Shackelford v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 20 June 1919 |
| Citation | 214 S.W. 788,185 Ky. 51 |
| Parties | SHACKELFORD ET AL. v. COMMONWEALTH. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
Rehearing Denied Sept. 19, 1919.
Appeal from Circuit Court, McLean County.
W. S Shackelford and J. E. Cowgill were convicted of obstructing justice, and they appeal. Reversed, with instructions.
Joe H Miller and R. Alexander, both of Calhoun, and Louis I Igleheart, of Owensboro, for appellants.
Chas H. Morris, Atty. Gen., and C. E. Smith, Commonwealth's Atty., of Hartford, for the Commonwealth.
Upon the trial of an indictment charging them with the crime of obstructing justice the appellants were found guilty. Shackelford's fine was fixed at $429.25 and 48 days in jail, and Cowgill was fined $221 and 23 days in jail, and to reverse the judgments entered pursuant to said verdicts this appeal has been prosecuted.
Shackelford was sheriff of McLean county, and Cowgill was a member of the jury that had been selected to try the case of Commonwealth v. Mans Gibson, for voluntary manslaughter. On the second day of the trial, and after the case had been submitted to the jury, the jury was placed in the custody of James Glenn, a deputy sheriff, who had been theretofore sworn during the trial and was ordered to keep the jurors together. Lodging had been provided for the jury in a room at the Capital Hotel, in the town of Calhoun, and between 10 and 11 o'clock on the night in question Shackelford went to the room occupied by the jurors and took with him certain musicians, and while the musical instruments were being played it is charged that Shackelford had a conversation with Cowgill in a corner of the room out of the hearing of the remainder of said jurors, and, after the musicians left, Shackelford took Cowgill into another room, where he was separated from the remainder of the jury and out of the presence, sight, and hearing of the remainder of said jury, and there remained for several minutes, and on account of this conduct they willfully and unlawfully obstructed the action of the McLean circuit court, then and there engaged in the Gibson trial.
The foregoing is the substance of the indictment, but for its length we would copy it in full. We are not advised as to the result of the Gibson trial.
One of the points urged for reversal is the error of the circuit court in overruling a demurrer to this indictment, and, having concluded the court did so err, it will be unnecessary for us to discuss the other points raised by appellants.
The phrase "obstructing justice" means impeding or obstructing those who seek justice in a court, or those who have duties or powers of administering justice therein. 29 Cyc. 1326.
By federal statute it is made an offense to impede or obstruct, by threats or violence, the due administration of justice in any United States court. U.S. Comp. St. § 10305. Under this statute, if the unlawful act, done with reference to a particular cause pending or contemplated to be brought before a United States court, does not obstruct the administration of justice therein, no offense is committed, although the evil intent of the unlawful act may militate against the administration of justice in some other cause. United States v. McLeod (C. C.) 119 F. 416; 29 Cyc. 1332.
The due course of justice means not only the due conviction and punishment, or the due acquittal and discharge, of an accused person as justice may require, but it also means the due course of proceedings in the administration of justice. By obstructing those proceedings public justice is obstructed. 8 R.C.L. 319.
In Gregory's Criminal Law, § 233, the author states:
As defined by the foregoing citations, we are satisfied the indictment under consideration was insufficient to charge appellants with the crime of obstructing justice.
It is defective in many respects. It does not charge that the conversation between the appellants pertained in any wise to any subject connected with the trial, as is prohibited by sections 245 and 246 of the Criminal Code.
As said in Canter v. Commonwealth, 176 Ky. 360, 195 S.W. 825:
"It has, however, never been held that to speak to a juror upon a subject not connected with the trial is a ground for a reversal of the verdict, or that such communication, when made in the presence of the officer in charge and the other jurors, has never been held to be of such a prejudicial character as to warrant setting aside the verdict of the jury."
Instead of a concert a card game was provided for the amusement of the jurors in the Canter Case; the jailer being an invited guest. A reversal was asked because the presence of the jailer violated section 2257, Ky. Stats., which provides:
"No sheriff or other officer shall converse with the jury, or any member thereof, upon any subject after they have been sworn, without leave of court."
Answering this point, the court says:
"This statute seems to be directed principally to the conduct of the officer, and is one of the safeguards which the law...
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