Shackleford v. Hamilton

• Decision Date: 26 March 1892
• Parties: Shackleford v. Hamilton.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

19 S.W. 5

93 Ky. 80

Shackleford v. Hamilton.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

March 26, 1892

Appeal from circuit court, Mason county.

"To be officially reported."

Action for breach of marriage promise by Lena M. Hamilton against James J. Shackleford. Demurrer to the answer sustained. Defendant appeals. Reversed.

PRYOR J.

Lena Hamilton, the plaintiff below, and the appellee in this court, instituted the present action in the Mason circuit, in which she seeks to recover damages for the violation of the promise on the part of the appellant to marry her in pursuance of an agreement to that effect, entered into in the month of December in the year 1887, by the terms of which they were to marry in the fall of 1888. That subsequently and by mutual consent, the marriage was postponed until the spring of 1889. No day was designated for the consummation of the contract, but it is alleged that in the month of April 1889, the defendant, against the consent of the plaintiff announced to her that he would not perform his contract at any time or place. That the plaintiff was willing and ready to perform her contract at any time or place the defendant might designate, and offered to do so, of which fact the defendant had notice. That he failed and refused to execute this contract or marriage with her, and still refuses. On the 19th of April, 1889, the plaintiff had served on the defendant the following notice: "Mr. James Shackleford You are hereby notified that I am ready, able, and willing to perform our contract of marriage, and to become your wife, at any time and place you may designate, and am now ready and propose to fix a time and place at which our engagement of marriage may be consummated. Very respectfully, Lena Hamilton." An answer was filed by the defendant, admitting the existence of the marriage contract, and his failure to consummate it, and presents in his answer the following defense, to which a demurrer was sustained, and the question here is: Was that defense a bar to the recovery as on the demurrer the facts alleged stand admitted? The defendant says that at the time he made the contract to marry the plaintiff he believed himself to be in good and sound health, and knew of no impediment to its consummation. That long prior to any contract of marriage with the plaintiff he contracted a loathsome disease, called "syphilis," and was treated for it by skilled physicians, until he was pronounced cured, and free from the malady. That this was long before he made the acquaintance of the plaintiff. That he consulted two reputable physicians, and one of whom made a thorough examination of his person, and advised him there was not the slightest evidence of the existence of the disease; and this was long before he thought of marrying the plaintiff, or any one else. That his regular physician who had treated his disease advised him that he was cured, and in a fit state to marry, and could safely do so. That after this time, and with the belief in good faith that the malady no longer existed, he made the contract with the plaintiff, induced by the love and affection he had for her. He says that after the engagement to marry, and without any fault on his part, symptoms of the disease again appeared, and is now upon him, and he is advised by his physicians that he ought not to marry. That prior to the bringing of this action he made known to the plaintiff the grounds of his refusal, etc. After sustaining the demurrer to the answer, the court below permitted testimony of defendant's condition to go before the jury in mitigation of damages, and the facts alleged in his answer are all sustained by the testimony of skilled physicians, who treated him, and that good faith prompted the conduct of the defendant in refusing to marry the plaintiff. He continued to visit the plaintiff regularly, with no evidence of any diminished affection, until the return of the symptoms of this loathsome disease, that one of the physicians states is in its worst form. When the engagement was broken, he said to the plaintiff, that he could make no explanation of his course except to say to her, "You would not want to marry a man who would be sure death to you." After the notice was served on him of the readiness of the appellee to fulfill her engagement, and before the action was instituted, he wrote to the plaintiff as follows: "I engaged in good faith to marry you, and I am surely the party most aggrieved by my inability to do so. The condition of affairs has caused me more suffering than you can possibly imagine, and doubtless more than you have felt; but I am compelled, as an honorable man, to save you from that fate that would await you as my wife. You can but respect me the more when you know all. I cannot tell you more, but I had a talk with your lawyer, Mr. Hutchins, and I refer you to him," etc. "I believed myself able to marry you, but recent developments have convinced me of my mistake, and it would be a crime where I to do so. Think of me and my misfortunes as kindly as you can. Respectfully, James Shackleford." We can well see how such a letter might be penned with a view of escaping responsibility in the way of damages, instead of being prompted by an honest conviction of right on the part of the defendant; but when his physicians testify as to facts-all of which are uncontradicted-that leave no doubt as to his good faith, and of his belief that he was permanently cured, long prior to his engagement with the plaintiff, the sole question arises as to the sufficiency of the answer, and we have alluded to the facts only because they stand uncontradicted and were offered in mitigation.

The court below entertaining the opinion that, as the defendant had entered into this marriage contract, he is bound for its breach, although it might have been the duty of the appellant, under the circumstances, to decline to execute it sustained the demurrer to the defense. That the contract was unconditional, and the defendant being able, at the time the promise was made, to perform the contract, he must either execute it, or become...