Seymour v. Over River School-Dist

• Decision Date: 23 February 1886
• Citation: 53 Conn. 502,3 A. 552
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: SEYMOUR v. OVER RIVER SCHOOL-DIST.

3 A. 552

53 Conn. 502

SEYMOUR

v. OVER RIVER SCHOOL-DIST.

SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT.

Filed February 23, 1886.

Appeal from Fairfield county.

John PI. Perry and Winthrop H. Perry, for plaintiff.

John S. Seymour, for defendant.

CARPENTER, J. Scire facias. A process of foreign attachment was served on the defendant, November 5, 1883, as the trustee, etc., of one Wigham, a teacher in the defendant district, factorizing the salary of said Wigham for the month of October preceding; afterwards his salary for December and February was factorized by service of two orders for further attachment, one served December 21, 1883, the other February 29, 1884. The court of common pleas held the defendant liable as to the second and third attachments, and not liable as to the first or original attachment. Both parties appealed.

Plaintiff's appeal. On the third of November, 1883, the committee of said district drew an order on the treasurer thereof, payable to the order of said Wigham for his salary for the month of October, and delivered the same to him. The salary of said Wigham was usually paid to him by such orders. On the same day Wigham indorsed the order in blank, and delivered it to S. E. Olmstead, who in good faith paid him the money thereon. None of the officers of the district were notified of the transfer to Olmstead until the treasurer paid the order to Olmstead on the fourteenth of December, when the factorizing process was served. November 5th the treasurer disclosed to the officer an indebtedness of the district to Wigham of the sum of $120. The court overruled the claim of the plaintiff that the defendant was liable for the salary for October, and held that the delivery to said Wigham, of said order transferred and paid as aforesaid, was in law a payment of the salary for said month of October, before the first attachment by the plaintiff.

We think the facts stated are equivalent to an express finding that the order was given by the district, and received by Wigham in payment. His salary was "usually paid to him by such orders." He had been in the employ of the district for more than two years, and was accustomed to receive his pay in orders on the treasurer. The district had adopted that mode of payment, in which Wigham acquiesced, and which was continued after the suits were brought. The salary for November was paid by a similar order; and so was the salary for each of the months of December, January, and February following. That the parties intended, by giving and receiving the order, to give and receive a chose in action —evidence of an indebtedness—simply to change the form of the obligation, will not be presumed. It was a reasonable and convenient method of paying their bills. When an order was received, the claim was liquidated, adjusted, and nothing remained to be done but to call upon the treasurer and receive the money. It was intended and understood by the parties as payment; as much so as receiving a town-order or bank-check. The order was regarded and treated as cash, not only by the parties, but by Olmstead, who received several of them. To regard it otherwise, to treat the indebtedness as still subsisting, would mislead and operate as a snare. When, therefore, the judge says that he overruled the claim of the plaintiff, and held that the order so given and paid was in law a payment, his language imports, not merely a legal conclusion, but, taken in connection with the facts, an actual payment; especially as he made such payment the foundation of his judgment. The supposed error is not manifest, and the judgment on the plaintiff's appeal is not reversed.

Defendant's appeal. 1. It is claimed that the court erred in holding that the teacher was not a public officer within the meaning of the law exempting the salaries of such officers from attachment. We think the court did not err in this respect. It will be noticed that the claim is not that the defendant is not liable as garnishee. That it may be so liable is practically conceded; and well it may be. In Bray v. Wallingford, 20 Conn. 416, it was expressly held that a town is so liable; and doubtless, for the same reasons, other territorial corporations would be liable. We think school-districts, in respect to all matters within the scope of their powers, must stand upon the same footing.

But the claim is that Wigham's salary is exempt for his sake, or on his account. It is true, he was serving the public in a matter of great public importance. But not every one serving the public can claim that his compensation therefor is exempt from attachment. Mechanics and laborers employed in erecting school buildings are serving the public, but their wages are not on that account exempt from attachment A. teacher is not an officer in the ordinary sense of the word. He is not usually elected or appointed, but is employed,—contracted with. He has duties to perform incident to his employment, but they are not official duties, and he is not under oath. We see no good reasons why his salary should not be liable for his...