Shachter v. City of Chi.
| Decision Date | 20 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19 CV 6267,19 CV 6267 |
| Parties | JAY F. SHACHTER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The City of Chicago fined plaintiff Jay Shachter for overgrown weeds on his property. He alleges that the City's hearing officers, who adjudicate local offenses, are biased in favor of the City, in violation of his due process rights under the U.S. Constitution, and that the hearing officer who fined him made mistakes of fact and law. He seeks review of the administrative decision and a declaration that the system of administrative hearings is unconstitutional. The City moves to dismiss Shachter's complaint. The motion is granted.
A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plausibly suggests the violation of a legal right. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-58 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-80 (2009). At the motionto dismiss stage, I assume all factual allegations are true and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor, but do not accept legal conclusions, bare assertions, or conclusory statements. Iqbal at 678-79. Documents attached to the complaint and information subject to judicial notice, like city ordinances and public records, can be considered. Phillips v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 714 F.3d 1017, 1020 (7th Cir. 2013); Independent Trust Corp. v. Stewart Information Services Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 943 (7th Cir. 2012); Fed. R. Evid. 201.
The City of Chicago's Streets and Sanitation Department reported Jay Shachter in violation of an ordinance that requires property owners to cut or control all weeds so that the average height does not exceed ten inches. Chi. Mun. Code § 7-28-120(a); [1] at 4.1 At the hearing, an administrative law judge from the City's Department of Administrative Hearings ruled that Shachter violated the code and fined him $600.00 plus $40.00 in costs. [1] at 4. The finding was contested. Id. Shachter filed this federal lawsuit, alleging the City violated his constitutional right to a neutral adjudicator. [1]. In Chicago, the Mayor appoints the director of the Department of Administrative Hearings, who is responsible for hiring administrative law judges, also known as hearing officers.2 Chi. Mun. Code §§ 2-14-010; 2-14-030(2). Hearing officers are employees of the City's Department of Administrative Hearings,not the municipal department that issues or prosecutes the violation. See Chi. Mun. Code § 2-14-076(c). Shachter alleges that because hearing officers are hired as independent contractors for a single day, they have an incentive to rule in favor of the City to secure future employment. [1] ¶ 6. He also alleges that the City's power to assign cases to hearing officers and reassign them if the case continues to the next day creates a structural bias, along with the City's lack of a recusal mechanism for hearing officers accused of prejudice, and the City's failure to exercise oversight over refusals to recuse. Id. ¶¶ 7-8.
Shachter requests a declaration that the City's system of administrative hearings is unconstitutional and that all of its decisions are void, and a reversal of the hearing officer's decision. I interpret Shachter's pro se complaint to allege a federal due process claim under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, and a state-law claim for review of the administrative decision under the Illinois Administrative Review Act. 735 ILCS 5/3 101 et seq. This court has federal question jurisdiction over the constitutional claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.3 Supplemental jurisdiction exists over Shachter's state-law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
The Constitution requires the government to provide a process to prevent the arbitrary exercise of power when depriving an individual of "life, liberty, or property." U.S. Const. amends X, XIV. The correct, i.e. constitutional, amount of process dependson the private interest at stake, the risk of wrongful deprivation, and the cost to the government of additional procedural protections. Armstrong v. Daily, 786 F.3d 529, 545 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). The basic requirements are notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a decision by a neutral decisionmaker. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975). To prove a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must show he was deprived of a protected interest and that there were insufficient procedural protections surrounding that deprivation. Tucker v. City of Chicago, 907 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).4
Adjudicators are presumed to act with honesty and integrity. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47. To overcome the presumption, a plaintiff must show a "conflict of interest or some other specific reason for disqualification." Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982). Just because hearing officers are employed by the City does not mean they are biased in favor of the City. Amundsen v. Chicago Park Dist., 218 F.3d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). The part-time, at-will status of hearing officers does not compromise their ability to perform their duties, even when they depend on the City for secure employment and the City financially benefits from the fines they order. Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1352-53 (7th Cir. 1997). More must be alleged to show unconstitutional bias. Id. For example, Shachter does notallege that the hearing officers had a direct financial interest in the outcome of the cases. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (). Shachter does not allege that the hearing officers had competing municipal responsibilities, like generating revenue, which would tempt them to disregard neutrality. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).5 He does not allege the municipal department prosecuting the violation exercises "significant and disproportionate influence" over the hearing officer assigned to the case or the director of the Department of Administrative Hearings. Caperton v. A.T. Massey, 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009).6 He does not allege that the hearing officers both judged and prosecuted their cases, like in In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), or that they have some other stake that creates a conflict of interest. All that is alleged is that the officers are temporary workers for the City. That status is too tenuous to allege bias or the risk of bias. See Van Harken, 103 F.3d at 1352-53.7
Van Harken is about part-time, at-will hearing officers and not independent contractors hired by the day, but this distinction does not matter. Whether the Cityfires hearing officers at-will or decides not to rehire them, the City wields the same discretionary power over their future employment.8 The nonbinding California cases Shachter cites contradict circuit precedent and are unpersuasive.9 Finally, even though the maximum fine for uncut weeds was $1,100 more than the maximum fine for parking violations in Van Harken, the presumption of honesty and integrity applies regardless of the private interest at stake. Shachter does not show how the higher cost to him created a conflict of interest for the hearing officer. While the City of Chicago hires the administrative hearing officers, raises revenue from fines they order, and is always the plaintiff prosecuting the local violation, there is sufficient economic and bureaucratic separation to rely on the presumption that the hearing officers are not biased. Since the City's reassignment and recusal procedures only matter if there is bias, Shachter's two remaining procedural concerns are irrelevant.
Shachter fails to plausibly allege systemic unconstitutional bias at his administrative hearing, so I need not reach the question of the constitutional adequacy of his state-law remedies. Nevertheless, any final decision by a hearing officer is subject to judicial review in Illinois state court. Chi. Mun. Code § 2-14-102; 735 ILCS 5/3-104. Illinois courts can review allegations of bias and reverse the hearing officer's decision. See e.g. Cannici v. Village of Melrose Park, 2017 WL 11438613, at *3 (Ill.Cir.Ct. 2017), aff'd Cannici v. Village of Melrose Park, 433 Ill.Dec. 742, 755-56 (Ill.App.1 Dist. 2019) (citations omitted). The deferential standard of review is not controlling where the hearing officer is accused of impartiality. Michalowicz v. Village of Bedford Park, 528 F.3d 530, 535 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Comito v. Police Bd. of City of Chicago, 251 Ill.Dec. 9, 15-16 (Ill.App.1 Dist. 2000)). Claimants may also raise state and federal constitutional claims about the hearing in state court. Board of Educ. of Rich Tp. High School Dist. No. 227, Cook County v. Brown, 244 Ill.Dec. 68, 76-77 (Ill.App.1 Dist. 1999) (citing Howard v. Lawton, 22 Ill.2d 331, 333 (Ill. 1961)). If the administrative record is insufficient, the court may remand the case for further evidence. 735 ILCS 5/3-111(7). Thus, the post-deprivation process available to Shachter would provide him with the procedural protections he seeks and more: an independent inquiry into a prejudiced hearing officer, a procedure for additional factfinding, and the ability to raise new constitutional claims.
Shachter's motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) is denied. The City's argument about Shachter's post-deprivation remedies was notfrivolous. When adjudicator bias is the result of "random and unauthorized" conduct, adequate post-deprivation remedies at the hands of unbiased decisionmakers is sufficient due process. Michalowicz, 528 F.3d at 535 (citation omitted). In these instances, a plaintiff cannot allege a due process violation if he refuses to pursue adequate post-deprivation remedies. Id. at 536 (citation omitted).10...
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