Shabazz v. Kailer

• Decision Date: 12 August 2016
• Docket Number: 15-CV-2798 (JGK)
• Citation: 201 F.Supp.3d 386
• Parties: Omar SHABAZZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Kieran KAILER, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

201 F.Supp.3d 386

Omar SHABAZZ, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Kieran KAILER, et al., Defendants.

15-CV-2798 (JGK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed August 12, 2016

Peter A. Cross, Robert Howard Rickner, Eaton & Van Winkle, LLLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Donald Wallace, pro se.

Qiana Charmaine Smith, NYC Law Department, Office of the Corporation Counsel, New York, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:

Omar Shabazz and Donald Wallace, a.k.a. Donald Perrington, bring this action against defendants Kieran Kailer and the City of New York for alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for malicious prosecution under New York law. Shabazz and Wallace allege that Kailer, then a New York City Police Department ("NYPD") officer, violated their constitutional rights by fabricating evidence that was presented in a trial at which the plaintiffs were each convicted of criminal possession of a weapon. The convictions were ultimately reversed by the New York Court of Appeals, and the State subsequently abandoned the charges. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The defendants now move to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I.

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor. See McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp. , 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir.2007). The Court's function on a motion to dismiss is "not to weigh the evidence that might be presented at a trial but merely to determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient." Goldman v. Belden , 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir.1985). The Court should not dismiss the complaint if the plaintiff has stated "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). While the Court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. ; see also A'Gard v. Perez , 919 F.Supp.2d 394, 398–99 (S.D.N.Y.2013).

When presented with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may consider documents that are referenced in the complaint, documents that the plaintiff relied on in bringing suit and that are either in the plaintiff's possession or that the plaintiff knew of when bringing suit, or matters of which judicial notice may be taken. See Taylor v. Vt. Dep't of Educ. , 313 F.3d 768, 776 (2d Cir.2002) ; see also A'Gard , 919 F.Supp.2d at 399.

II.

The following facts alleged in the Amended Complaint are accepted as true for the purposes of the defendants' motion to dismiss.

Around midnight on January 9, 2008, the plaintiffs were in a car with two other individuals, Arroyo and Cornielle, when they were stopped by defendant Kailer and his partner Sergeant Albin. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18, 26.) At that time, Arroyo was the driver, Wallace sat in the front passenger seat, and Shabazz and Cornielle sat in the back. (Id. ¶ 18.) The two police officers asked all four occupants to exit the car. (Id. ¶¶ 28-31.) When Cornielle attempted to exit with her purse and some Chinese food, she was ordered by Sergeant Albin to put those items back in the car. (Id. ¶ 30.) Kailer searched the car after Cornielle placed her purse back on the backseat. (Id. ¶ 34.) Kailer grabbed Cornielle's purse, felt that there was a gun inside, unlatched and opened the purse, and found a small handgun in the purse. (Id. ¶ 35.) The plaintiffs and their companions were then arrested and taken to the precinct. (Id. ¶ 36.)

At the precinct, the plaintiffs and their companions were interviewed by Kailer and NYPD officer James Quilty. (Id. ¶ 38.) During the interview, Cornielle allegedly told Kailer that the handgun belonged to her and that no one else in the car knew she had it. (Id. ¶ 39.) The plaintiffs further allege that they in fact had no knowledge of the gun's presence until it was found in Cornielle's purse. (Id. ¶ 40.)

The plaintiffs allege that Kailer, in furtherance of his scheme to falsely charge Shabazz, Wallace and Arroyo each with criminal possession of a weapon, manufactured photographic evidence by placing a bottle of champagne taken from the trunk and a near empty bottle of Hennessey that had not been in the car in the backseat of the vehicle on either side of the purse. (Id. ¶¶ 48-49, 68, 86.) Kailer allegedly took photographs of the bottles and the purse and provided those photographs to Assistant District Attorney Joanne Li. (Id. ¶¶ 49, 51.) Kailer allegedly drafted and provided to Li a misleading and inaccurate affidavit that omitted that Cornielle owned the purse and tried to leave the car with it, that the purse was found in the car only because Sergeant Albin told her to put it back in the car, and that Cornielle admitted that the gun was hers. (Id. ¶¶ 52-53, 55.) Kailer told Li that he noticed the car switching lanes without signaling and smelled marijuana when Arroyo rolled down his window, and that he saw the purse sitting vertically in the middle of the backseat of the car, with the butt of the gun sticking out of the top of the unlatched purse. (Id. ¶¶ 56-62.) According to the plaintiffs, Kailer's story of why he pulled over the car and searched it and how he found the gun was false. (Id. ¶¶ 56-62.) Kailer was allegedly the only NYPD officer that Li interviewed before initiating the prosecution. (Id. ¶ 63.)

Li allegedly believed Kailer and used Kailer's fabricated photographs and story to indict the plaintiffs for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. (Id. ¶ 63.) See People v. Perrington , 89 A.D.3d 529, 932 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2011). Kailer allegedly told the same false story with the same omissions when he testified during the grand jury and trial proceedings. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 64-87.) During the trial, the attorneys for Shabazz and Wallace attempted to introduce testimony that Cornielle had admitted the gun was hers, but that admission was excluded. (Id. ¶ 90.) Allegedly there was no physical evidence introduced at trial against Shabazz or Wallace that connected them to the gun in any way. (Id. ¶ 89.) The jurors asked for the allegedly fabricated photographs during deliberation, and eventually returned a guilty verdict. (Id. ¶¶ 91-92.)

On September 16, 2009, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the plaintiffs. See Perrington , 932 N.Y.S.2d 472. The plaintiffs were each sentenced to a term of eight years. Id. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. See id. On October 15, 2013, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, and ordered a new trial. See People v. Shabazz , 22 N.Y.3d 896, 977 N.Y.S.2d 141, 999 N.E.2d 504, 505 (2013). The Court of Appeals held that it was an error for the trial court to exclude Cornielle's admission that the gun belonged to her. Id. , 977 N.Y.S.2d 141, 999 N.E.2d at 505–06. Wallace and Shabazz were released on bail in November and December, 2013, respectively, by which time they had remained in custody for almost six years. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 42, 94, 95.) On June 30, 2014, the New York County District Attorney decided to abandon the charges against the plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 96.)

On April 10, 2015, the plaintiffs filed this action against Kailer and the City of New York, asserting claims for violations to their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Kailer, including malicious prosecution and the denial of a fair trial due to the fabrication of evidence. Shabazz separately asserted a state law malicious prosecution claim against Kailer, and the same claim against the City of New York for respondeat superior liability. The defendants' motion to dismiss followed.

III.

The defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They argue that: (a) the plaintiffs' federal and state malicious prosecution claims should be dismissed because there was probable cause for prosecuting the plaintiffs; (b) the plaintiffs' fair trial claim should be dismissed because it is barred by the statute of limitations; (c) the plaintiffs' fair trial claim should be dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to show that the alleged evidentiary fabrication led to the deprivation of their liberty; and (d) Kailer is entitled to qualified immunity.

A.

To sustain a § 1983 claim based on malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must demonstrate conduct by the defendant that is tortious under state law and that results in a constitutionally cognizable deprivation of liberty. See Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff , 63 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir.1995) ; see also Jocks v. Tavernier , 316 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir.2003) ; Jenkins v. City of New York , No. 98–CV–7170 (JGK)(DFE), 98–CV–7338 (JGK)(DFE), 1999 WL 782509, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1999), aff'd , 216 F.3d 1072 (2d Cir.2000).

The elements of a malicious prosecution claim under New York State law are: "(1) the initiation or continuation of a criminal proceeding against plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in plaintiff's favor; (3) lack of probable cause for commencing the proceeding; and (4) actual malice as a motivation for defendant's actions." Murphy v. Lynn , 118 F.3d 938, 947 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting Russell v. Smith , 68 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir.1995) ); see also Manganiello v. City of New York , 612 F.3d 149, 160–61 (2d Cir.2010). A police officer may initiate criminal proceedings by bringing charges and...