Shade v. Mo Hwy. & Tranp. Comm'n
| Decision Date | 19 June 2001 |
| Docket Number | WD58652 |
| Parties | Randall J. Shade, et al., Appellants, v. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission, et al., Respondents. WD58652 Missouri Court of Appeals Western District 0 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Ray County, Hon. Werner A. Moentmann
Counsel for Appellant: Philip R. Holloway
Counsel for Respondent: William D. Farrar and Jay L. Smith
Opinion Summary: Appellants appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission on Appellants' petition for damages from flooding on Appellants' property. Appellants based their case on an inverse condemnation claim against the Commission. Appellants contend the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Commission because: (1) the court erroneously applied a five-year statute of limitations, set forth in section 516.120 RSMo 1994, rather than the ten-year statute of limitations set forth by the Missouri Supreme Court in Doyle v. Kansas City and Southern Railway Company, 20 S.W. 970 (Mo. 1892); (2) the court erroneously held that the 1996 and 1998 floods did not establish new causes of action against the Commission, and that the statute of limitations began to run when the 1993 flood occurred; and (3) the court erroneously held that four subsequent purchasers had no cause of action for damages to their personal property as a result of the 1996 and 1998 floods.
Division II holds: (1) The trial court erred in finding that the statute of limitations on Appellants' real property inverse condemnation claim was five years. Neither the United States nor the Missouri constitutions contemplate a limitation period for real property inverse condemnation claims, and we find no specific statutory limitation period that applies to such claims. The statute of limitations in such cases must not be shorter than ten years, which is the time required for the entity with the power of eminent domain to obtain a prescriptive easement on the property.
(2) Because of our disposition of Appellants' first point on appeal, their second point is moot. We need not consider whether the flood events in 1996 and 1998 established new causes of action or whether the statute of limitations began to run when the 1993 flood occurred because under our holding in the first point, the statute of limitations has not run on Appellants' claims, regardless of whether those claims stemmed from the 1993, 1996 or 1998 floods.
(3) The trial court erred in finding that the subsequent purchasers had no cause of action because damages to personal property are compensable in an inverse condemnation proceeding. However, under section 516.120(4), the statute of limitations on such claims is five years.
Appellants1 appeal from the trial court's grant of the Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission's motion for summary judgment on Appellants' petition for damages resulting from flooding on Appellants' property. Appellants raise three points on appeal. First, Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Commission because the court erroneously held that the statute of limitations that applies to a cause of action for inverse condemnation is five years pursuant to section 516.120,2 and rather should have applied a statute of limitations of ten years, as set forth by the Missouri Supreme Court in Doyle v. Kansas City and Southern Railway Company, 20 S.W. 970 (Mo. 1892). Second, Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Commission because the trial court erroneously held that the flood events in 1996 and 1998 did not establish new causes of action against the Commission, and further erroneously held that the statute of limitations began to run when the 1993 flood event occurred. Third, Appellants claim that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Commission against the subsequent purchasers, Randall Shade, Jennie Shade, Jeffrey Haynes, and Joyce Haynes, holding that they have no cause of action, because the court failed to consider their cause of action for damages based on the personal property taken by the Commission as a result of the 1996 and 1998 flood events.
We reverse and remand.
This case arises from a construction project engaged in by the Respondent Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission on Missouri Highway 210 west of Fishing River and east of the City of Orrick in Ray County, Missouri. This reconstruction project by the Commission involved elevating a new portion of Missouri Highway 210 to a height that exceeded the elevation of old Missouri Highway 210. The permanent grading was completed and accepted on April 10, 1987.
Appellants Tula D. Jeffries, Robert D. Claypole, Doris L. Claypole, Edgar Lee Easley, Lola L. Easley, and Randall L. Easley were the owners of real property adjacent to the Commission's right of way and the new construction of Missouri Highway 210.
On August 12, 1993, Appellants' property adjacent to the reconstruction of Missouri Highway 210 was flooded under a substantial amount of water, and Appellants suffered substantial damage in personal property and real property.
On April 9, 1994, Tula D. Jeffries sold her property to Randall J. Shade and Jennie A. Shade.
On June 17, 1996, Appellants' property adjacent to the reconstruction of Missouri Highway 210 was flooded under a substantial amount of water, and Appellants suffered substantial damage in personal property and real property.
On May 22, 1997, Robert D. Claypole and Doris L. Claypole sold their real property to Jeffrey D. Haynes and Joyce A. Haynes.
On October 4, 1998, there was a third flood, which put Appellants' property under a substantial amount of water and caused substantial damage to Appellants' personal property and real property.
Appellants filed a petition for damages on February 17, 1999, and subsequently amended that petition on July 12, 1999. Appellants' lawsuit was pursued under a theory of inverse condemnation against the Commission, alleging that the reconstruction of Missouri Highway 210 materially changed and altered the flow of surface water from Appellants' property and property surrounding Appellants' property. Appellants further alleged that the material change in surface water by the Commission's reconstruction project resulted in the flooding of Appellants' property on August 12, 1993, June 17, 1996, and October 4, 1998. Appellants further alleged that the change in the flow of surface water by the Commission was unreasonable and constituted a wrongful appropriation of Appellants' property in violation of Article I, section 26 of the Constitution of Missouri.
On July 19, 1999, the Commission filed its answer to Appellants' amended petition, raising the affirmative defense that the statute of limitations, section 516.120, barred Appellants' cause of action.
On July 28, 1999, Appellants filed a motion to strike the paragraphs of the Commission's answer setting forth the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense.
The issues were briefed and argued before the court on August 20, 1999. The court denied Appellants' motion to strike the paragraphs of the Commission's answer setting forth the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations. The Commission filed a motion for summary judgment as to each count of Appellants' first amended petition for damages. On April 26, 2000, the trial court entered its order granting the Commission's motion for summary judgment on each count of Appellants' petition. This appeal follows.
Summary judgment will be affirmed on appeal if this court determines that no genuine issues of material fact exist and the movant has a right to judgment as a matter of law. Bryan v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 963 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Mo.App. W.D. 1998). "Appellate review of the propriety of summary judgment is de novo." Id. We view the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered, and that party is afforded all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. Id.
The first point on appeal is that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Commission because the court erroneously held that the statute of limitations that applies to a cause of action for inverse condemnation is five years pursuant to section 516.120, and rather should have applied a statute of limitations of ten years, as set forth by the Missouri Supreme Court in Doyle v. Kansas City and Southern Railway Company, 20 S.W. 970 (Mo. 1892).
The trial court held that the statute of limitations that applies to the inverse condemnation claims in this case bars Appellants from recovery because more than five years passed from the date of the first flood and the filing of Appellants' petition for damages. The main issue to be decided is what statute of limitations applies to inverse condemnation actions.
Appellants contend that the trial court's reliance on section 516.120 is erroneous, and the ten-year statute of limitations set forth in Doyle is the correct one. In Doyle v. Kansas City and Southern Railway Company, 20 S.W. 970 (Mo. 1892), a railroad constructed a road across the plaintiffs' property, damaging it. The plaintiffs brought an action against the railroad seeking to recover the value of the land taken by the railroad for a right of way, and for damages to the residue of the land. Doyle, 20 S.W. at 970. The trial court found that the statute of limitations for the plaintiffs' action was five years. Id. at 971. The supreme court disagreed, finding that the action, if successful, would vest in the railroad an easement in the land, as in a normal condemnation proceeding. Id. The court held that "the five-years bar, which may be appropriately invoked in simple actions of trespass, does not apply, and cannot apply, to ...
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