Seymour v. Hug
| Decision Date | 03 May 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-2502.,06-2502. |
| Citation | 485 F.3d 926 |
| Parties | Donna L. SEYMOUR, Plaintiff, v. Carol HUG et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal of Leslie V. Matlaw. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Leslie V. Matlaw (argued), Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
Mark D. Howard, Chicago, IL, Manuel Sanchez, Paige C. Donaldson (argued), Sanchez & Daniels, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.
Leslie V. Matlaw, Chicago, IL, pro se.
Before MANION, KANNE, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.
Attorney Leslie V. Matlaw represented plaintiff Donna Seymour in this case. Ms. Matlaw, acting on her own behalf, seeks to set aside the settlement agreement reached in this case and related orders entered by the district court. Ms. Matlaw lacks standing to bring this appeal and therefore the appeal is dismissed.
Plaintiff Donna L. Seymour filed a lawsuit in March 2004 alleging that she had been discriminated against on the basis of race in violation of the Fair Housing Act when she tried to purchase a home in suburban Chicago. The defendants are the real estate agents, potential sellers and others associated with the contested transaction. The case was initially assigned to District Judge George M. Marovich. In August 2004, the parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to proceed before Magistrate Judge Ian Levin. Judge Levin retired from the bench and the Executive Committee of the Northern District of Illinois reassigned the case to Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Cole in May 2005.
In June 2005, the parties reported to Judge Cole that they had reached a settlement and were in the process of finalizing the settlement document. Judge Cole dismissed the case with leave to reinstate within sixty days and retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. In July 2005, the parties returned to Judge Cole filing cross motions to enforce the settlement agreement.
In a thirty-seven page opinion issued in November 2005, Judge Cole granted the defendant's motion to enforce the agreement and denied the plaintiff's cross motion. He concluded that the plaintiff and her attorneys had been less than honest during the settlement proceeding. Judge Cole stated that the parties' intent during the June 2005 settlement was to reach an agreement that covered both the plaintiff's claims and her minor children's potential claims against the defendants. Although the children were not parties to the case, the plaintiff referenced alleged harm to her children in her complaint and during discovery. As such, the defendants wanted, and Judge Cole concluded that the plaintiff had agreed to, a global settlement covering both the mother's actual claims and any potential claims by the children. To account for the children's claims, the settlement required an allocation of the total settlement amount between the plaintiff and her children.
The plaintiff and children are residents of the State of New York. Under New York law, the plaintiff does not have authority to settle her children's claims. Instead, a petition must be brought before the New York Surrogate Court which makes an independent evaluation of the children's claims to insure that the children's interests have been fairly represented. Consequently, the settlement agreement required the plaintiff to petition to the Surrogate Court and obtain approval as a condition of settlement. The settlement agreement also required the plaintiff to bear the costs of petitioning the Surrogate Court.
Judge Cole concluded that the plaintiff and her attorneys acted improperly in their representations to the defendants during the settlement and in their petition to the Surrogate Court. According to Judge Cole, the plaintiff decided that the entire settlement amount should go to her and none should be allocated to the children. To achieve this goal, the petition to the Surrogate Court incorrectly represented that the children had no independent claims and therefore had no interest affected by the settlement agreement. The language in the settlement agreement was also altered to make it appear that it did not cover any potential claims by the children. Judge Cole concluded that the plaintiff and her attorney had deceived both the Surrogate Court and the defendants because the children's potential claims had been an integral part of the original settlement. Judge Cole ordered the plaintiff and her attorneys to make a second petition to the Surrogate Court and readjust the settlement agreement to properly reflect the parties' agreement as to the children's potential claims. Judge Cole also met informally with the parties and suggested that the defendants be compensated for the attorney's fees incurred for enforcing the settlement agreement. The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration a week after the original opinion but Judge Cole denied the motion.
In April 2006, Judge Cole entered the new settlement agreement reached by the parties. He again dismissed the case with leave to reinstate, this time within ninety days, and also stated that he would retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. Two weeks later, Ms. Matlaw, on her own behalf and before Judge Marovich, filed objections to the settlement agreement pursuant to Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ms. Matlaw objected to Judge Cole's findings that she had been dishonest in the settlement proceedings and before the Surrogate Court. She also argued that the April 2006 settlement had effectively reduced the amount of attorney's fees and costs that she would receive.
Apparently, in light of Judge Cole's November 2005 order, the parties had allocated a portion of the original settlement amount to the defendants' attorney's fees incurred in enforcing the settlement agreement. Ms. Matlaw stated that she was to receive a percentage of the award received by the plaintiff. Consequently, her fee amount was reduced under the April 2006 settlement agreement because the overall amount awarded to the plaintiff was less. However, the April 2006 settlement agreement does not mention Ms. Matlaw or any payment of fees to her. Any agreement between her and the plaintiff relating to fees was done separately and not placed in the April 2006 settlement agreement.
Judge Marovich issued an order on May 19, 2006 denying Ms. Matlaw's objections and informing her that his participation in the case ended when the parties consented to the magistrate judge's jurisdiction back in August 2004. His order cited 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) and informed Ms. Matlaw that the appropriate procedure was a direct appeal to the court of appeals. Ms. Matlaw then filed a notice of appeal on May 26, 2006 appealing Judge Marovich's denial of her Rule 72 objections and Judge Cole's November 2005 opinions. Ms. Matlaw presently characterizes her Rule 72 objections as a Rule 59 motion. In July 2006, Ms. Matlaw filed a Rule 60 motion before Judge Cole to amend the April 2006 settlement agreement arguing that there had been a mutual mistake of fact and law by the parties. Judge Cole denied Ms. Matlaw's Rule 60 motion in August 2006. During the briefing of this appeal, the defendants filed a motion with this court arguing that Ms. Matlaw's appeal is frivolous and that she should be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The defendants also have a pending motion for sanctions before Judge Cole.
Ms. Matlaw seeks to overturn the April 2006 settlement agreement and Judge Cole's November 2005 and July 2006 opinions that were critical of her conduct in this case. She argues that she is able to bring this appeal on her own behalf because: (1) Judge Cole's opinions have negatively affected her reputation, and (2) the April 2006 settlement agreement has effectively reduced the amount of attorney's fees and costs she would have otherwise recovered in this case.
The "general rule [is] that a nonparty cannot challenge on appeal the rulings of a district court." Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 475 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir.2007) (citing Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304, 108 S.Ct. 586, 98 L.Ed.2d 629 (1988) (per curiam); B.H. ex rel. Pierce v. Murphy, 984 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir.1993)). We have recognized that an attorney can bring an appeal on her own behalf when challenging a district court decision imposing monetary sanctions on the attorney, but this rule does not allow an appeal of otherwise critical comments by the district court when no monetary sanctions...
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