to the extent that it compensates for future loss of earnings that have accrued since the dissolution of a marriage. Winslow v. Winslow, 14 S.W.3d 690, 695 (Mo.App. E.D.2000).
Regarding Husband's workers' compensation claims against Energy Petroleum, the record reveals the following. Energy Petroleum employed Husband from 1996 to 2003. Husband had four intertwined workers' compensation claims against Energy Petroleum for injuries occurring in 1997 and 1998.7 Initially, Husband testified that all of these claims were pending at the time of trial. Subsequently, Husband testified that the claim stemming from the 1997 injury had been settled six years prior, and he had been paid on that settlement and did not expect any more money from that claim. Husband also had a fifth workers' compensation claim against Energy Petroleum for injuries occurring in 2002.8 During the period of time that Husband was unable to work due to his injuries, he received monthly payments from workers' compensation. Husband did not offer into evidence any of the actual workers' compensation claim forms to indicate the nature of the claims. Husband testified that he could not provide any explanation or documentation to support his allegation that the workers' compensation claims were separate property. Husband testified that he filed the claims because he injured his back at work, and, based on the injuries, workers' compensation would compensate him. Husband was not aware of anything else for which he would be compensated on the claims.
The pending workers' compensation claims are nonmarital property to be set aside to Husband as his separate property to the extent the claims compensate Husband for future loss of earnings after the dissolution of the parties' marriage. The record does not establish what percentage, if any, of Husband's pending workers' compensation claims will compensate him for loss of earnings during the marriage versus future loss of earnings after the dissolution of the parties' marriage. If the claims reflect compensation for the former, they are considered marital property. See Wilk v. Wilk, 781 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Mo.App. E.D.1989). If the claims reflect compensation for the latter, they are considered nonmarital property. See Id.
Because the record fails to disclose the information necessary for computing what portions of Husband's pending...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hollaway v. Hollaway
...evidence." (citing Akamine v. Haw. Packing & Crating Co., 53 Haw. 406, 410, 495 P.2d 1164, 1167–68 (1972) )); Seyler v. Seyler, 201 S.W.3d 57, 65 (Mo.Ct.App.2006) (reversing where "Husband presented no evidence that attendance at the high school division of the Catholic School met an educat......
-
Morgan v. Morgan
...other states have uniformly recognized that a court invested with jurisdiction over custody issues may do so. See Seyler v. Seyler, 201 S.W.3d 57 (Mo.Ct. App.2006) (test for determining when a court should order private or parochial schooling for a child over wishes of one parent is when th......
-
Sendlein v. Sendlein
...that the "particular educational needs" requirement applied. In support of this argument, Father primarily relies on Seyler v. Seyler , 201 S.W.3d 57 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006). In Seyler , one parent objected to private school and was ordered to pay half of the child's private school expenses. I......
-
Ryan v. Ryan, No. 2008-CA-000858-MR (Ky. App. 4/24/2009)
...may not compel any particular form of education, but may decide which parent's plan is in child's best interest); Seyler v. Seyler, 201 S.W.3d 57 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (test for determining when court should order private or parochial schooling for child over wishes of one parent is when scho......
-
Witness
...law considers that privilege waived when a Plaintiff brings a medical malpractice claim against that doctor. MISSOURI Seyler v. Seyler , 201 S.W.3d 57, 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). The record in a child custody action was sufficient to trigger application of statute which prevents party from inv......
-
§ 8.02 Workers' Compensation Benefits
...289 Mich. App. 195, 795 N.W.2d 826 (2010). Minnesota: Ward v. Ward, 453 N.W.2d 729 (Minn. App. 1990). Missouri: Seyler v. Seyler, 201 S.W.3d 57 (Mo. App. 2006); Pauley v. Pauley, 771 S.W.2d 105 (Mo. App. 1989). Montana: In re Marriage of Blankenship, 210 Mont. 31, 682 P.2d 1354 (1984). Nebr......