Shackleford v. State

• Decision Date: 07 May 2001
• Citation: 51 S.W.3d 125
• Parties: (Mo.App. W.D. 2001) Robert Shackleford, Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent. WD58865 0
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

51 S.W.3d 125 (Mo.App. W.D. 2001)

Robert Shackleford, Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent.

WD58865

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District

05/07/2001

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Jackson County, Hon. Justine E. Del Muro

Counsel for Appellant: Sara Weber

Counsel for Respondent: John Munson Morris and Adriane Crouse

Opinion Summary: Shackelford appeals the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief without evidentiary hearing, in which he claimed that his plea was rendered involuntary due to being misinformed by his plea counsel that he would not be paroled on his state conviction after completion of a federal sentence he was concurrently serving.

Division holds: (1) Even assuming the alleged misrepresentation occurred, Shackelford could not be prejudiced unless he could reasonably believe the statements of plea counsel.

(2) Shackelford could not reasonably believe that he would be paroled from his ten-year state sentence upon release from his forty-six month federal sentence.

(3) As the record before the motion court establishes that Shackelford was not prejudiced by the alleged misinformation provided by plea counsel, the trial court properly denied Shackelford's motion for postconviction relief without hearing.

Ronald R. Holliger, Judge

Appellant appeals the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion in which he sought relief from his conviction of one count of Robbery in the Second Degree, entered pursuant to a guilty plea entered on February 24, 1997. The motion court denied appellant's motion without an evidentiary hearing.

At the time of his guilty plea, Shackleford was serving a 46-month federal sentence for second-degree robbery. The terms of the plea agreement in this matter were that the charge against him would be reduced from the original charge of Robbery in the First Degree, and that Shackleford would be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 10 years, to run concurrently with the federal sentence previously imposed upon him. Subsequently, Shackleford completed his federal sentence on April 30, 1999, and, rather than being placed upon parole, was delivered to the Missouri Department of Corrections on May 1, 1999, to serve the remainder of his state sentence. His pro se Rule 24.035 motion was timely filed on July 15, 1999.

Appellant argues on appeal that the motion court erred in denying his Rule 24.035 motion without hearing, because his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Shackleford claims that his plea counsel misinformed him that he would not be required to serve any time on the state conviction upon completion of his federal sentence. He alleges that he would not have entered a guilty plea had he known that he would be transferred to state custody to serve the remainder of his state sentence after completion of his federal sentence.

This court's review of a lower court's ruling upon a Rule 24.035 motion is limited. The motion court's findings and conclusions are presumptively correct. Huth v. State, 976 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Mo. App. 1998). This court cannot reverse the lower court's judgment unless the findings of facts and conclusions of law reached by the lower court are clearly erroneous. Loudermilk v. State, 973 S.W.2d 551, 553 (Mo. App. 1998). That standard is met only when a review of the entire record leaves this court with a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. See Huth, 976 S.W.2d at 516.

In challenging a guilty plea, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are immaterial unless they impinge upon the knowledge of the pleading party and the voluntariness with which the plea was made. See Jenkins v. State, 9 S.W.3d 705, 708 (Mo. App. 1999). Further, for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to prevail, a two-part test must be satisfied. First, plea counsel must have "fail[ed] to exercise the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances." State v. Clay, 975 S.W.2d 121, 135 (Mo. banc 1998) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). Second, prejudice must be established through showing "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id.

Before reaching the merits of Shackleford's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, this court must first address the threshold issue of whether the motion court properly refused to conduct an evidentiary hearing upon appellant's motion for postconviction relief. A motion court is only required to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief when: "(1) movant alleges facts, not conclusions, which, if true, would entitle movant to relief; (2) the factual allegations are not refuted by the record; and, (3) the matters complained of prejudice the movant." Loudermilk, 973 S.W.2d at 553. To prevail, appellant bears the burden of proof to establish each element of this three-prong test.

Addressing the first prong of that test, a review of appellant's motion for postconviction relief reveals fact allegations that his plea counsel misled him concerning his eligibility for state parole upon completion of his federal sentence. As a general proposition, parole eligibility is a collateral circumstance of which a criminal defendant need not be advised to make that defendant's plea knowing and voluntary. See Jenkin, 9 S.W.3d at 712; State v. Abernathy, 764 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Mo.App.1989). However, if the defendant is grossly misinformed by his attorney regarding parole eligibility, and the defendant relies upon that misinformation, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be meritorious. Id. Here, Shackleford alleged an affirmative act of misinformation by his plea counsel and...