Seymour v. Prescott

• Decision Date: 22 February 1879
• Citation: 69 Me. 376
• Parties: Charles SEYMOUR v. Joseph D. PRESCOTT.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

69 Me. 376

Charles SEYMOUR v. Joseph D. PRESCOTT.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

February 22, 1879

ON REPORT.

ASSUMPSIT on a promissory note of the following tenor:

" Knoxville, Tennessee, June 11, 1870. One year after date I promise to pay to the order of Charles Seymour, with interest at the rate of ten per cent, one hundred and ninety-six and 15-100 dollars at said Seymonr's office in Knoxville, Tenn., value received. (Signed) J. D Prescott."

Answer, duress and want of consideration. The material facts appear in the opinion.

S Belcher, for the plaintiff.

J. B. Severy, for the defendant, in a written brief of thirty-seven pages, cited, among others, the following authorities.

I. Duress. 1 Par. Con. (5 ed.) 392, 393. Met. Con. 23, and ref. 2 Greenl. Ev. 302. Robinson v. Gould, 11 Cush. 57. Foshay v. Ferguson, 5 Hill 154. Bush v. Brown, 19 Am. R. 695-8, and ref. 49 Ind. 573. Alexander v. Pierce, 10 N.H. 494. Worcester v. Faton, 13 Mass. 371. Taylor v. Jaques, 106 Mass. 291. Whitefield v. Longfellow, 13 Me. 146.

II. Want of consideration. Met. Con. 171, 172. Packard v. Richardson, 17 Mass. 129. Bixler v. Ream, 3 Penn. 282. Bingham v. Kimball, 17 Ind. 396.

SYMONDS J.

This case was tried at nisi prius, by consent of parties, before the presiding justice, who, after hearing the evidence, ruled, as matter of law, that it did not sustain the claim of the defendant in respect either of want of consideration for the note in suit, or of its procurement by duress; and, as these were the only grounds of defense, ordered judgment for the plaintiff for the amount of the note. The evidence is now before the court upon exceptions taken by the defendant to this ruling thereon.

There is an essential inconsistency between the testimony for the plaintiff and that for the defendant in regard to the transactions which led to the giving of the note and the circumstances attending it. The contradictions cannot be reconciled. The statements cannot both be true.

In reference to the testimony for the plaintiff, it is sufficient to say that, if it is to be believed, there can be no pretense either that a legal and adequate consideration for the note was wanting, or that the defendant's signature was obtained while he was under the influence of any fear or restraint. It was, on the contrary, if the evidence is credible, a note given for money loaned to defendant, at his request and for his accommodation; made at the time and for the amount of the loan.

The only question, then, to be determined is whether the testimony offered by the defendant sustains either of the grounds on which the defense proceeds.

The defendant is a resident of Maine, who at the date of the note was in Knoxville, Tennessee, where he had gone as agent for his son for the purpose of effecting the sale of certain real estate, which had previously been in charge of the plaintiff, a real estate agent in Knoxville. On June 4, the defendant says, he finished his business, paid the plaintiff $100 for his commissions and services in completing the sale and writing the deeds, and then regarded his dealings with the plaintiff as at an end. The defendant was at that time seventy-one years of age, and, according to this account, in a state of health so poor that he did not dare to return to Maine alone, and therefore remained in Knoxville about a week for the purpose of making the journey in the company of some friends, Mr. Holt and his family, who were going as far as New York. Just as the defendant was about to take the train with these friends he says the note was signed, and under circumstances which may be stated in his own language. " I knew about what time the cars started, .. and as the time was expiring and I thought I ought to be there, Mr. Seymonr came into the house with an inkstand and a pen and some papers in his hands and requested me to execute the note on my son's account. I said to Mr. Seymour, ‘ The cars are about to leave, Mr. Holt has already gone up. I can't stop a minute to see to this matter.’ Said he, ‘ You can't leave the place until you sign this note,’ holding it up to me. Well, I felt for a moment as if my life depended on going home at that time with Mr. Holt. So great was my terror that I seized the pen and signed the note, and immediately made my way to the depot. He held the note and this paper in his hand."

The paper which the plaintiff is said to have held in his hand at that time with the note was a bill against the defendant's son, containing items of commissions and cash expended, on which the balance due was the same as the face of the note in suit. This bill, receipted by the plaintiff, was taken by the defendant after signing the note, and on his return home was delivered to his son, by whom it has since been retained.

This is substantially the defendant's account of the manner in which the note was given, the details of which are stated more fully in the report of the case.

Giving, then, to all the testimony introduced by the defendant upon this point the weight of truth, does it prove the duress alleged?

The plaintiff claimed that a balance of account equal in amount to the face of the note was due to him from the defendant's son for services and disbursements. It was not, so far as the case shows, a...